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COUNTERINSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA:

A US NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 1958-1966

By

Dennis M. Rempe

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty
of the University of Miami
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Coral Gables, Florida

May 2002

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COUNTERINSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA:

A US NATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE 1958-1966

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Counterinsurgency in Colombia: (May 2002)
A US National Security Perspective 1958-1966

Abstract of a dissertation at the University of Miami.

Dissertation supervised by Professor Bruce Michael Bagley.
No. of pages in text. (186)

This dissertation analyzes the key role played by the United States in the development of Colombia's internal security structures during the latter phase of the *Violencia* era, 1958-1966. It utilizes Realism as the primary framework of analysis to understand US security strategies designed to neutralize radical actors and promote stability, democratization, and institutional reform in Colombia.

The first chapter sets the international context, focusing on the development of US internal security strategies during the Cold War, detailing the response of US policymakers to the threat of communist subversion and revolutionary warfare in the Third World. Chapter two concentrates on the internal dynamics of Colombian society during the *Violencia* period, providing the domestic political context in which US-Colombian security relations evolved.

Chapter three details the origin of US internal security policy in Colombia, examining the critical role of a CIA-fielded counterinsurgency team in reorienting Colombia's security forces towards an internal security mission. The last chapter examines the efficacy of US-Colombian collaborative counterinsurgency efforts during the early National Front period.

This historical analysis draws several conclusions. National security interests led US policymakers to privilege stability over democratization and social reform in Latin

America. In Colombia this translated into short-term success in containing that nation's extensive violence problem through effective counterinsurgency operations. Unfortunately this was not matched with a long-term commitment to reforming Colombia's social, political, economic, and institutional infrastructure.

Failure to resolve the violence problem during this earlier period has important implications for US decision-makers today. Overly concentrated on a militarized approach to the 'war on drugs,' policymakers must broaden their focus to support state-stability and strengthen democratization in order to achieve widespread human security in Colombia.

For Marcia, Rachael, and Rebecca

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In writing this dissertation there are several individuals to whom I owe a particular debt of gratitude. I am especially grateful to Dr. Bruce Bagley, my advisor. To my mind the word 'advisor' does not properly capture the rich relationship we have established over the course of this work. I prefer '*Doktor Vater*' – literally, the Doctor's Father – which more fully apprehends his continual support, expert advice, and friendship. I will always recall our time together with great fondness.

Also, I am indebted to Professor J. Foster Collins and Drs. Felipe Agüero, William Smith, Michael Shin, and Russell Ramsey for generously sharing their time and knowledge and for their helpful, critical appraisals of this study. To Dr. Ramsey I am particularly indebted as his work in the field of counterinsurgency in Colombia inspired my own interest. In addition, my sincere thanks to Mr. Steve Ralph of the School of International Studies for opening his home to me and for his unerring advice and friendship these past years.

I also wish to express my appreciation to Ms. Regina Greenwell of the Lyndon B. Johnson Library; Ms. Carol Leadenham, Mr. Ronald Bulatoff, and Mr. Dale Read of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace; Mr. David J. Haight and the staff of the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; and the staffs of the US Army Center of Military History, the US National Archives, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center-US Army Special Operations Command Archives, and the National Security Archives. All were invaluable in facilitating my research.

I would like to offer a special note of thanks to the many *amigos* whose work on revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency has advanced and informed my own. I am

especially grateful to Dr. Thomas Marks, Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, Mr. William Krauthammer, Dr. Max Manwaring, GEN Alvaro Valencia Tovar, COL Joseph Nunez, Dr. David Spencer, LTC Robert Gordon, LTC Dan Tomlinson, MAJ Greg Metzgar, and Mr. Chanley Mohney for their valuable critiques of this study.

To my parents, Irene and Günther, my brother Ron, sister Nicole, and their families; to my in-laws Bette and Bland and the extended Woofter clan; and to the Stürmer family, I once again owe a tremendous debt of gratitude for their unfailing support throughout this academic endeavor. I am deeply saddened that my father-in-law, Bland, passed away before seeing its final completion. I dedicate this work to my wife Marcia and daughters Rachael and Rebecca, with love. Only they know the true cost – in time spent apart – that this dissertation represents.

Dennis M. Rempe
February 04, 2002

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INTRODUCTION

Issues surrounding internal security make Colombia the most complex foreign policy problem facing US policymakers in the Western Hemisphere today.[1] Narcotics trafficking, guerrilla warfare, and collusion between drug cartels and insurgent groups into a 'narco-insurgent nexus'[2] have raised concerns that Colombian democracy is disintegrating, that the nation is ripe for 'dirty war,' and that the fragmentation of the state might require US intervention to restore stability.[3]

Remarkably, despite these considerable difficulties, Colombia has seen much worse this century. Modern problems evolved from the dynamics of a period in Colombian history known simply as *la Violencia* (the Violence)[4] – a period marked by terror and near anarchy in the countryside, partisan political warfare, and finally military dictatorship in its early phases (1946 through 1957); guerrilla-bandit violence and the rise of Colombia's contemporary insurgent movements during its 'last and most obscure phase,' 1958 through 1966.[5]

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[1] Elements of this dissertation have been approved and published. See Dennis M. Rempe, 'Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics: US Counterinsurgency Efforts in Colombia, 1959-1965,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 6/3 (Winter 1995), pp.304-27; Rempe, 'An American Trojan Horse? Eisenhower, Latin America, and the Development of US Internal Security Policy 1954-1960,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10/1 (Spring 1999), pp.34-64; and Rempe, 'The Origin of Internal Security in Colombia: Part I-A CIA Special Team Surveys *La Violencia*, 1959-1960,' *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10/3 (Winter 1999), pp.24-61.

[2] Max G. Manwaring, 'Guerrillas, Narcotics, and Terrorism: Old Menaces in a New World' in Richard L. Millet and Michael Gold-Bliss (eds.) *Beyond Praetorianism: The Latin American Military in Transition* (Coral Gables, FL: North-South Center Press, 1996), p.46.

[3] James L. Zackrison and Eileen Bradley, 'Colombian Sovereignty Under Siege,' *Strategic Forum* Number 112 (May 1997), pp.1-6. INTERNET: www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/strforum/forum112.html.

[4] Charles Bergquist, 'Colombian Violence in Historical Perspective' in Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñeranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez (eds.) *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1992), p.4. This volume is one of the best English-language sources for understanding both historical and contemporary aspects of the violence problem in Colombia.

[5] Ricardo Peñeranda, 'Surveying the Literature on the Violence,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, pp.294, 304.

Scholars have conducted research on a wide range of topics from the Violence period including its remote origins and direct antecedents; social and cultural conditions conducive to violence; legal, religious, economic, and political themes; general surveys and specialized topics focusing on individual bandit or guerrilla leaders; sociological and behavioral modeling theories; and a diverse selection of military case studies. The result is 'the most voluminous set of studies on a single subject ever seen in Colombian historiography.'[6]

Missing from this vast array of research is an examination of US counterinsurgency policy during the latter phase of the *Violencia* era – a policy that orchestrated the containment of Colombia's violence problem and concomitantly established that nation's modern internal security state. This thesis investigates the key role played by the United States in constructing Colombia's unconventional warfare capabilities, analyzing how US policy initiatives expedited the ability of Colombia's security forces to undertake offensive counterinsurgency and psychological warfare operations in order to destroy bandit-guerrilla organizations that arose from the Violence.

By specifically analyzing the development and impact of US counterinsurgency policy on low-intensity conflict in Colombia and by utilizing previously untapped diplomatic, military, and intelligence records, this work addresses a gap in the historiography of the period. Indeed it establishes the unique role played by the United States in advancing the development of all aspects of Colombia's internal security

[6] Ibid., pp.294. Still useful as a bibliographical survey is Russell W. Ramsey, 'Critical Bibliography on *La Violencia* in Colombia,' *Latin American Research Review* 8 (Spring 1973), pp.3-44.

infrastructure in order to contain 'one of the world's most extensive and complex internal wars of this century.'[7]

US National Security Policy: The Early Cold War Context

A variety of complex internal and external developments precipitated the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Perceptions shaped by mistrust, internal political pressures, and ideological differences over the Soviet search for security and the US concern with communist expansion all combined to hinder the resolution of differences.

In 1946 George F. Kennan, American chargé d'affaires in Moscow, analyzed the threat posed by the USSR in an eight thousand word telegram that had an extraordinary effect on officials in Washington. In the telegram Kennan described a Soviet worldview that split capitalism and socialism into two irreconcilable camps where the possibility for compromise and peaceful coexistence did not exist. The USSR, Kennan concluded, sought to increase its power and influence, while dividing Western nations through a communist international directed by Moscow.[8]

The timely arrival of this analysis coupled with Soviet actions in Eastern Europe had a profound impact on the conduct of American diplomacy. The administration of President Harry S. Truman, using the unchallenged economic power and leadership position of the US in the post-war world, sought to avoid past mistakes by seeking security through engagement rather than isolation.

Policymakers concerned themselves with reviving world trade through the Bretton Woods system, promoting self-determination globally, and establishing the United

[7] Ramsey, 'Critical Bibliography on *La Violencia* in Colombia,' p.3.

Nations as an effective collective security organization. Finally, as the USSR transformed itself from ally to potential enemy, they also felt obliged to balance against this power and concentrate on containment of the Soviet threat – first in Europe and then throughout the world – through the development of global anticommunist security alliances.[9]

To this end Kennan identified the contours of what would become US policy throughout the early Cold War period. There are 'only five power centers of industrial and military power in the world which are important to us from the standpoint of national security,' Kennan declared. Of these five – the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan – only one was in 'hostile hands.' Therefore 'the primary interest of the United States in world affairs . . . was to see to it that no others fell under such control.'

As one US scholar has noted, given that 'harmony' was not an achievable policy between the two superpowers, Kennan's analysis offered decision-makers a means of achieving stable relations 'through a careful balancing of power, interests, and antagonisms' in which 'there need be no conflict between the demands of security and those of principle, provided the first were understood as necessarily preceding the second.'[10]

The Truman administration responded to these new security demands by reorganizing its foreign policy apparatus, merging the State Department and the Foreign Service and

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[8] John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp.283-84, 302-03.
[9] Ibid., pp.353-61; School of Inter-American Affairs, University of New Mexico, 'Study No.1: Post-World War II Political Developments in Latin America' in US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States-Latin American Relations-Compilation of Studies*, Document No.125, 86th Congress (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960), p.37. Hereafter cited as US Senate Document No.125.

instituting the Policy Planning Staff. This reorganization culminated in the National Security Act of 1947, which established the Department of Defense (DOD), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Security Council (NSC).

Earlier that same year an urgent appeal from the governments of Greece and Turkey for financial and economic assistance was the catalyst from which the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan developed. The Truman Doctrine committed the United States 'to aid all governments facing domestic leftist insurrections,'[11] while the Marshall Plan – a vast economic aid program designed to stimulate European economic recovery – reestablished prosperity and political stability in Western Europe by 1950. These actions symbolized the American response to the Soviet challenge of global expansion and represented a clear hardening of the US position to Soviet opportunism.[12]

As the Cold War progressed, hostility and mistrust between the US and USSR grew, driven by a series of crises and confrontations over Berlin, the formation of NATO, the victory of Mao Tse-tung's communist forces in China, Soviet development of an atomic bomb, and especially, the Korean War. Tense US-Soviet relations remained the key issue in 1953 for newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower even after the armistice agreement in Korea. Containment persisted as US policy, though Eisenhower instituted a 'New Look' military strategy that coupled a nuclear-based threat of 'massive retaliation' to a pared conventional force structure.

A third element of Eisenhower's strategy was the growing use of covert action against regimes perceived as hostile to US interests, including Iran in 1953, Guatemala in

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[10] All quotes John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp.29-32.
[11] Robert D. Schulzinger, *US Diplomacy Since 1900* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1998), p.208.

1954, and Indonesia in 1958. Pressured by the growing danger of revolutionary warfare and 'wars of national liberation' the administration began to refocus its attention towards 'peripheral' nations of the Third World in an effort to counter communist subversion. This proceeded with renewed urgency after Fidel Castro's successful revolution in Cuba in 1959. The second Eisenhower mandate ended with revived tensions between the two superpowers after the Soviets shot down an American U-2 espionage plane. Eisenhower's denials of spying, followed by reversals and then a refusal to apologize, effectively ended a planned US-Soviet summit.

President John F. Kennedy took office at the end of the second Eisenhower mandate determined to renew US foreign and national security policy. Instead of 'massive retaliation' the Kennedy administration touted 'flexible response:' a strategy that would bring to bear against opponents the full range of US capabilities through a 'controlled and graduated application of integrated political, military, and diplomatic power.' This strategy later met with considerable success in direct confrontations with the USSR over Berlin and the Cuban Missile Crisis, but failed – at terrible cost – in Vietnam.

As well, in an effort to address rising discontent in the Third World the Kennedy administration sought to realign US interests with 'progressive' elements in Latin America, Asia, and Africa in order to support evolutionary change. Although the administration did not shrink from the possible need to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations, it envisioned that this 'would be intervention on behalf of diversity, not in opposition to it.'[13] Its disastrous attempt to overthrow the Castro regime followed later by its actions in the Congo and Southeast Asia belied the administration's lofty rhetoric,

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[12] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp.21-22.
[13] Ibid., pp.201-03, 231, and 238.

reflecting instead a continuing commitment to Cold War containment and balance of power policies.

Following Kennedy's assassination the administration of his successor, President Lyndon B. Johnson, was marked by turbulence. Internationally the administration continued the interventionist policies of its predecessor, invading the Dominican Republic on the thin premise of stopping a 'Communist-inspired' coup. But it was Johnson's decision to widen US involvement in Vietnam that caused the greatest international and domestic upheaval. Facing both a tenacious enemy, covertly support by China and the Soviet bloc, and mounting domestic opposition to US involvement in the war, Vietnam would ultimately consume the Johnson presidency.[14]

US Security Policy in Latin America: An Overview

Although clearly not considered a 'core' area under Kennan's early Cold War analysis, Latin America did figure in US security calculations, growing in importance until, as one scholar has recently noted, Kennedy considered it 'the most dangerous area in the world.'[15]

As early as 1938 the US began to establish military missions throughout Latin America and entered into various cooperative military agreements in response to the growing threat posed by National Socialism. After the defeat of the Axis powers, American efforts to contain Soviet expansionism brought a host of new policy initiatives – the Chapultapec Act of 1945; the Rio Treaty of 1947; and the establishment of the Organization of American States in 1948 – that recalled the Monroe Doctrine and reaffirmed the Western Hemisphere as a US sphere of influence during the Cold War.

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[14] This synopsis of early Cold War history draws upon Schulzinger, *US Diplomacy Since 1900*, pp.201-288.

As US strategy for the region evolved from hemisphere defense to internal security under Eisenhower – a transformation that gained urgency after the Cuban Revolution – a dual-track US policy emerged that sought to couple security and development in response to the threat of communist internal subversion. On the one hand internal security policies were employed to contain radical and revolutionary groups and preserve stability. Conjunctively, promoting democratic governance, economic growth, and nation-building were seen as key elements in fostering a progressive, evolutionary path to development. This bifurcated anticommunist policy reached its primacy in Latin America under Kennedy and Johnson as counterinsurgency and the Alliance for Progress became the principal means of enforcing order and supporting social reform.[16]

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[15] See Stephen G. Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

[16] John Saxe-Fernández, 'A Latin American Perspective on the Latin American Military and Pax Americana' in Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr. (eds.) *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America* (Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press, 1978), pp.162-63. Other works that explore the security-development paradigm in Latin America include Leslie Bethell, 'From the Second World War to the Cold War: 1944-1954,' pp.41-70 and Tony Smith, 'The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s,' pp.71-89 both in Abraham F. Lowenthal (ed.) *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America-Themes and Issues* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1991); Roderic Ai Camp (ed.), *Democracy in Latin America: Patterns and Cycles* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1996); Lars Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp.332-366; Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp.3-33; and Frederico G. Gil, *Latin American-United States Relations* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Publishers, 1971), pp.189-265.

For a critique of both Eisenhower's and Kennedy's policies toward Latin America see Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America.* On US foreign policy under Eisenhower see Blanche Wiesen Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower: A Divided Legacy* (Garden City, NY: Double Day & Company, Inc., 1981).

Regarding US counterinsurgency policy two older works that remain useful are Willard F. Barber and C. Neale Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power: Counterinsurgency and Civic Action in Latin America* (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1966) and Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present* (New York, NY: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1977). For excellent current works vis-à-vis Latin America see Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991); and Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).

On Latin American military issues see Russell W. Ramsey, *Guardians of the Other Americas: Essays on the Military Forces of Latin America* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1997); J. Samuel

Nowhere was this dual-track policy more in evidence than in Colombia during the latter phase of the *Violencia* period. It is for this reason that Colombia provides such a useful case study, given that successive US administrations between 1958 and 1966 came to see that nation as a showpiece for the security and development model.

Bilateral relations after World War II centered primarily upon the larger issues of hemisphere defense, development of conventional armed forces, the Korean War, trade and investment, military assistance, and the search for political stability. But in October 1959 the Eisenhower administration shifted its focus in Colombia towards internal security. A high-powered special survey team jointly comprised, perhaps for the first time in Latin America, of military and civilian counterinsurgency experts with experience in South East Asia, went to that nation at the request of the Colombian government to survey its internal security problems and make recommendations towards solving the violence problem.

Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1998); Abraham F. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch (eds.), *Armies and Politics in Latin America* (New York, NY: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc., 1986); and Brian Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1999).

For a critical assessment of US counterinsurgency policies see D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of US Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). For more vociferous critics see Alexander George (ed.) *Western State Terrorism* (New York, NY: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1991); Noam Chomsky, *Turning the Tide: The US and Latin America* (New York, NY: Black Rose Books, 1987); Michael McClintock, *Instruments of Statecraft: US Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism 1940-1990* (New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1992); and Martha K. Huggins, *Political Policing: The United States and Latin America* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998). On the issue of human rights see Schoultz, *Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

For more general works on counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare see Walter Laqueur, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical and Critical Study* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998); Anthony James Joes, *Modern Guerrilla Insurgency* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992); Joes, *Guerrilla Warfare: A Historical, Biographical, and Bibliographical Sourcebook* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996); Paul B. Rich and Richard Stubbs (eds.), *The Counterinsurgent State: Guerrilla Warfare and State Building in the Twentieth Century* (London, UK: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997); and Benjamin R. Beede, *Intervention and Counterinsurgency: An Annotated Bibliography of the Small Wars of the United States, 1898-1984* (New York, NY: Garland Publishers, 1985).

Thereafter, US-Colombia policy initiatives that both Kennedy and Johnson articulated, while greatly expanded, had considerable continuity to those established under Eisenhower. Ultimately the goal of American economic and security assistance to Colombia was to 'further the cause of social reform' and make that nation 'a model of peaceful revolution.' Although this policy did not achieve wide-ranging reforms, it did, in the view of US decision-makers, restore a 'semblance of order and stability to Colombia' by the mid-1960s.[17]

History and Theory:

Towards an Analytical Framework of US National Security Policy

The basic tenants espoused by Kennan in the development of post-World War II US national security policy – balance of power, national interests, and the prioritizing of those interests – is the language, theoretically speaking, of realism. This realist paradigm – that states are the key actors in the international system and decision-making elites as 'rational actors' conduct foreign policy: that international politics is defined by the balance of power between and national interests of sovereign states; and that security outranks all other issues on the foreign policy agenda, with threats to national security warranting full recourse to force[18] – formed a 'distinctive mental orientation'[19] that policymakers utilized to frame the security interests of the United States during the Cold War period.

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[17] All quotes William O. Walker III, 'The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: US Drug Policy and Colombian State Stability, 1978-1997' in H. Richard Friman and Peter Andreas (eds.) *The Illicit Global Economy and State Power* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1999), p.147.

[18] Bruce M. Bagley and Juan G. Tokatlian, 'Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of US-Latin American Drug Policies' in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas (eds.) *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s: Beyond the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p.216; Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.38.

[19] Schoultz, *Beneath the United States: A History of US Policy Toward Latin America*, p.xvii.

This thesis uses realism as its primary framework of analysis to understand the formation and implementation of a US counterinsurgency policy in Colombia that sought to marginalize radical actors and promote institutional reform and democratization. In the first instance, realism's value as an interpretative tool lies in its ability to offer decision-makers an 'intuitively plausible' means by which they might comprehend and manage 'potential threats to the security of their states.'[20] More importantly for this study, realism was the 'intellectual creed' of the US foreign policy establishment after World War II, providing 'the categories by which they assessed the external world and the state of mind with which they approached prevailing problems.'[21]

As a means of understanding US-Latin American relations the realist paradigm is a particularly useful analytical tool, for as one scholar has declared, 'if one wants to understand the core of United States policy toward Latin America, one studies security.'[22] This is especially evident when studying hemispheric relations this past century given the preponderance of US political, economic, and military power, and the attendant ability of American policymakers to impose their geostrategic will on the region.

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[20] Robert O. Keohane, 'Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics' in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.8.

[21] Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations*, pp.27-28. Intellectual influences claimed by the realist school include Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes. Key modern works within the realist and neorealist tradition include E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (London, UK: Macmillan, 1939); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York, NY: Knopf, 1948); Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored: Castlereagh, Metternich, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1959); and Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

Contemporary works that analyze the ongoing relevance of realism to the post-Cold War era include Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Millar (eds.), *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995) and Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (eds.), *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999).

[22] Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America*, p.xi.

Realism as a theoretical construct provides an important means, at the state-to-state level, by which to analyze the impact of US counterinsurgency strategy on Colombia. However, given the state-centric nature of this paradigm and its weakness in addressing issues within the 'domestic structures of states,'[23] this dissertation also draws upon theoretical models[24] that are able to furnish a greater understanding of the internal dynamics of Colombian society during the *Violencia* period. This balances the importance of US-Colombian interstate relations with that of other actors inside the confines of the 'black box' of the state, eliciting a better understanding of the domestic social, political, economic, and security context of the violence problem.

In sum, by utilizing a variegated theoretical framework this dissertation attempts to show how, within the international Cold War context, US policymakers viewed the threat of communist subversion and revolutionary warfare in the Third World and, more specifically, how they responded to this perceived threat in Latin America. From there it investigates the major internal factors that contributed to or further fomented *la Violencia* in Colombia and how the US view of the violence problem affected the formation and implementation of counterinsurgency policy in that country.

Finally, this dissertation analyzes how successful – from both a short and long-term perspective – this collaborative US-Colombian approach to counterinsurgency was, drawing broad conclusions and implications for the current crisis in Colombia. Overall

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[23] Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, 'The Political Economy of Colombian-US Narcodiplomacy: A Case Study of Colombian Foreign Policy Decision-Making, 1978-90,' Ph.D. Thesis (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University, 1991), p.11.

[24] See for instance Jack A. Goldstone, 'Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation,' *World Politics* 32/3 (April 1980), pp.425-53 and Goldstone (ed.), *Revolutions: Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical Studies* (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994); Vendulka Kubálková (ed.), *Foreign Policy in a Constructed World* (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, Inc., 2001); Vendulka Kubálková, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World* (Armonk, NY: M.E.Sharpe, Inc.,

this case study of Colombia offers a useful working model by which scholars might investigate the impact of US counterinsurgency policy on other Latin American nations during the Cold War and extrapolate implications for current US security policy in that region.

Methodology: Research and Data; Thesis Overview

Research and Data

This thesis deploys a wide range of sources to support a case study of the development and impact of US counterinsurgency policy in Colombia. Extensive archival research has yielded primary material from a variety of institutions. Presidential libraries have proved a considerable document source for this project. The Dwight D. Eisenhower library was particularly useful for data related to the origins of US internal security policy, while the Lyndon B. Johnson library was a fruitful source for documentation related to diplomatic and military relations between the two nations as counterinsurgency policy became doctrine in the early 1960s. Further support for understanding these developments, particularly for the Kennedy period, was gleaned from the Low-Intensity Conflict Document Collection at the National Security Archives in Washington, D.C.

Any effort to understand the impact of the so-called *Violencia* era in Colombia must begin with a study of the extensive historiography of secondary sources. Close evaluation of these sources is supplemented with documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series and by numerous studies from the Special Operations Research Office (SORO), the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS), and

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1998); and Graham T. Allison, 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,' *The American Political Science Review* LXIII/3 (September 1969), pp.689-718.

papers from various US military institutes including the Air War College (Air University), US Army War College (USAWC), US Army Center of Military History (CMH) Archives, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center-US Army Special Operations Command (JFKSWC-USASOC) Archives, and the National Archives.

A detailed view of the origin of US-Colombian internal security strategy is offered in the Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers at the archives of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. The initial request for declassification of Colombia-related material within the Bohannan Papers began in October 1992 during my MA studies at the University of Calgary. These Papers provide a unique perspective into the workings of a CIA special team sent to Colombia to assess the violence problem and make recommendations toward its solution.

Finally, operations reports from US and Colombian civic action, counterinsurgency, and intelligence teams as well as interviews with one of the principle architects of Colombia's internal security strategy from the 1958-66 period, General (ret.) Alvaro Valencia Tovar, are used to analyze and evaluate the efficacy of US policy.

Thesis Overview

Relations between the United States and Colombia in the field of national security began to expand as a result of World War II and Colombia's geostrategic proximity to the Panama Canal. This relationship intensified as the US and USSR engaged in cold war. While Colombian policy makers supported US global strategy, the internal crisis known as *la Violencia* consumed them for almost two decades after the war. It was within the context of this violence that the US-Colombian security relationship developed.

Chapter one focuses on the international Cold War context and the development of US internal security policy in response to the threat of communist subversion and revolutionary warfare in the Third World. A coherent, global US internal security strategy began under Eisenhower in December of 1954 with NSC Action No.1290d. Through Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), a 1290d Working Group was established composed of personnel from State, Defense, International Co-operation Administration (ICA), and CIA. Their task was to develop and maintain effective internal security forces in nations – primarily in the Third World – threatened by communist subversion. Later redesignated as the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), six of the original 22 nations targeted for assistance were in Latin America.

US internal security policy in the other American republics, as elsewhere in the developing world, focused on influencing host nation legislative and judicial systems and aiding police, military, information, and intelligence agencies to act against communist infiltration and subversion. Implementation of OISP policy in Latin America, however, met with considerable resistance. Critics in both Latin America and the United States assailed the Eisenhower administration for its support of authoritarian regimes that used anticommunism as an excuse to repress legitimate opposition groups. Furthermore, Latin Americans believed that the administration overestimated the ability of the Soviet Union to influence indigenous communist forces in the region and feared that OIS programs would be used as a 'Trojan Horse' to penetrate their existing security services.[25]

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[25] For original 'Trojan Horse' reference concerning Latin American fears of US internal security policy see Albert R. Haney-Deputy Assistant to the Director for Security Affairs, International Co-operation Administration, Observations and Suggestions Concerning the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP)-14 June 1957, White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB014.12 File#5(2) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (Abilene, Kansas: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL)), p.7.

Reacting to these concerns, critics in the US Congress opposed administration efforts to increase military assistance spending to regimes in the region that lacked democratic support. In June 1958, that year's Mutual Security Act passed with the so-called 'Morse Amendment' – named after its sponsor, Senator Wayne Morse – specifically prohibiting the use of Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds for internal security purposes in Latin America without special presidential determination.

But the practical effect of the Morse Amendment was lost after the Cuban Revolution in January 1959. Fearing that *Fidelista*-style communist insurgency would spread throughout the hemisphere, aided and supported by the new revolutionary government in Havana, the Eisenhower administration revitalized its efforts to establish OIS Programs in the region. Colombia, with its geostrategic proximity to both Cuba and the Panama Canal and a newly restored, democratic government seeking help to overcome its violence problem, became a showpiece for US internal security policy in Latin America.

Chapter two focuses on the internal crisis in Colombia brought on by the murder Gaitán and the ensuing *Bogotazo*. The roots of Colombia's violence problem lay within its social, political, and economic structures. Conflict over land, vast disparities of wealth, society-wide political antagonisms between Liberals and Conservatives, and a fundamental inability within that nation's institutional structures to adapt to the processes of modernization, fuelled increasing levels of violence.

Generally speaking the *Violencia* era is broken down into four periods.[26] Increasing political instability characterized Phase I (1946-9 April 1948) as the Liberal party under

[26] Ramsey, 'Critical Bibliography on *La Violencia* in Colombia,' pp.3-4; James L. Zackrison, '*La Violencia* in Colombia: An Anomaly in Terrorism,' *Conflict Quarterly* 9/4 (Fall 1989), pp.6-7. See also Russell W. Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis (Gainesville, FL: University of

Alberto Lleras Camargo split its left and right wing constituencies, losing power to a minority Conservative government led by Mariano Ospina Pérez. Out of power for nearly 16 years, the Conservatives utilized the new opportunity to fill patronage positions throughout the country with party supporters, exacerbating existing political enmities. The assassination of Gaitán on 9 April 1948 produced the *Bogotazo*, the most visible expression of these simmering internal tensions.

Phase II (*Bogotazo*-13 June 1953) saw the bloodiest period of insurrection, with guerrilla warfare spreading in Colombia from the Llanos into Tolima. Both Liberal and Conservative *campesinos* organized into guerrilla self-defense groups in rural areas to protect themselves against partisan attacks. As the Conservative government lost control over the situation, partisan use of the National Police and to some extent of the Army increased, tarnishing those institutions and further mobilizing the Liberal peasantry against the ruling party.[27] As violence reached unprecedented levels, General Gustavo

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Florida, 1970). This work is published in Spanish as *Guerrilleros y Soldados* (Bogotá, Colombia: Tercer Mundo Editores. 2000 [Second Edition]).

[27] Report of the Colombia Survey Team, Part I-Colombian Survey, April 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 11, File #-Part I (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace), Chapter 2-The Violence Problem, 2-8 thru 13; Ramsey, 'Critical Bibliography on *La Violencia* in Colombia,' p.4. Hereafter the following are cited as Bohannan Papers Hoover Institution Archives (HIA); Report of the Colombia Survey Team (RCST); Colombian Survey (CS); Recommendations for Colombian Action (RCA); Recommendations for US Action (RUS).

The basic report of the Colombia Survey Team is broken into three parts. Part I details the actual survey of the Colombian situation from October through December of 1959 and includes a preface and nine chapters: Chapter 1-Introduction to Colombia: Chapter 2-The Violence Problem; Chapter 3-The Military Establishment of Colombia; Chapter 4-National Police; Chapter 5-The *Lanceros*; Chapter 6-Intelligence; Chapter 7-Information and Psychological Warfare; Chapter 8-Relief and Rehabilitation; and Chapter 9-Communism in Colombia. Chapter and paragraph numbers, rather than page numbers, are given throughout Part I of the survey and citation will follow this convention. (For instance, if paragraphs 17 through 27 of Chapter 2 are used they will be cited as 2-17 thru 27. Non-consecutive paragraphs will be cited as 2-17, 19, etc.). Part II details Recommendations for Colombian Action (RCA) and Part III, Recommendations for US Action (RUS). Page numbers are given as RCA-I-1, RCA-I-2, etc. depending upon the particular appendix number (although the introductory chapter is, again, unnumbered) or RUS-1, RUS-2, etc. and will be cited as such.

Rojas Pinilla stepped in to overthrow the government and install a military dictatorship. For his actions he was 'hailed as a deliverer' throughout the country.[28]

Phase III (13 June 1953-10 May 1957) coincides with the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship. Initial attempts to quell the violence that had engulfed the country through amnesty programs brought some success. However, as progress toward restoration of constitutional processes stalled, corruption increased, and lingering violence met with repression by the Rojas regime, guerrilla warfare once again began to spread. Fearing a return to previous levels of bloodshed and pushed by Rojas Pinilla's attempts to create a political 'Third Force' movement, Liberal and Conservative leaders reached bipartisan agreement to form the *Frente Nacional* (National Front) government – a plan to alternate the presidency and split power between the two parties every four years. On 10 May 1957 a five-man military junta displaced Rojas, forcing him into exile and ushering in the final phase of the *Violencia* era.[29]

This final phase – Phase IV (August 1958-1966) – encompasses the first two National Front governments of Liberal Lleras Camargo and Conservative Guillermo León Valencia. It witnessed the extensive collaborative effort between the United States and Colombia in developing the latter's internal security apparatus, ultimately yielding the most successful counter-bandit/counter-guerrilla operations of that time in the Western Hemisphere. Although this 'officially' ended the *Violencia* era and initially brought a

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[28] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-65-Prospect for Colombia, 9 July 1965, *Declassified Document Quarterly Series* (*DDQS*) Vol.14 (1988), Microform 003075 (Washington, D.C.: Carrollton Press, 1989), p.3.

[29] RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 2-The Violence Problem, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 2-14 thru 16; Despatch from the Ambassador in Colombia (Cabot) to the Department of State-Political Summary and Assessment: The Rojas Regime and Its Fall, 9 July 1957 in *Foreign Relations of the United States* (*FRUS*) Vol.VII, 1955-1957, pp.943-45.

greater measure of stability to the nation, problems rooted in this period continue to plague Colombia to the present day.

Chapter three analyzes early collaborative efforts between the United States and Colombia to formulate strategies designed to counter internal security problems in that nation. It focuses on the confluence of security interests between the two nations that led the Eisenhower administration to form a Colombia survey team to study the violence problem. Details concerning this special team – its mandate and composition as well as the problems it encountered both in Washington and Colombia – are addressed. This sets the stage for a broad analysis of its preliminary report, a minority report produced as a result of critical differences within the team and finally, the actual survey and recommendations for both Colombian and US action towards the violence problem.

The efficacy of the Special Team's proposed solutions to Colombia's security problems is also analyzed, in particular, counterinsurgency tactics, reorientation of special combat units (*Lanceros*), civic action and economic rehabilitation programs, intelligence operations, and psychological and information warfare capabilities. Finally, this chapter also examines the planned role of covert action in Colombia, placing containment of *la Violencia*, at least from a US perspective, in its Cold War context.

Chapter four begins with an overview of the Kennedy administration's dual-track policy of socioeconomic aid coupled to counterinsurgency. It then examines, in-depth, the implementation of counterinsurgency strategies under the first two National Front governments in Colombia. Inception of the bipartisan National Front system in Colombia brought both cooperation between the two warring political parties and restoration of the army's 'nonpolitical' image. Since the new system was based on an inter-party consensus,

those bandit and guerrilla groups that continued to operate after the October 1958 amnesty declaration became, by definition, either dangerous to public order or subversive. As a consequence the army targeted these groups without the same political risk it had confronted before the National Front period.[30]

In February 1962 a U.S. Army Special Warfare Center team headed by Brigadier General William P. Yarborough was dispatched to Colombia in a follow-up study to the 1959-60 survey team's overview of the internal security situation. Yarborough proposed recommendations that bolstered those made earlier by the Special Team. From these studies evolved a Colombia Internal Defense Plan as well as Plan LAZO: strategies designed to integrate military efforts with economic, social, and political solutions to the internal security problem. In the end the US played a vital role during the latter phase of the *Violencia* period in facilitating the development of all aspects of Colombia's internal security infrastructure, ultimately helping to contain that nation's violence problem.

Conclusion – Lessons Learned?

What lessons can be derived from this dissertation that would lend themselves to policymakers facing the current crisis in Colombia? Contemporary problems defy easy categorization as the unintended consequences of past policy failures have transmogrified this struggle from its 'standardized' Cold War template to a post-modern internal conflict that grafts 'autonomous'[31] sources of financing – kidnapping, extortion, narco-tax – onto classic Maoist-style insurgency. Nonetheless, this historical analysis does offer observable landmarks that might guide policy.

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[30] Richard Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia* (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1973), pp.66-67.

[31] Bruce Michael Bagley in discussions with author.

First, fearing the consequences of the Cuban Revolution US policymaker's privileged Cold War national security interests over efforts to promote democratization and peaceful social and economic reform. Failure to institutionalize human rights training into internal security programs further undermined this effort. This preference for security, order, and stability continues to distinguish US policy today despite growing regional interdependence and a spectrum of issues better served by multilateral approaches.

Second, interconnected security interests of Colombia and the United States during the latter phase of the *Violencia* period insured containment of the violence problem in the short term. Today, there is a mismatch of security interests between the two nations, as an overly militarized US approach to the drug war fails to ensure a multifaceted approach that will promote state stability, revitalize Colombia's institutions, and provide security for that country's populace.

Third, an integrated strategy is needed to deal with the current violence problem. In this respect the CIA Special Team survey of 1959 continues to offer insights to policymakers today. Though offered from a decidedly Cold War perspective, the team's key nation-building strategies and integrated politico-military approach to counterinsurgency continue to resonate as a practical means for restoring political stability to Colombia, while concurrently undertaking social, economic, and institutional reform.

Fourth, a wide range of political, sociocultural, economic, and military factors contributed to the emergence of *la Violencia* in Colombia. That nation's social and political structures proved incapable of meeting the challenges of modernization, agrarian and institutional reform, and intense political polarization. Although a wider social

revolution was averted after the assassination of Gaitán and the ensuing conflict, revolutionary groups emerged from this era with a radical vision for a new Colombian society outside of oligarchic control. The challenge faced by contemporary policymakers is to refashion Colombia's social, political, economic, and institutional framework in order to undermine insurgent groups seeking to promote radical alternatives.

Fifth, although the efficacy of US-Colombian counterinsurgency efforts during the 1958-1966 period is mixed, counterinsurgency remains a key element in the solution of Colombia's current crisis. During the earlier *Violencia* period, clear successes were achieved in reorienting security forces to their internal security mission, thereby containing the violence problem. However, policymakers in both the United States and Colombia failed to couple successful counterinsurgency operations to a larger nation-building strategy that, in the long-term, would have broadened democratization, development, and structural reform. This larger, multifaceted approach to counterinsurgency must be reinvigorated.

Finally, as in the past, current US policy is too narrowly focused on a militarized strategy to Colombia's internal security problems, in particular, on the issue of narcotics trafficking. US policymakers must reorient their focus towards stabilizing the Colombian state, developing legitimate civil defense structures, supporting the fight against armed insurgent groups, and building an inclusionary civil society framed on issues of human security.

CHAPTER ONE

THE AMERICAN TROJAN HORSE:

US INTERNAL SECURITY POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

Introduction

US perceptions of Third World nations as susceptible to communist subversion and revolutionary warfare led the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower to formulate a coordinated internal security strategy known simply as '1290d'. Later renamed the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP), the Eisenhower administration implemented this policy in an effort to strengthen host-nation security forces, judicial systems, and public information media.

But implementing OISP in Latin America proved difficult. Congress criticized the administration for colluding with dictatorial regimes, while Latin Americans feared that the US would use the new program as a "Trojan Horse" to penetrate their security structures. Nonetheless, after the Cuban Revolution internal security issues came to dominate hemispheric security relations for the remainder of the Cold War.

The American Sphere of Influence: US Security Initiatives in Latin America

Military assistance and hemisphere defense preoccupied US policy plans for Latin America even prior to the beginning of the Cold War. In 1938 the United States established military missions that offered training and instruction in order to counter the threat of Fascist and Nazi subversion. After the outbreak of World War II, 16 Latin American nations granted air and naval base privileges as well as transit rights to US military forces, and the US government entered into Lend-Lease agreements with every Latin American republic except Argentina and Panama. US policymakers established the

Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) as well as joint defense commissions with Mexico and Brazil in an effort to facilitate US-Latin American military interaction.

In the post-war world arrangements for the common defense of the hemisphere played an integral part in the development of a worldwide anticommunist security system arrayed against the Soviet Union.[32] Latin America played a key part in this non-communist international system, forming an important element of the US strategic position in the event of war.

But the region offered few strategic opportunities to the Soviets given existing military realities. As early as 1947 Central Intelligence Group (CIG), precursor to CIA, recognized Latin America's limited potential as either a Soviet ally or source of supply given the fact that US naval and air power could effectively blockade the region. The Soviets had nothing to gain by integrating their economy with that of Latin America since any large-scale trade arrangements involving strategic materials would elicit an 'immediate and effective' response from the United States.

Economic dependency upon an area that could be cut off during war was 'unlikely to commend itself to the security-conscious USSR.'[33] As Kennan later described it, 'mass supported communist conquest' was not the real danger, but rather the 'clever infiltration' of key positions within these nations' power structures from which they could sabotage relations between Latin America and the United States.[34]

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[32] James F. Schnabel, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol.1 1945-1947* (Washington, DC: Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1979), pp.347-49. From National Archives, Record Group 218.

[33] Soviet Objectives in Latin America, Central Intelligence Group Document ORE 16, 10 April 1947 in *CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946-1976*, Reel #2 (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc., 1982), p.1.

[34] Memorandum by the Counselor of the Department (Kennan) to the Secretary of State: Relationship of Latin America to our Global Policies, 29 March 1950, *FRUS* Vol.II, 1950, pp.598-609.

These special conditions forced the Soviets to undertake clandestine operations in Latin America. Trade unions became major targets for penetration, especially those that extracted, processed, and transported materials the US might need from the region in any future war. Other Soviet activities included dissemination of carefully selected propaganda themes, and the creation and maintenance of intelligence networks.[35]

Early CIA assessments of the communist threat viewed these developments with alarm. Analysts believed that the USSR could merely give the necessary orders that would withhold from the United States its normal peacetime flow of strategic raw materials from key Latin American nations and precipitate economic crises in several others.[36] Others within the intelligence community disagreed, envisaging only isolated acts against areas of strategic importance but no truly concerted action, given the fact that 'best figures' estimates of Communist Party membership in Latin America accounted only for some 360,000 people.[37]

All analysts agreed that in Latin America, poverty, illiteracy, and repressive governments provided communists with a supportive environment within which to develop a base. Effective countermeasures depended in part upon an increasingly rapid growth of middle classes, greater organization of and cooperation with anticommunist

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[35] Soviet Objectives in Latin America, Central Intelligence Group Document ORE 16, 10 April 1947 in *CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946-1976*, Reel #2, pp.4-5.
[36] Soviet Objectives in Latin America-Summary, Central Intelligence Agency Document ORE 16/1, 1 November 1947 in *CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946-1976*, Reel #2, no page numbers.
[37] This figure is drawn from A Report of the National Security Council by the Department of State on US Policy Regarding Anti-Communist Measures which could be Planned and Carried out within the Inter-American System, NSC 16, 28 June 1948 as cited in OIR Report No.4367, 16 September 1947, Communist Strength in the other American Republics, *DDQS* Vol.2 (1976), Microform 42(F), p.3.

labor and political groups of the left (both liberal and socialist), and increased co-operation between police, military, information, and intelligence agencies.[38]

Truman responded to US security concerns in Latin America by approving NSC 56/2 – United States Policy Toward Inter-American Cooperation – in May 1950. This policy sought to balance the desire for hemisphere defense with the need to promote social and economic development. The document delineated the role US policymakers envisioned for Latin American security forces: (1) maintenance of security within their own territory; (2) prevention of revolutionary disturbances and clandestine enemy operations; (3) protection of sources/installations of strategic materials; and (4) securing bases, military facilities, and vital lines of communication.

Recognizing the overwhelming financial obligations faced by Latin American nations caused by severe dollar shortages and unstable trade positions, the Truman administration sought long-term loans and constructive economic projects in order to promote the regional stability so vital to US national security interests.[39]

One month after Truman signed NSC 56/2 the North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel, invading its southern neighbor. The Korean War dramatically altered US perceptions of world stability and consequently, the dynamics of inter-American military cooperation. Fearing new outbreaks of communist aggression, the Truman administration perceived a substantial need for increases in military manpower throughout the region.

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[38] A Report of the National Security Council by the Department of State on US Policy Regarding Anti-Communist Measures which could be Planned and Carried out within the Inter-American System, NSC 16, 28 June 1948, *DDQS* Vol.2 (1976), Microform 42(F), pp.4-10.

[39] Report by the NSC to the President: NSC 56/2-United States Policy Toward Inter-American Collaboration, 18 May 1950, *FRUS* Vol.I, 1950, pp.631-34.

Latin American troops might well be needed to counter developments in other parts of the world. These new forces would require training, equipment, and logistical support from the United States. Without enthusiastic American leadership, disastrous political consequences might follow.[40] But for the average individual in Latin America the conflict in Korea appeared remote. As one State Department official commented, 'moral solidarity' with the US response to the crisis was satisfactory, but any positive military and economic cooperation remained 'distinctly disappointing.'[41] Only Colombia sent armed forces to the Korean theatre in 1950.[42]

Nonetheless the Korean crisis did accelerate military collaboration throughout the hemisphere. At a consultative meeting between foreign affairs ministers in April 1951, they agreed to a common defense against the 'aggressive activities of international communism.'[43] That same year the US Congress authorized the appropriation of $38,150,00 in grant military assistance for hemisphere defense under the newly constituted Mutual Security Act. By 1952 the US had signed mutual defense assistance agreements with a number of Latin American nations, firmly establishing US preeminence in the field of military assistance throughout the region.

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[40] Draft Paper for the NSC by the Director of the Office of Regional American Affairs (Dreier), 3 August 1950, *FRUS* Vol.I, 1950, pp.644-46.

[41] Memorandum by Ivan B. White of the Office of Regional American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller). 14 February 1951. *FRUS* Vol.II, 1951, pp.994-95.

[42] In a letter to this author (Letter Valencia to author, 25 January 2000), General (Ret) Alvaro Valencia Tovar described Colombian military involvement in the Korean War as the 'starting point of a profound transformation in every field' that would have considerable impact on Colombian military thinking in combating the *Violencia* during the early National Front period. For in-depth studies see Charles L. Steel IV, 'Colombian Experience in Korea and Perceived Impact on *La Violencia*,' MA Thesis (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 1978) and Russell W. Ramsey, 'The Colombian Battalion in Korea and Suez,' *Journal of Inter-American Studies (JIAS)*, 9/4 (October 1967), pp.541-60.

[43] The Foundations of Common Defense Against International Communism and Aggression-The Unity of the American Republics: Final Act of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of American State. 17 April 1951 (Excerpts), *American Foreign Policy 1950-55: Basic Documents Volume I* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, July 1957), p.1292.

The Origin of US Internal Security Policy in Latin America: Eisenhower and 1290d

President Dwight D. Eisenhower defined and approved Latin American policy for his administration shortly after taking office in January 1953. Eisenhower recognized the need for support from the other American republics in the Cold War and provided military and economic assistance in order to strengthen hemispheric solidarity.[44]

Policy documents NSC 144/1 (18 March 1953) and NSC 5432/1 (3 September 1954) – United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America – framed a variety of economic, political, and military objectives that the administration sought to advance. These included support of US policies both in the UN and other international organizations; orderly political and economic progress; standardization in organization, training, doctrine, and equipment of military forces along US lines; and the reduction and elimination of internal communist or other anti-US subversion.[45]

After the overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz in June of 1954 the need for sustained action in countries threatened by internal subversion gained urgency. Adoption of the anticommunist resolution (Resolution 93) at the Caracas Conference (March 1954) meant that the United States could, as Secretary of State Foster Dulles declared, 'operate more effectively to meet Communist subversion in the American Republics.'[46] For Latin America, internal security programs became the practical implementation of the administration's anticommunist policies.

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[44] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism*, p.26.

[45] NSC 144/1-United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, 18 March 1953, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 4, NSC 144-Latin America (2) (DDEL), pp.1-7; NSC 5432/1-United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Latin America, 3 September 1954, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 13, NSC 5432/1-Policy Toward Latin America (DDEL), pp.1-8.

[46] Discussion at the 189th Meeting of the NSC, Thursday, 18 March 1954, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Papers, 1953-61 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 5, 189th Meeting (DDEL), p.3.

Throughout the Cold War US policymakers saw less developed countries as a major source of weakness to the free world's position against communism. They believed that political instability, economic backwardness, extreme nationalism, and colonial issues dramatically increased the likelihood of direct communist pressure, intervention, and subversion.[47]

To counter this Eisenhower and his administration launched NSC Action No.1290d in December of 1954 – the first substantial policy initiative in the field of internal security undertaken on a global scale. On 21 December the NSC, with the President's approval, requested that OCB present a report, 'on the status and adequacy of the current program to develop constabulary forces to maintain internal security and to destroy the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in free world countries vulnerable to Communist subversion.'[48]

Overall they sought to achieve a coordinated US internal security assistance strategy that would: (1) assess the nature and degree of communist threat in target countries; (2) increase the capability of internal security forces to counter subversion and paramilitary operations; (3) revise legislation and reorganize judicial systems in order to permit more effective anticommunist action; (4) exchange information on subversive methodologies; and (5) assist in the development of public information programs to clarify the nature of the communist threat.[49]

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[47] NSC 5501-Basic National Security Policy, 6 January 1955, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs-Records, 1952-61 (OSANSA), NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 14, NSC 5501-Basic National Security Policy (DDEL), p.3.

[48] NSC Record of Actions 229th Meeting, 21 December 1954-Action Number 1290d, Ann Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 1, Records of Actions by NSC 1954(4) Action Nos. 1259-1292 (DDEL), p.2.

[49] Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 23 November 1955, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 13, NSC 5434/1 Military Assistance Program, Procedure for Review-Annex A (DDEL), pp.20-21. Initial 1290d policy was drafted out of the so-called 'MacArthur Concept', apparently a reference to Douglas MacArthur II, Counselor of the Department of State until 24 November 1956.

The administration formally initiated concepts and programs for US assistance to aid in the development of foreign internal security consequent to NSC Action No. 1290d.[50] Prior to this point the US had offered piecemeal help on an emergency basis in Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Iran, and Guatemala, with agencies tasked to internal security activities as circumstances warranted.[51] When requested the United States provided technical co-operation programs in other nations to improve training, organization, equipment, and functioning of civil police elements.

The Truman administration had utilized personnel with police experience as part of the public administration work associated with the US Mission.[52] This 'fire-fighting' approach to policy changed in 1954. Eisenhower expressed the view that, 'in certain kinds of countries inhabited by certain kinds of people, it might be militarily sound and less costly for the US to provide them with light armament rather than standard heavy equipment. That is, a constabulary or a Philippine scout-type force might do the trick.'[53] As a result he urged the formulation of internal security policy, recognizing that it served US interests to aid nations vulnerable to communist subversion in order to extinguish 'remaining fires' and prevent new ones from occurring.[54]

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[50] Report in Connection with the Overseas Internal Security Program-1 April 1959, OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 6, Overseas Internal Security Program (April 1958-May 1959) (DDEL), p.1. The 1290d program was renamed the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP) in March of 1957.

[51] Observations and Suggestions Concerning the 'Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP)', 14 June 1957, Albert R. Haney-Deputy Assistant to the Director for Security Affairs, International Co-operation Administration (ICA), White House Office, NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB 014.12 File #5(2) NSC 1290d - Internal Security (DDEL), pp.11-12. Hereafter cited as Haney Report.

[52] Memorandum for the Record-Second Meeting Called by ICA to Discuss 1290d Procedure (Draft Attachment), 6 February 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(1) NSC 1290D-Internal Security (DDEL), no page number.

[53] OCB Progress Report, 19 March 1957: Overseas Internal Security Program, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Chronological Subseries, Box 4, April 1957(2) (DDEL), 1 page.

[54] Haney Report, p.12. In November of 1954 the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) in Washington, DC agreed to a three-year contract with the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) to provide training for 75 overseas police officers. As a result IACP and FOA assumed primary responsibility for the training of foreign police officials.

OCB formed a 1290d Working Group with representatives from the Departments of State and Defense, ICA (established 30 June 1955 from Foreign Operations Administration), and CIA was formed. The Group interpreted and developed by a concept for proceeding on the problem that focused on influencing judicial and legislative systems, public information media, and police and military forces sufficient for internal defense.[55]

Sub-regional drafting committees received specific Country Team reports along with currently available Washington-level information. These drafting committees, composed of area specialists, prepared the initial 1290d Country Reports and submitted them to Working Group deputies for review and final forwarding to the Working Group and OCB. President Eisenhower and the NSC subsequently received the fully completed series of reports.

Ultimately the Working Group reviewed forty-four countries selecting twenty-two for initial analysis including:

Western Hemisphere		Southeast Asia	
Bolivia	Costa Rica	Philippines	Laos
Brazil	Guatemala	Vietnam	Thailand
Chile	Venezuela	Cambodia	Indonesia

Far East	South Asia	Near East	Europe
Japan	Burma	Iran	Iceland
Korea	Pakistan	Iraq	Greece
	Afghanistan	Syria	

The Working Group evaluated the threat of communist subversion as:

Critical: Laos, Vietnam

Dangerous: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Syria

Potentially Dangerous: Brazil, Chile, Greece, Iran, Pakistan (East)

[55] Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 23 November 1955, pp.1-2; Annex A, pp.20-21.

Contained But Needs Watching: Guatemala, Iraq, Korea, Pakistan (West), Philippines, Thailand.

Analysts perceived no immediate threat to Japan, Costa Rica, Iceland, and Venezuela, postponing 1290d review for these areas. On 1 June 1955, OCB began its review process with Guatemala.[56]

Throughout Latin America 1290d initiatives focused on preventive, police-type activity with limited application of force. This included detecting components of the communist apparatus such as agents, fellow-travelers, and front organizations, and detaining communist personalities or groups and undertaking judicial action against them. US assistance sought to develop honest and competent administration by eliminating unqualified personnel and increasing pay and training; providing appropriate arms, equipment, transport and communications facilities; revising legislation and reorganizing judicial systems in order to permit more effective action; exchanging information on the methodology of subversion; and assisting in the development of public information programs to clarify the nature of the threat.[57]

In countries where actual or potential large-scale communist insurrection existed, US assistance followed a twofold strategy. First, police forces received aid in order to suppress minor civil disturbances stemming from banditry and low-level guerrilla actions. Jointly, indigenous military and paramilitary forces were trained, equipped, and

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[56] Ibid., p.4 and Annex A, pp.21-22. Preparation of Washington-based information was assigned as follows: Nature of the Threat-CIA; Description of Internal Security Forces-Defense; Inventory of Current US Programs-FOA (ICA); Political Factors Bearing on Internal Security-State.

[57] Report of NSC 1290d Working Group, 16 February 1955, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 16, OCB 014.12 File #1(2) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), pp.2, 4. See also NSC 1290d Working Group (Internal Security Force), Draft Model Telegram, 10 March 1955, File #1(4), pp.1-2 from the same Box.

deployed to provide counter-intelligence, and to suppress large-scale riots, demonstrations, and guerrilla activities.[58]

OCB Working Group (1290d) for Latin America undertook summary assessments of the early efficacy of US internal security policy in target countries. The group included Spencer King (Chairman-State), Col. William T. Bennett (Defense), Walter Bauer (ICA), Albert E. Carter (United States Information Agency-USIA), Col. R.P. Crenshaw (Staff Representative-OCB), and an unnamed CIA representative. Individual country assessments formed the basis of 1290d summary reports for Latin America, beginning with 'Analysis of the Internal Security Situation in Guatemala,' dated 1 June 1955.

Thereafter assessments for Chile and Brazil (16 November 1955), Bolivia (21 December 1955), Venezuela (13 June 1956), and Costa Rica (15 August 1956) followed and all reports subsequently underwent yearly progress reviews and reassessments as needed. The Working Group added new countries for analysis and action as the program developed. Surveys on a country-by-country basis provided analysis and recommendations that allowed internal security specialists to individually design US assistance to meet the specific requirements of each nation.[59]

By the end of 1956 there appeared little danger of either an overt communist attack on Latin America or prospects for their general electoral success. However the Soviets had increased trade and cultural relations with the region, which the administration saw as an attempt to disrupt 'friendly [US] relations with Latin America, to subvert the

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[58] Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 23 November 1955, pp.4-5; NSC 1290d Working Group (Internal Security Force), Draft Model Telegram, 10 March 1955, pp.2-3; Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff-Implementation and Coordination of NSC Action 1290d, not dated, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB 014.12 File #3(1) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), p.1.

[59] Report of NSC 1290d Working Group, 16 February 1955, p.7.

countries in the area, and to destroy the inter-American system.'[60] It responded with a variety of US political, economic, and military initiatives including new 1290d programs in Costa Rica, Venezuela, Argentina, Haiti, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, El Salvador, Peru, and Colombia.[61]

Policy Failings: Bureaucracy, Human Rights, and The Trojan Horse

Working Group analysts who examined various host-nation internal security structures found large disparities in concept, organization, and effectiveness. Militarily all of the countries studied except Bolivia and Afghanistan had forces sufficient or in excess of internal security requirements. Many maintained heavy weapons, armor, combat ships and jets, but lacked the special training and equipment required for counterinsurgency or counter-guerrilla operations.[62]

Extensive layering of police forces – national, provincial, and metropolitan *Carabineros*, constabulary, civil guards and border/frontier troops – further exacerbated the problem. In several nations (Vietnam, Iran, and the Philippines), the military undertook police-type internal security functions, while in others (Thailand), certain police units maintained military tasking and capabilities. The influence of European police systems was the solitary factor that all systems appeared to have in common.

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[60] NSC 5613/1-US Policy Toward Latin America, 25 September 1956, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5613/1-Policy Toward Latin America (2) (DDEL), p.2.

[61] Annual 1290d Report-Costa Rica, Venezuela, 15 February 1957, pp.27, 57; Summary of 1290d Activities-Attachment: Status of 1290d Programs, 15 August 1956, and 1290d Project-Priorities on New Countries, 23 August 1956 both in NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(6) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), no page numbers. Globally, 1290d papers for all 22 of the original countries selected for analysis were completed by the end of 1956, including Japan and Iceland. The administration also determined new 1290d priorities for a variety of nations outside the Western Hemisphere including Austria, Ceylon, Finland, India, Egypt, Turkey, Taiwan, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Lebanon.

[62] Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d-Working Draft-7 September 1955, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #1(8) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), pp.3-4, 7.

Among Latin American security forces, as elsewhere in the developing world, deficiencies centered on poor administration, obsolete equipment, a lack of modern scientific techniques and procedures to counter covert communist activities, and a dearth of programs to develop public support.[63] Indeed developing public support was of particular importance given that these forces, often illiterate and poorly paid, existed through bribery, corruption, and extortion.[64] US policymakers viewed these problems as representative of the region.

R.P. Crenshaw, OCB Staff Representative of the Latin American 1290d Working Group believed for instance, that US policy towards the region should forthrightly reflect obstacles inherent to its development including, 'instability, corruption, lack of social consciousness, lack of initiative and enterprise, [and] the rabidly anti-US attitude of some non-communist groups.' This would never occur, Crenshaw believed, as it was 'to delicate to put down.'[65]

But within the Eisenhower administration itself, bureaucratic problems also interfered with the development of 1290d programs. No single identifiable program existed but rather a variety of plans that encompassed economic assistance, anticommunist information programs, and training of security forces. Every major US government agency overseas attempted to promote, directly or indirectly, internal stability in target

[63] Ibid., pp.3-4.
[64] Haney Report, p.8. The FBI, Scotland Yard, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are given as examples of forces which enjoyed broad public support for their internal security missions.
[65] New LA Policy Paper: Planning Board Meeting 26 July, 27 July 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 75, OCB 091.4 File #7(6) Latin America (DDEL), 1 page.

countries.[66] As a consequence coordination of 1290d policy at this early stage proved erratic.

State Department responsibilities arose from control over foreign relations but remained ill defined with regards to 1290d. USIA often had overlapping anticommunist information activities associated both with 1290d and standard Country Outline Plans of Operations, but placed little emphasis on developing programs that could bolster public support for indigenous security elements.

ICA and Defense shared authority and responsibility for surveying, training, and equipping internal security forces, while Defense also maintained responsibility for developing foreign armed forces for more general Mutual Security missions. No US agency actively took responsibility for influencing legislative reform in the developing world.[67]

Further difficulties arose from needlessly high levels of security and lack of bureaucratic initiative. Because the status or problems of ongoing 1290d operations was neither centralized nor consolidated from the field, officials who required internal security information were often left uninformed.[68] Meeting infrequently, performance levels varied considerably between groups. Surprisingly for such a specialized and sensitive policy, people at relatively low personnel levels, some not even technically competent in matters concerning internal security, often conducted 1290d initiatives.[69]

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[66] Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 6 September 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(7) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), pp.1-2.
[67] Report to NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d-Working Draft, 7 September 1955, pp.6-7.
[68] Annual 1290d Report, 15 February 1957, p.4.
[69] Memorandum for the Record-Second Meeting Called by ICA to Discuss 1290d Procedure, 6 February 1956, no page number.

Inadequate inter-agency coordination of internal security program planning, evaluation, and reporting existed, and the overall leadership needed to resolve conflicts and provide guidance was handled on an ad hoc basis.[70] These problems remained particularly acute within the Latin American Group given the region's size, diversity, and low level of priority within US strategic planning. As regards secrecy, not even the State Departments Bolivia desk, in drafting the regular Outline Plan of Operations for Bolivia, was completely informed on 1290d plans for that country.[71]

Personnel and funding also proved key problem areas in the development of 1290d policy. A limited number of US specialists had the appropriate experience, personal qualifications, and language capabilities to conduct counter-subversive training. As a result, use of foreign specialists increased, as did continental US (CONUS) training of selected personnel, though facilities were often inadequate.[72] Moreover, funding requirements, while modest in scope (FY1957 projections called for approximately $25 million, $35 million in FY1958) often proved difficult to obtain under existing Mutual

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[70] Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 6 September 1956, p.3.

[71] Memorandum re: Request for NSC 1290d File as Affects Latin America and Priority to be Given Latin America, 18 November 1955, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 73, OCB 091.4 File #4(9) Latin America (DDEL), pp.1-2.

[72] NSC Action 1486c, 13 December 1955 as quoted in Memorandum to the OCB from John B. Hollister, Director, ICA re: Need for Clarification of the 'Overall Leadership' Function in the Implementation of the NSC Action 1290d Programs, 6 September 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(7) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), p.10; Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 23 November 1955, p.9. Prior to NSC Action 1290d, ICA had established a Civil Police Branch in its Public Administration Division. This was elevated to divisional status after approval of 1290d. Its three most senior members included Byron Engle (GS-15, Chief of Division), a graduate of the FBI National Academy with nine years of service in the Middle and Far East including Chief, Police Administration, Far East Command responsible for Japanese training under General MacArthur; Charles C. Oldham (GS-14, Deputy Chief of Division) a former Chief of a large state police organization; and Arthur E. Kimberling (GS-14, Chief, Far East Branch) a former Chief of the Louisville Police Department who had also been engaged in Japanese police reorganization. See Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 6 September 1956, p.7.

Security legislation given that neither ICA nor Defense had complete flexibility to utilize foreign aid funds for internal security assistance purposes.[73]

In general, US economic, military, and technical assistance to developing nations rarely took country-specific internal security requirements into account. Developing nations, struggling within the context of poverty and explosive population growth, political immaturity and corruption, illiteracy, racial and colonial conflict, and proximity to countries controlled by communist governments required 'special contributions' for specific internal security needs. When planning large-scale assistance programs those needs rarely received full consideration.[74]

But the Eisenhower administration faced far greater problems than bureaucratic inefficiencies in its efforts to expand 1290d programs in the developing world. Latin American and US perceptions differed markedly over both the actual threat posed by communism and the ability of the Soviets to orchestrate its proponents. Confusing 'revolutionary nationalism and indigenous discontent with externally supported Communist movements,' the United States often found itself aligned with repressive regimes and 'discredited elites' whose importance as bulwarks against communism was out of all proportion to their nations' actual Cold War strategic value. As a result, American support often enforced the status quo rather than meeting the rising need for progressive change demanded in the developing world.[75]

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[73] Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 23 November 1955, p.10.
[74] Ibid., pp.4,8.
[75] All quotes Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp.508-11. See also Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present*, p.8.

Critics excoriated the administration for abetting the development of police states and aiding dictatorships that violated human rights.[76] But in an attempt to rebutt these charges, Albert R. Haney, Deputy Assistant to the Director for Security Affairs (ICA) in the Eisenhower administration, proclaimed that the administration did not have the 'moral luxury' of helping only those countries with democratic ideals similar to the United States.

'Eliminate all the absolute monarchies, dictatorships and juntas from the free world,' Haney declared, 'and count those that are left and it should be readily apparent that the US would be well on its way to isolation – the fortress America illusion.' Haney continued, 'properly understood as a democratic, unselfish, often unconditional approach to helping other countries to help themselves to strengthen and improve the very sinews of government. [1290d programs are] a very worthy and honorable form of foreign aid.'[77]

Although perhaps too lofty an endorsement of a policy known even within the US government as the 'police program,' Haney nonetheless remained adamant that US law enforcement and military officers leave 'no brutality, repression or violation of human rights . . . unchallenged.'[78] This did not mollify critics in Congress, who continued to attack security policies that aided governments in suppressing legitimate internal opposition.[79]

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[76] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp.38-41.
[77] Haney Report, pp.7-10.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy*, p.88.

Latin Americans also worried about greater US intervention in their internal affairs, questioning whether 1290d programs were little more than a 'Trojan Horse' intended to penetrate their security services.[80] Indeed US internal security initiatives:

> [Had] not generally gained the interest and support of the Latin American governments which, with the exception of Bolivia, did not feel sufficiently threatened by Communism to overcome local political problems inherent in establishing new security organs. There were, for example, indications that some of the legally constituted law enforcement and military bodies, as well as the non-Communist opposition, resented and feared the introduction of new security agencies designed to combat Communist subversion, fearing they would be used (as they [were] in some cases) as political weapons under the control of the existing governments primarily directed at the political opposition as such, and function to the detriment of existing security organs.[81]

While the administration did not originally promote its 1290d policy as a means for developing 'assets' within Latin America's security structures, at the same time it was not an unexpected by-product. Given the degree of collaboration that developed between US police, military, and intelligence organizations and their counterparts in the region, Latin Americans had cause for concern.

A New Look: The Overseas Internal Security Program

In an attempt to alleviate the problems associated with 1290d policies, policymakers introduced special procedures and mechanisms, including greater centralized direction and control in order to revise and refine operations.[82] The administration made high level

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[80] Haney Report, p.7.

[81] Special Report on Latin America (NSC 5613/1)-Annex B: Major Operating Problems and Difficulties Facing the United States, 26 November 1958, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5613/1-Policy Toward Latin America (1) (DDEL), p.24. Even in 'sufficiently threatened' Bolivia, both the Communist Party of Bolivia and the Trotskyite Workers Revolutionary Party, when permitted to participate in the June 1956 elections, polled only some 1.5 percent of the national vote, achieving no Congressional representation. Sensitive political considerations in nations such as Burma, Tunisia, Morocco, Iceland, Ethiopia and The Sudan also militated against open 1290d support to those governments. See Haney Report, p.8.

[82] Supplemental Progress Report on Actions Taken Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d, 6 September 1956, p.3.

appointments from ICA and a Senior Advisory Group in order to plan and expedite internal security operations.

Drawn from departments and agencies with primary responsibility for the implementation of internal security policy, those appointed included Arthur Richards (State), William Leffingwell (Defense), Edward Roberts (USIA), James Angleton (CIA), and T.E. Naughten (Senior Official, 1290d).[83] This group remained operational during the initial phase of restructuring, with the Senior Official given access to covert aspects of 1290d programs, 'on a need-to-know basis consistent with the operational security considerations involved.'[84]

On 13 March 1957 the Eisenhower administration redesignated all policies associated with NSC Action 1290d as the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP). While the newly named policy maintained the previous mandate of developing the capabilities of security forces and agencies to counter internal communist subversion, policymakers acknowledged that attempts to eliminate all possible economic, social, and political causes of subversion went beyond the program's capabilities.[85]

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[83] Haney Report, p.11; ICA Annual Status Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d-Working Draft, 29 December 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 18, OCB 014.12 File #4(1) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), covering letter. For an overview of the positions and liaison-area responsibilities of Hollister, Naughten, Haney, and other full-time staff associated with 1290d policy coordination see Summary Report of US Assistance in Strengthening the Internal Security of Countries Vulnerable to Communist Subversion, not dated, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(8) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), no page numbers. Senior staff was drawn from ICA, Defense, and CIA.

[84] Operational and Coordinating Arrangements for the NSC Action No. 1290d Program-Attachment, 19 September 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(8) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), p.2. Problems in presenting 1290d programs to Congress were solved by offering a designated Top Secret presentation section. As well, for some OCB scheduled meetings CIA representatives were offered the opportunity to present oral briefings of covert information if desired.

[85] Annual Report of Operations of the Overseas Internal Security Program to the OCB for the NSC December 1956 through November 1957, 11 March 1958 (Revised), OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 6, Overseas Internal Security Program (April 1958-May 1959) (DDEL), p.1. Hereafter cited as Annual OISP Report, 11 March 1958.

Still they believed that a focused OISP policy, properly coordinated and run in conjunction with appropriate technical, political, and economic actions could form an 'internal security system' that ensured a significant measure of stability to the developing world. Haney envisioned OIS programs as a 'major element of US foreign operations,' forming an integral part of all operational plans for underdeveloped nations. Their purpose: to act as a 'vaccine' against communist subversion, thereby allowing for orderly progress and development.[86]

The administration also clarified roles and responsibilities for the various departments and agencies tasked with implementing OISP policy. ICA assumed 'an affirmative responsibility in initiating, directing and supervising' OISP actions.[87] It undertook assistance to civil police forces and agencies, providing training, equipment, technical assistance, and personnel through the Technical Co-operation program. This assistance focused both on training foreign personnel for operations against communist infiltration and subversion as well as aiding host governments to mobilize public support for internal security initiatives.

State now provided political and policy guidance in the field, negotiated program acceptance, and attempted to influence host country laws and judicial systems in favor of anticommunist legislation. CIA continued to provide intelligence/counterintelligence

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[86] Haney Report, pp.2-7.

[87] Memorandum to the OCB from John B. Hollister, Director, ICA re: Need for Clarification of the 'Overall Leadership' Function in the Implementation of the NSC Action 1290d Programs, 6 September 1956, pp.1-4. Hollister was Director of ICA from July 1955 to July 1957. James H. Smith who directed ICA from July 1957 to January 1959 followed Hollister, while James W. Riddleberger replaced Smith in February 1959.

support, liaise with foreign intelligence services, and undertake covert action as required in support of OISP objectives.[88]

Defense training of foreign military forces both in the United States and abroad continued, focusing on riot control, counter-intelligence, and counter-guerrilla operations funded through military assistance programs. Other DOD roles now included 'courtesy' training in US facilities of 'neutral' country personnel; assistance to select paramilitary and police forces jurisdictionally linked to host-country military forces; and logistical support to US field elements operating directly or indirectly with counter-subversive forces.[89]

To achieve military assistance economies and reduce direct US involvement, regional training centers and third-country instruction – Vietnamese by Filipinos, Laotians and Cambodians by Thais, Bolivians by Chileans – received even greater emphasis. This was both a political consideration and a practical necessity given the lack of qualified US personnel available for internal security purposes.[90]

Officials from the Latin America Working Group undertook further measures to refine the OISP concept and insure that policy be implemented more expeditiously. They clarified concerns over leadership responsibilities, preparation of OISP courses of action and progress reports, as well as security classification.[91] They also instituted an OISP

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[88] Annual OISP Report, 11 March 1958, p.1; Statement of Coordination Arrangements for the Overseas Internal Security Program, 1 April 1957, Annex A-Illustrative Roles of Participating Agencies, 13 March 1957, pp.1-3.

[89] Ibid.; Memorandum from Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Chairman-JCS, and Defense Representatives-OCB Working Groups re: Implementation and Coordination of NSC Action 1290d, 14 March 1956, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 17, OCB 014.12 File #3(3) NSC 1290d-Internal Security (DDEL), pp.1-2.

[90] Haney Report, p.22; Report to the NSC Pursuant to NSC Action 1290d-Working Draft, 7 September 1955, p.3.

[91] Memorandum for Members-OCB Working Group on Latin America-from R.P. Crenshaw re: Progress Report on Latin America (NSC 5613/1), 23 May 1957, NSC Staff: Papers, OCB Central Files, Box 76, OCB 091.4 Latin America File #11(3) (DDEL), p.7.

activity plan backed by a regional fund of $2,000,000 that included more than $500,000 each for Bolivia and Brazil, $300,000 for Guatemala, and $100,000 each for Chile and Costa Rica. Internal security funds set aside for countries not yet approved for OISPs included $300,000 for Colombia and $100,000 each for Ecuador and Uruguay.[92]

In sum, throughout 1957 the Eisenhower administration contended with ongoing Sino-Soviet bloc efforts to establish and expand diplomatic, cultural, and economic ties throughout Latin America, aided and supported by local communist parties and groups.[93] It countered by actively implementing, with varying success, internal security programs in several nations in that region. By the end of the year OISP activities in Latin America were proceeding, albeit at a moderate pace.

Nonetheless, this proved the last full year in which the administration could initiate OISP policy in the region without substantial legislative restrictions. While events throughout the following year were the low point for the administration's policies in Latin America, revolutionary changes ultimately elevated internal security to a dominant policy position for the remainder of the Cold War.

OISP Policy Under Siege

US Vice President Richard M. Nixon departed for a tour of eight Latin American nations on 27 April 1958 with his wife and various US officials. Dramatic and widely publicized anti-American demonstrations greeted Nixon in Lima, and in Caracas, a mob of some 4000 people attacked his motorcade. Troops with drawn bayonets were needed to clear a way for the cars through the angry crowd. In order to assure the protection of

[92] Annual 1290d Report, 15 February 1957, pp.9-10.
[93] Annual OISP Report, 11 March 1958, p.9.

the American delegation, Eisenhower placed Marine units at Cherry Point, North Carolina on standby.[94]

Nixon's disastrous trip highlighted the failure of the administration's Latin American policies. That the attack on the Vice President occurred in Venezuela was particularly embarrassing given that OISP reports for several years had declared that nation 'stable.'[95] US officials claimed that communists had inspired and directed the outbreaks of violence, though they admitted that non-communists, angry at US policies towards the region, constituted the majority of rioters.

Ultranationalism, particularly among politically active students and intellectuals, appeared the most serious current problem facing US interests in the area. As well many democratic elements resented US support of dictatorial regimes and the administration's general neglect of Latin America in comparison to Europe, Asia, and Africa. All of these factors, US analysts concluded, allowed communists to increase their political, cultural, and propaganda activities, and place the United States in a negative position.[96] Intelligence reports revealed that Latin American communist parties appeared to grow in strength, particularly in Colombia, Venezuela, and Guatemala.[97] These reports not withstanding, CIA director Allen Dulles admitted that even without a communist presence, problems would exist in the region.[98]

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[94] Letter from the Secretary of State to the Vice President, 6 March 1958, pp.222-23; Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to the Secretary of State, 9 May 1958, p.224; Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation, 13 May 1958, pp.228-29 all in *FRUS* Vol.V, 1958-1960.

[95] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, pp.100-02.

[96] Background of Recent Latin American Demonstrations Against Vice President Nixon and Initiative For High-Level Western Hemisphere Meeting-Summary, not dated, *DDQS* Vol.3 (1977), Microform 64(A), pp.1-4.

[97] OCB Report on US Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5613/1), Annex B: CIA Intelligence Annex-Sino-Soviet Bloc Activity in Latin America, 15 April 1958, *DDQS* Vol.7 (1981), Microform 335(A), pp.1-4.

[98] Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, p.102.

The situation in Venezuela for instance, punctuated an important misperception of US policymakers: Latin Americans might well be ultranationalist and even violently anti-American but that did not necessarily make them procommunist. In fact during the 1958-1964 period the Venezuelan governments of Rómulo Betancourt and Rául Leoni struggled against a communist insurgency of both urban and rural composition.

Both governments 'maintained a position that the insurgents must be countered by legal and humane methods within the existing framework of the country; that individual rights and civil liberties must be respected and maintained; and that, at the same time, effective social, economic, and developmental reform programs must be instituted.'[99] Through extensive nation-building efforts that included widespread agrarian reform and controlled use of counterinsurgency the threat was contained, despite anti-American sentiment in the country.[100]

Nonetheless in an effort to offset these adverse factors the administration began to place greater emphasis on both its economic and security policy in the region. But attempts to counter suspected communist influence through increased military assistance funding met with stiff congressional opposition.[101] Congress raised concerns about the validity of implementing public safety programs in countries where political, economic,

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[99] US Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), *Selected Readings in Insurgent War*, Reference Book (RB) 31-100, Vol.II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Compiled from CRESS and SORO material, 1973), p.5-1.

[100] Ibid., pp.5-1 – 5-29.

[101] Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp.330-32. See also Letter to the President from Senators Green, Fulbright, Sparkman, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse, Kennedy, and Langer re: Mutual Security Appropriations Bill for 1959, 25 August 1958, President's Committee to Study the US Military Assistance Program: (Draper Committee) Records, 1958-59, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) January 1959(2) (DDEL), five pages. For CIA review and rebuttal of the charges that US MAP assistance had encouraged a trend towards military regimes in the underdeveloped world see Letter and Attached Study from Robert Amory, Jr. (CIA-Office of the Deputy Director [Intelligence]) to General Draper re: Certain Problems Created by the US Military Assistance Program, 30 January 1959, Draper Committee, Box 8, II. Letter to Allen Dulles, CIA, 15 December 1958; Replies of 14 and 30 January 1959 (DDEL), pp.1-20.

or even ultranationalist factors caused instability, 'in the absence of any immediate threat from communist subversion.'[102]

Many congressional critics, including Hubert Humphrey, John F. Kennedy, William Fulbright, and Wayne Morse opposed increased military assistance to regimes that lacked popular, democratic support within their own nations at the excuse of being anticommunist.[103] Senator Morse dealt another blow to the administration's OISP policy in June of 1958 when the Mutual Security Act passed with an amendment he sponsored, prohibiting the use of MAP funds in Latin America for internal security purposes.[104] This placed the administration, 'in the absurd position of working on an expanding number of civil OIS Programs and, at the same time, being under specific Congressional injunction not to use MAP funds for internal security purposes except in "exceptional" cases.'[105]

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[102] OCB Report on US Policy Toward Latin America (NSC 5613/1), 21 May 1958, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 18, NSC 5613/1-Policy Toward Latin America(1) (DDEL), p.6. As regards the name change to 'Public Safety Programs', in his report of 14 June 1957, Albert Haney recommended renaming ICA's civil police program 'to a title more expansive and palatable abroad' such as 'Public Safety.' Clearly the administration adopted this recommendation (see Haney Report, pp.20, 28).

[103] Cook, *The Declassified Eisenhower*, pp.330-31.

[104] The Mutual Security Act of 1960-Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate on S. 3058, 22 April 1960, Reports to the President on Pending Legislation Prepared by the White House Records Office (Bill File), Box 166, Appr. 5/14/60 To Amend Further the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as Amended, and for Other Purposes. H.R. 11510 (DDEL), p.36. By this point, Morse had good reason to be recalcitrant about the administration's internal security policy. Within the summary OISP legislative history it is noted that, 'a deliberate effort was made to keep legislative presentations subtle with respect to this type of activity and blend the activity into overall presentation in such a way as not to call undue public attention to the program because of obvious security connotations, and yet at the same time make clear to Congress the type of activity in which ICA was undertaking.' As well, by the end of the year Eisenhower 'advised all concerned that when they went to Congress to get appropriations for military assistance for political purposes or to get economic assistance, they should simply describe all such assistance as national security assistance.' See Edwin H. Arnold to J.H. Smith, Jr. re: Worldwide Review of Public Safety Programs (FY59-60), 12 November 1958, Annex A: Legislative History of OISP, 24 October 1958, Draper Committee, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) April 1959(2) (DDEL), p.1 and Memorandum re: Discussion at the 388th Meeting of the NSC, 3 December 1958, p.3.

[105] Memorandum from the Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Hill) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Snow) re: US Military Policy Towards Latin America, 29 July 1958 in *FRUS* Vol.V, 1958-1960, p.150. Hill also voiced concern that ongoing attempts by the administration to offer justifications for every 'exceptional' circumstance

To further complicate matters, the administration's ICA Director, James Smith, reacting to the mounting congressional pressure, decided unilaterally to limit equipment provided to developing nations under its Public Safety Program to only that amount needed for instruction or demonstration purposes. Writing to Smith, Edwin H. Arnold raised concerns that ICA's entrance into the field of internal security had constituted 'a wide departure from established concepts of "technical assistance" and "economic development".'

According to Arnold, public safety administration in OISP-scheduled countries often included 'activities not normally associated with police operations in the United States,' such as the operation of national communications networks, maintenance of national personal registration and identification systems, and domestic counter-intelligence and control of subversive activities.

Moreover, supporting forces 'deemed repressive or militaristic often [appeared] incompatible with other ICA objectives.' Arnold called for a reassessment of OISP and ICA Public Safety policies.[106] James W. Riddleberger replaced Smith as ICA Director in February 1959, but his attempt to limit ICA's internal security role proved a factor in the eventual militarization of OISP policy.

Revolution in Cuba: Resuscitating OISP in Latin America

In an effort to address congressional criticism over MAP funding in underdeveloped regions, Eisenhower established the President's Committee to Study the US Military

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involving internal security in Latin America would 'some day cause . . . acute embarrassment if there is a searching inquiry by the press or the Congress.'

[106] Edwin H. Arnold to J.H. Smith, Jr. re: Worldwide Review of Public Safety Programs (FY59-60), 12 November 1958, pp.2, 9-11. Arnold recognized that historical support, ongoing national security interests, and the interests of other agencies involved in the development of internal security programs would mitigate against immediate application of ICA's new policy. In 1958 coordination of Mutual Security

Assistance Program in November 1958. Eisenhower appointed General William H. Draper chairman of the committee, which held its first meeting in December. But events some 90 miles off the coast of Florida overshadowed the committee's inception and the congressional criticism it was meant to defuse.

On 1 January 1959 the collapse of the Fulgencio Batista government in Cuba and the emergence of Fidel Castro's revolutionary regime presented a model for insurgency to all Latin American guerrilla movements. For the first time, guerrillas who openly identified their political beliefs as radical-leftist brought down and replaced a pro-American government.[107] For the Eisenhower administration this represented a final, major blow in an ongoing series of setbacks to its policies in Latin America made all the more embarrassing by the fact that no OISP initiatives were considered for Cuba in the years prior to Castro's revolutionary success.

The Cuban Revolution radically altered the US policymaker's geostrategic concepts of security for Latin America, forcing the administration to deal with not only social reform, but also the prospect of Cuban-style insurgency spreading throughout the region.[108] Previously, hemisphere defense had been the overriding US military consideration, although OIS programs for various nations did attempt to promote training of paramilitary, civil police, and intelligence organizations for the maintenance of internal security.

Program activities was transferred to the State Department and with it, leadership functions concerning OISP.

[107] Andrew Hoehn and Carlos Weiss, 'Overview of Latin American Insurgencies,' in G. Fauriol (ed.) *Latin American Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies and The National Defense University Press, 1985), pp.13-14.

[108] Gil, *Latin American-United States Relations*, p.227; Thomas C. Wright, *Latin America in the Era of the Cuban Revolution* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1991), p.61.

Military assistance had placed the US in a favorable position of influence in the Latin American military sphere, contributed indirectly to the national economies by sharing defense costs, and impacted on the psychological conditioning of officers and men trained in the United States. But now, declared US Army Chief of Staff, Brigadier General James W. Coutts in a letter to the Draper Committee, 'the greatest aid Latin America can furnish us militarily is in preserving their internal stability.'[109]

Colonel (later Brigadier General) Edward G. Lansdale in DOD's Office of Special Operations (OSO) echoed this belief:

> Perhaps the outstanding Defense need with the OCB is a more realistic look at the Overseas Internal Security Program (OISP). What the originators of OISP intended and what the OISP is today are too far apart. Defense has gradually defaulted its very real stake in OISP to ICA and a civilian police program. This is falling short of internal security goals. Bolivia furnishes an example. Under OISP the US trained Bolivian police . . . provided fine protection to American officials in the recent demonstrations. But, the internal security of Bolivia is in a highly unstable state. Wouldn't the judicious expenditure of some OISP funds in a program with the Bolivian Army . . . start constructing the fundamentals needed for internal security in Bolivia?[110]

Another OSO member, J.T. French, believed that OISP policy could be 'vitalized' through NSC level reaffirmation of its importance; centralized direction and leadership from Washington; 'full-time attention' to assessment, implementation, and progress reports; and utilization of personnel knowledgeable in internal security activity, including

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[109] Letter to William H. Draper, Chairman-US President's Committee to Study the US Military Assistance Program-from James W. Coutts, US Army Chief of Staff, 13 January 1959, *DDQS* Vol.10 (1984), Microform 001577, pp.1-3. Although the study focuses on East and Southeast Asian military performance estimates, an interesting overview of DOD's evolving global perception concerning the role of indigenous military forces can be found in a document prepared by The Institute for Defense Analysis for the Draper Committee. See A Brief of Weapon's Systems Evaluation Group's Study of the Utilization of Indigenous Forces of Underdeveloped Countries, 12 February 1959, Draper Committee, Box 11 (DDEL).

[110] Memorandum by Colonel E.G. Lansdale, Office of Special Operations (OSO)/Office of the Secretary of Defense (ODO) to Defense Collateral Activities Coordinating Group re:Military Assistance, 27 April 1959, Draper Committee, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) April 1959(2) (DDEL), p.7.

those from other countries, who would bring flexible and imaginative concepts and ideas to the program.

According to French, DOD's abrogation of responsibilities in implementing OISP policy meant that it often offered limited, 'standardized' support that proved 'meaningless' to the local situation or, worse still, failed to develop any programs at all, 'due to confusion or lack of knowledge on the part of people in the field as to what OISP [was] all about.' Many sections of the US government not currently involved could contribute to the program, French concluded, particularly under-utilized DOD specialists in intelligence, special warfare, civil affairs, and military government.[111]

CIA's Robert Komer shared a comparable view. He adamantly declared that no other program offered 'as much overall security' for such relatively small cost as OISP, and that the program was 'under fire largely because of ICA's reluctance to be in the police business.' Komer believed that, 'for what it's worth, my own personal opinion is that OISP ought to be increased, and offered to each new underdeveloped country. And if anyone had the guts to do so, OISP could be used to reduce the demand for military aid, especially in countries where internal security is the primary mission.'[112]

The heightened debate and interest in OISP did prove one thing: that the Cuban Revolution had, ironically, breathed new life into the Eisenhower administration's faltering internal security policy for Latin America, muting congressional critics. In August 1959 the administration issued US Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5906/1),

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[111] Memorandum for Colonel Bussey, Draper Committee Staff from J.T. French, Office of Special Operations re: Overseas Internal Security Program, 7 April 1959, Draper Committee, Box 17, Category V-Central Files (Military Assistance) April 1959(2) (DDEL), pp.1-3. Albert Haney had earlier envisioned greater use of Special Forces in both a counter-guerrilla warfare role and as a guerrilla exploitation force.

[112] Memorandum from R.W. Komer to Colonel G.A. Lincoln, Study Coordinator, Draper Committee re: OISP Program, 29 January 1959, Draper Committee, Box 20, Overseas Internal Security Program (DDEL), 1 page. (Underlined in original).

calling for continued support of civil police and other 'overt and covert' programs to fight against communist subversion, while concomitantly encouraging and assisting allied nations to develop their own covert programs in coordination with the United States. In NSC 5906/1 they also recommended similar actions against 'subversive or rebellious' non-communist elements deemed 'hostile to US interests.'[113]

For Latin America this meant that internal security programs could proceed 'as feasible,' with the caveat that consideration be given to the dangers of associating with security forces that utilized repressive or extra-legal methods of enforcement.[114] During much of the Cold War, however, this caveat would prove secondary to US national security interests in the region.

Summary

As Cold War attentions shifted to the 'contested areas' of the periphery,[115] the Eisenhower administration grew increasingly concerned by the rising threat of communist subversion and revolutionary warfare throughout the Third World, including Latin America.[116] The administration responded with the Overseas Internal Security

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[113] NSC 5906/1-Basic National Security Policy, 5 August 1959, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 27, NSC 5906-Basic National Security Policy[Strategic Stockpile; Space Policy](1) (DDEL), p.16. This policy remained valid throughout the remainder of the administration's mandate.

[114] NSC 5902/1-US Policy Toward Latin America, 16 February 1959, OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 26, NSC 5902-Latin America (1) (DDEL), pp.16-17. Administration officials also saw the maintenance of internal security as a contribution to hemisphere defense in so far as a breakdown in this security during time of general war would cause the diversion of US troops from other missions. See Annex B to above, p.67.

[115] Letter from General Graves B. Erskine, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) to Mansfield D. Sprague, The President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, Sprague Committee, Box 8, Military #28(13) (DDEL), p.1.

[116] Memorandum for Waldemar A. Nielsen, Executive Director, The President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad from Edward G. Lansdale, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) re: Latin America, Sprague Committee, Box 3, Latin America #12(4) (DDEL), p.1. For the final report of the Sprague Committee vis-à-vis Latin America see The President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (PCIAA No.12)-Latin America, 23 May 1960, NSC Staff: Papers, NSC Registry Series, 1947-62, Box 13, PCIAA Studies Nos. 11 and 12 (Sprague Committee) (DDEL), pp.1-15.

Program – a policy meant to build effective internal security systems within allied nations, primarily in the developing world.

Clearly problems associated with this new policy initiative existed. Initial authority and responsibility for OIS programs was ill-defined, jurisdictions overlapped and excessive secrecy and inter-agency rivalry slowed progress. Bureaucratic differences over policy priorities resulted in erratic coordination and implementation between the various US departments involved.[117] Personnel remained key problem area too, as limited numbers of qualified US specialists existed to conduct counter-subversive training, while those operating in the field often lacked centralized direction and leadership. Still, Eisenhower's Overseas Internal Security Program remains significant in that it offered the first coherent, integrated US strategy for countering low-intensity threats, communist or otherwise.

Amongst Latin Americans, however, political objections to Eisenhower's OISP policy made efforts to initiate and expand the program more difficult.[118] Differences over estimates of Soviet ability to influence and direct communist movements in the region and periodic revelations of US intelligence assets embedded within the security structures of various Latin American nations exacerbated the problem.

Latin Americans viewed the problem of communist agitation and subversion not solely within the global Cold War context, but rather as a function of the hemisphere's widespread social ills. Differences sharpened as security assistance, which many Latin Americans believed would threaten weak democratic institutions throughout the region, flourished, while regional development aid languished.

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[117] For an in-depth description of the politics of bureaucracies see Allison, 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,' *The American Political Science Review* LXIII/3 (September 1969), pp.708-11.

But amongst US officials the Cuban Revolution raised fears that Castro's government would actively promote and covertly assist communist revolutionary movements throughout the hemisphere.[119] This led the Eisenhower administration to promote internal security as a priority objective for the region, calling jointly for effective US counter-guerrilla doctrine as well as social, political, and economic assistance programs to deal with the root causes of discontent.[120]

Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations would adopt – and expand considerably – Eisenhower's military-economic strategy throughout Latin America, designating Colombia[121] as the 'showcase' nation for this dual-track policy approach.

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[118] Annual 1290d Report-15 February 1957, p.1.
[119] Bureau of Intelligence and Research-Intelligence Report No. 8385: The Situation in Cuba-27 December 1960, *DDQS* Vol. 5 (1979), Microform 71(C), p.5.
[120] Letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mallory) to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs (Irwin), *FRUS* Vol. V, 1958-1960, pp.214-15. See also documents 22, 33, 37, 38, and 40 in above for an overview of some final policy questions and statements by Eisenhower administration officials concerning Latin America and internal security.
[121] See Appendix 1.

CHAPTER TWO

LA VIOLENCIA IN COLOMBIA

Introduction

Political, sociocultural, economic, and military factors all contributed to the emergence of *la Violencia* in Colombia. As the traditional structures of a society burdened by regionalism, oligarchic control of the institutions of power, and polarized political loyalties proved incapable of meeting the challenges of modernization, political provocations and conflict grew. As the situation deteriorated the murder of populist Liberal leader Jorge Eliciér Gaitán on 9 April 1948 produced the *Bogotazo*: two days of riots in the capital followed by near-civil war in the countryside.

In 1953, after years of ever-increasing guerrilla and counter-guerrilla violence, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla overthrew the acting government of Conservative Laureano Gómez, installing a military dictatorship in an effort to restore order. Meeting in the first instance with some success, the Rojas regime's increasingly authoritative methods quickly disillusioned the Colombian populace. Renewed conflict led the military to depose Rojas, ultimately allowing former Liberal and Conservative antagonists to form a National Front government. Restoration of civilian government paved the way for greater collaboration with the United States in matters related to internal security.

The *Bogotazo*

In the early afternoon of 9 April 1948 an assassin shot and killed Liberal Party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in central Bogotá. Shortly thereafter a crowd seized Gaitán's killer, beat him to death, dragged the corpse to the front of the Presidential Palace and hung it in

a public street. Public order disintegrated shortly thereafter. A mob ransacked the *Capitolio* – seat of the concurrently running Ninth Inter-American Conference, where delegates would establish the Organization of American States (OAS) – almost setting fire to one wing of the building. Armed bands looted shops trying to obtain weapons and an assailant through a bomb into the *Edificio Americano*, which housed the offices of the US delegation to the Inter-American Conference on the seventh floor.[122]

The *New York Times* headline the following day left no doubt as to what the American press believed had occurred: 'Colombia Battles Leftist Mobs Burning and Looting the Capital; Inter-American Parley is Halted.' It reported that anarchy ruled in the beleaguered city. Gun battles took place outside the US Embassy and numerous government buildings as well as the Cathedral and the Conservative newspaper *El Siglo* were set on fire. Extremists captured a government radio station and urged widespread revolution. Troops killed eight people when they fired into a crowd trying to storm the Palace. Colombia's Conservative President Ospina Pérez appealed to citizens to rally against 'totalitarianism:' in a communiqué he decried the troubles as a 'communist maneuver.'[123]

US newspapers offered a variety of explanations for the violence. Some believed that the 'precise timing' of the riot indicated 'European-style communist techniques' making their appearance in Latin America. Others placed the blame on 'fanatical rightist' Colombian politics, which allowed communists to exploit discontent and 'make hay burn

[122] The Ambassador in Colombia (Beaulac) to the Acting Secretary of State, 9 April 1948-3:00pm, *FRUS* Vol.IX 1948, p.37.
[123] *New York Times (NYT)*, 10 April 1948, pp.1, 3.

after the fire had started.' US Secretary of State George C. Marshall explicitly blamed communists and the Soviet Union.[124]

Several days later the Colombian government announced that the group that had attempted to foment revolution after seizing a radio station had been arrested; the group included two Russian agents and other foreigners.[125] In America, Republican presidential aspirant Thomas E. Dewey excoriated the Truman administration and, implicitly, the newly constituted CIA for 'a shameful example of unbelievable incompetence . . . [W]e apparently had no idea what was going on in a country just 2 hours flying time from the Panama Canal.'[126]

In fact early in 1948 CIA had warned that intercepted communist communiqués showed that the Latin American Communist Party planned to disrupt the Bogotá conference. Arms and explosives had been stored in safe houses and plans made for organizing mass public meetings and distributing 50,000 handbills and 3,000 posters. Party members called for cell meetings, recruitment drives, and the organization of syndicates and unions during this period as well as agitation and propaganda attacks against Chilean, Brazilian, Argentine, and US delegations, all of whom where considered particularly anticommunist.[127]

In spite of these preparations, Gaitán's murder appeared to catch the communists by surprise. In mid-October of 1948 a State Department intelligence report indicated that no

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[124] *Washington News*, 21 April 1948 and *PM*, 20 April 1948 as cited in Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), p.53.
[125] The Ambassador in Colombia (Beaulac) to the Acting Secretary of State, 11 April 1948, *FRUS* Vol.IX 1948, p.41.
[126] Dewey quoted in Stephen J. Springarn, 'A Basic Program for the Vitalization of the National Defense Establishment Organization (and its lower echelons) relating to Overseas Counter-Intelligence . . . Addendum of 16 April 1948,' p.23 in Jefferey-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, p.53.
[127] Andrew R. Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, Department of the Army Pamphlet No.550-104 (Washington, DC: The American University-SORO, 1966), p.189.

conclusive evidence existed to implicate communist political elements in his death. Although communist groups participated extensively in the rioting utilizing radio, printed matter, and their position in organized labor, State could not determine to what extent they had instigated or participated in mob violence and vandalism. Long-standing political tension, chronic economic distress and consequent social unrest provided the stage for the riots in which communist agitators actively participated.[128]

By 11 April the government, having brought in the armed forces, reestablished relative order in the city. But for Colombia the long-term consequences of the violence proved dire, sparking a cycle of Liberal-Conservative guerrilla and counter-guerrilla actions that devolved into virtual civil war in the countryside.

Colombian Society and the Roots of *la Violencia*

The broader, historical reasons for the *Bogotazo* and the violence that ensued lay within the dynamics of social and political life in Colombia. A social structure had developed based on ownership and use of land. *Latifundista* institutions formed to support this structure, while values, beliefs, and attitudes associated with it remained practically unchanged from what can be described as a 'peasant order'.[129]

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[128] Communist Involvement in the Colombia Riots of 09 April 1948, OIR Report No.4686, 14 October 1948, *DDQS* Vol.6 (1980), Microform 72(C), pp.3-5.

[129] Orlando Fals Borda, 'The Role of Violence in the Break with Traditionalism: The Colombian Case,' paper given before the Fifth World Congress of Sociology-1962 as found in File 228-01 Permanent: HRC Geog G Colombia 400.318 (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History (CMH) Archives-Colombia File circa 1965), Tab A, p.1. Hereafter cited as *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives). This dissertation draws on the following structural categories identified by Goldstone: '(1) the variable goals and structures of states; (2) the systematic intrusion, over time, of international political and economic pressures on the domestic political and economic organization of societies; (3) the structure of peasant communities; (4) the coherence or weakness of the armed forces; and (5) the variables affecting elite behavior' (Goldstone, 'Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation,' pp.434-35).

Goldstone also identifies three distinct phases or generations of theories of revolution that have emerged over the past century. First Generation theorists (1900-40) were largely concerned with deducing patterns or stages of the revolutionary process, but did not utilize any larger theoretical frameworks. Specialists of the Second Generation (1940-75) considered this approach atheoretical and overly historical. In reaction, they undertook an analysis of revolutions utilizing social-scientific theories from psychology,

The two traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, dominated politics in the country. While leadership of these parties came from the upper economic and social strata of the society, the intense and violent rivalry that developed between the two groups expressed itself at all levels of Colombian society. Traditional political antagonism coupled to social and economic dislocation fueled violence that, particularly in rural areas, 'had the characteristics of a blood feud.'[130]

Differences in the basic philosophical make-up of each party furthered the rivalry between them. On religious issues, Conservatives supported the major role played by the

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sociology, and political science. Theorists of the Third Generation (since 1975) reacted, in turn, to the deficiencies of these social-scientific theories by developing several new categories of analysis, both at the systemic and the internal, domestic level, that second generation theorists had largely ignored.

Key First Generation works that Goldstone identifies include Pitrim A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincourt, 1925); Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1927); George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution* (New York, NY: Harper, 1938); and Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1938).

Key Second Generation works that Goldstone identifies include James C. Davies, 'Toward a Theory of Revolution', *American Sociological Review* XXVII/1 (February 1962), pp.5-19; Samual P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1966); Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970); and Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).

Key Third Generation works that Goldstone identifies include Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1975); S.N. Eisenstadt, *Revolution and the Transformation of Societies: A Comparative Study of Civilizations* (New York, NY: Free Press, 1978); Kay Ellen Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978); and Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

The classic work to which Third Generation scholars owe a considerable intellectual debt is Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1966).

For more recent, innovative work that extends Third Generation scholarship on the topic of revolution, insurgency, and internal subversion to Latin America see Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution: Essays on Latin American Insurgency and Revolutionary Theory*; and Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956*. For important new work that utilizes and adapts the structuralist approach of Third Generation scholars to the field of counterinsurgency studies see Thomas A. Marks, *Making Revolution: The Insurgency of the Communist Party of Thailand in Structural Perspective* (Bangkok, Thailand: White Lotus Co., Ltd, 1994); Marks, *Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam* (London, UK: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd, 1996); and Marks, *Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998).

[130] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-65-Prospects for Colombia, 9 July 1965, *DDQS* Vol.14 (1988), Microform 003075, p.3.

Catholic Church in Colombian society, particularly in education. Liberals on the other hand, favored educational reform and tended to be anticlerical. As well, Liberals looked towards greater economic diversity, development, and progress than their Conservative counterparts, who favored limited diversification and a more rural, agricultural society, rather than an urban industrial one. Liberal foreign policy looked outward, seeking trade liberalization, while Conservatives tended towards a more traditional, tariff-protected view. Both parties favored centralized power when in government.[131]

Liberal-Conservative struggles also formed around the issue of local as opposed to central control of political and economic patronage. Numerous civil wars during the 19th century extended partisan political identification to all levels of Colombian society. Throughout these civil wars control of the presidency was of primary importance. Victory in this struggle gave a party near total control of local and national political patronage appointments and the attendant rewards of economic and social status.[132]

The strength of Colombia's civilian political leadership also imposed itself on that nation's military establishment. Strong civilian influence combined with a paucity of external threats, low social status, and traditional antimilitarism limited the military's political influence.[133] Throughout much of the 19th Century, Colombia's history revolved around a series of civil wars. Five major conflicts – 1839-41, 1860-61, 1875, 1885, 1895 – occurred, while the Thousand Day War of 1899-1903 caused an estimated 100,000

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[131] Stephen J. Randall, *Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence* (Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1992), pp.45-46, 68; LTC Joseph A. Yore, 'Military Forces (Army) in Colombia During Conflict Stage of Insurgency,' United States Army War College (USAWC) Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USAWC, 1971), pp.7-8.

[132] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.6.

[133] Army Roles, Missions, and Doctrine in Low-Intensity Conflict (ARMLIC): Preconflict Case Study 2-Colombia, File HRC 319.1, (CMH Archives), Washington, DC (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Operations Research, Inc. under contract No.DAAG 25-67-C-0702 for US Army Combat Developments Command, 15

deaths. These wars more often consisted of 'head-on, point-blank range battles between two opposing conglomerations of peasants led by lawyers turned generals.'[134]

Colombia's first efforts to establish a formally trained military officer cadre began with the advent of the Rafael Reyes administration early in the 20th century. To further this end Reyes called on the Chilean army to send a training Mission to Bogotá in 1907, which proved instrumental in establishing the Colombian Army Military Academy that same year, while a second Mission would later help to establish the Colombian War College. Chilean advisors continued to assist Colombia's security forces until early 1960.

A Swiss Mission succeeded these early initiatives, offering army school and aviation training in the late 1920s. A German Mission followed and remained through the 1930s in a training and advisory capacity for the army, while also establishing the aviation school at Cali. Concurrently, a French General Officer served as instructor at the War College and a British Naval Mission established the Colombian Navy Academy at Cartagena.[135]

In 1939, as war loomed in Europe, a US Military Mission (army and navy) was established in Colombia, given that nation's strategic proximity to the Panama Canal. As described in the Mission History, 'despite the long history of mission instruction, the Americans found a poorly equipped, indifferently trained, and political, rather than

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December 1969), pp.9-10. Hereafter cited as ARMLIC: Preconflict Case Study 2-Colombia (CMH Archives).

[134] J. Leon Helguera, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia,' *Journal of InterAmerican Studies (JIAS)*, 3 (July 1961), pp.351-52.

[135] Ibid., p.352; Brief History of US Army Mission to Colombia-US Army Mission to Colombia, c/o US Embassy, Bogotá, Colombia, 22 June 1965, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab C, pp.1-2; and Summary and Conclusions *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), pp.20-21.

military-minded officer corps.'[136] As a result, Mission training focused on upgrading professionalism and equipment, while promoting US Army doctrine, tactics, and organization.

While an earlier conflict with Peru at Leticia in 1932-33 did raise awareness in Colombia to the need for improving armed forces capabilities, it was World War II and Colombia's alliance with the United States that resulted in a substantial increase in army budget and force levels. During this period, internal dissent led junior army officers to attempt a coup against President Alfonso López in the city of Pasto in 1944. Although the so-called 'Pasto Rebellion' failed, it did indicate that some unrest existed within the fabric of Colombia's military establishment.[137] Still, compared to their counterparts in other Latin American republics, Colombian military officers remained disinclinded to disregard or usurp authority, although both the internal and external political situation would soon cause this to change.

Finally, Colombian society was also beset by disputes over rural land ownership between landlords and frontier settlers, particularly in the eastern plains and Andean regions. The civilian population in rural areas carried arms, while political opposition and violence remained prevalent throughout the society.[138] In the 1930s, differences in economic development and distribution of wealth became more acute as urbanization increasingly replaced traditional values and social processes associated with a rural, agricultural society.

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[136] Summary and Conclusions *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), p.21.
[137] Helguera, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia,' *JIAS*, 3 (July 1961), pp.353-54.
[138] Jorge P. Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and Guerrilla Warfare* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989), p.85.

Political, economic, and religious innovations introduced by Liberal President Alfonso López's 'Revolution on the March' programs exacerbated these differences and heightened strains with Conservative political opponents. As political tensions grew, land invasions, tenant expulsions, and persecution of political opponents increased.[139]

During World War II armed groups appeared in southern Tolima, southern Cundinamarca, and the Llanos (eastern plains) region. Supported by local and national leaders of the Liberal and Communist parties, these groups attempted to reclaim rural property they believed the Conservative elite had taken illegally. Armed confrontation followed as landowners organized themselves to counter these groups. Security forces, both military and police, lacked a reputation for political neutrality, further complicating an already volatile situation. Violence was the end result of political extremism, vendetta, ongoing disputes over land, and the dissolution of local government authority.[140]

Throughout Colombia's history, contests for political power were limited to choices between Liberal and Conservative candidates. But efforts by the Liberal regime to transform the country created a 'populist' following later headed by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. In 1945 he attempted to position the Liberal Party as the leader of the masses against the oligarchy. This effort split the Party and allowed, after 16 years of Liberal rule, a minority Conservative government under Mariano Ospina Pérez to come to power in 1946.[141] Ospina's status quo regime, however, did not further the aspirations of the new

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[139] Fals Borda, 'The Role of Violence in the break with Traditionalism: The Colombian Case,' *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), pp.1-2.
[140] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, pp.85-87.
[141] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-65-Prospects for Colombia, 9 July 1965, *DDQS* Vol.14 (1988), p.3.

political class, and severe postwar inflation increased economic hardship, further intensifying political and social polarization to a critical level.[142]

Conflict grew between populist forces and those wishing to maintain the customary system as the modernization processes prior to World War II threatened traditional Colombian society. Several additional factors including intense party loyalty and affiliation, a history of political violence, and the willingness of both parties to exploit the burgeoning violence for their own political purposes further fueled this internal crisis.[143] By 1946, 'violence was latent in Colombian rural society, and required only a spark to set it off.'[144]

After the 1946 election, Liberals in rural areas increasingly resorted to armed resistance to the Conservative assumption of power, often as a result of partisan political attacks. As Liberal guerrilla groups formed to attack the Conservative-dominated regime, the government responded both by increasing their control over the police and armed forces, and through the formation of counter-guerrilla groups.[145] In this atmosphere of ongoing rural violence and sustained political agitation the murder of Gaitán in April 1948 produced the *Bogotazo*: two days of riotous violence, mob control of the streets of Bogotá, and some 1,400 people killed.[146]

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[142] 'Study No.1: Post-World War II Political Developments in Latin America,' US Senate Document No.125, p.20.
[143] Richard S. Weinert, 'Violence in Pre-Modern Societies: Rural Colombia,' *The American Political Science Review*, 60 (June 1966), p.346.
[144] James M. Daniel, *Rural Violence in Colombia Since 1946* (Washington, DC: SORO, 1975), p.16.
[145] Norman A. Bailey, '*La Violencia* in Colombia,' *JIAS*, 9 (October 1967), p.566.

La Violencia in Colombia, 1948-1953

Violence in the Countryside

Although the government ultimately contained the *Bogotazo*, violence escalated throughout rural Colombia in its aftermath. Between 1948 and 1949 two 'National Union' Conservative governments failed and a cycle of attacks and repression in the backlands grew in extent and ferocity. By 1949 this increasing violence drove the Liberal presidential candidate from the race for the presidency. The government declared a state of siege and called in the Army to restore order. Conservative candidate Laureano Gómez was elected to the presidency in the 27 November election after the Liberals refused to field a candidate.[147] Shortly thereafter he dissolved Congress.

Directed by the Gómez regime, the National Police and the army increasingly resorted to repressive measures to contain civil strife, further straining the political fabric. Liberals felt subjugated by a Conservative dictatorship wholly supported, they believed, by the security forces and the Church.[148] Early in 1950 attacks against Liberals became so intense that they resorted to extraparliamentary measures to protect themselves. Operating in the *Llanos*, the northern highlands, and some western districts, newly formed Liberal guerrilla groups undertook counterattacks against Conservative farms, towns, and villages.[149]

Organizational structures as they existed within these guerrilla forces – including several groups of communist irregulars – tended to follow patterns similar to conventional formations. These structures were informal, organized on a local scale with

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[146] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-65-Prospects for Colombia, 9 July 1965, *DDQS* Vol.14 (1988), p.3.
[147] Editorial Footnote, *FRUS* Vol.II 1949, p.622.
[148] Department of State Policy Statement: Colombia, 8 May 1950, *FRUS* Vol.II 1950, p.820.

loyalties directed primarily at the village level,[150] though an infusion of Liberal intellectuals modestly transformed their cohesive structure.

In some instances they established councils and guerrilla training initiatives, while among communist-inspired units, 'revolutionary shadow governments' developed in an attempt to gain control over particular zones or regions. Local Liberal *caudillos* (commanders), often independent of any national participation, attempted to provide political leadership. Centralized military-style organization and direction remained limited, with many of these groups, both Liberal and Conservative, acting primarily as bandits rather than politically motivated guerrillas. Vigilante fighting best characterizes the state of warfare between these groups during this early period.[151]

As the crisis deepened and disorders spread, the *Partido Communista Colombiano* (Colombian Communist Party-PCC) attempted to cultivate and unite sections of the Liberal guerrilla movement. Although they too lacked military leadership, the communists did organize some 1000 peasant families into the *Commando de El-Davis* (El-Davis Command) in the central cordillera region of Tolima Department.

Despite the active presence of these guerrilla groups in the countryside, no coherent plan to both politically organize their membership and gain power existed. While a conference of these guerrilla commands did successfully convene in early 1952, they proved unable to promote their aims at a national level.[152] Ideological differences also

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[149] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.6.
[150] Robert C. Williamson, 'Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of Rural Colombia,' *Western Political Quarterly*, 18 (March 1965), p.40.
[151] Russell W. Ramsey, *Peasant Revolution 1950-1954* (New York, NY: Carlton Press Inc., 1969), pp.85-86, 129.
[152] Alberto Gómez, 'The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Their Perspectives,' *World Marxist Review* (April 1967) as cited in Richard Gott, *Rural Guerrillas in Latin America* (Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1973), pp.281-82; Yore, 'Military Forces (Army) in Colombia During Conflict Stage of Insurgency,' USAWC, p.11.

became apparent between what Liberal leadership called *liberales limpios* (clean liberals) and *liberales sucios* (dirty liberals [communists]). Eventually leadership cadre within the 'clean liberal' organizations ordered their followers to separate from and ultimately fight, communist guerrillas.[153]

As the guerrilla threat in the Liberal-controlled *Llanos* region grew, the Gómez regime reacted by strengthening the *Vargas* battalion garrisoned in Villavicencio and augmenting National Police units in the area by recruiting numerous peasants from the Indian areas of Boyacá into the force. The government also sought to seal the borders with Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama after security forces seized machine guns, apparently supplied by guerrilla sympathizers in Venezuela. Despite these actions attempts at military suppression of the *Llanos* guerrillas proved unsuccessful.[154]

In 1951 National Police agents adopted and carried out a policy of enforced resettlement. Severe repressive measures exacerbated partisan and religious hatreds. Persecution of Protestants, closely linked to the Liberal Party, continued without restraint. Banditry remained prevalent throughout the central Andes region and from Cauca to Bolivar, while piracy on the Magdalena River forced vessels to tie up at river ports overnight for their own safety.[155]

As the struggle continued it developed into more than a purely political phenomenon.

> The term '*Violencia*' became an umbrella under which every variety of criminality could be found. As the depredations of men under arms grew ever more ghastly, it became clear that large numbers of psychopaths and

[153] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, p.91.
[154] Ramsey, *Peasant Revolution*, pp.85-86, 130; Memorandum of Conversation by Maurice M. Bernbaum of the Office of South American Affairs-Outstanding Military Problems with Colombia, 19 June 1952, *FRUS* Vol.IV 1952-1954, p.775
[155] Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State: Colombia, 22 May 1951, *FRUS* Vol.II 1951, p.1300.

> common bandits had joined those who claimed to be fighting to maintain their political principles.[156]

For months peasants throughout the entire *Llanos* region rebelled and by May 1951 guerrilla groups controlled most of the northern sections. They instituted rudimentary government structures including a penal code and tax system throughout these zones, organizing shops, supply depot, and arms caches to support raids, while women made uniforms and provided medical supplies, and pack animals furnished transport.

Security forces, on the other hand, faced constant logistical problems. No coordinated anti-guerrilla efforts between police and army units existed. The National Police, poorly equipped and underfunded, were forced to steal in order to insure unit survival. Lack of standardized weaponry compounded the problem as did inefficiency and corruption, while the army failed to utilize aerial support of ground troops.[157] Despite these handicaps, security forces lost only a few villages as guerrillas concentrated for a series of attacks against towns in June 1951. Nonetheless hundreds of supporters from both parties perished in the failed offensive.[158]

Well-organized guerrilla forces operated extensively in Tolima and Antioquia, while in Caldas, Valle, Cauca, Santander, and Norte de Santander violence remained primarily of a bandit or vigilante nature. In October the air force attacked guerrilla bases forty miles west of Medellín near Urrao, destroying little except peasant support for the government that might have existed in the area. By the end of the year the government attempted to negotiate with the guerrillas, arranging a truce for New Year's Day through

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[156] James D. Henderson, *When Colombia Bled: A History of the Violencia in Tolima* (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1985), p.149.
[157] Ramsey, *Peasant Revolution*, pp.87, 139-40.
[158] Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, p.257.

former Liberal President Alfonso López Pumarejo. Influential Colombians and the Papal Nuncio supported this offer, but it too failed to stop the fighting in the countryside.

In July 1952 guerrilla fighters caused public outrage when they killed ninety-four soldiers, most of them inexperienced recruits who had not taken part in earlier pacification operations, in an ambush near Villavicencio.[159] In Bogotá that September, after the burial of five policemen assassinated in Tolima, shots were fired at a group of policemen and sympathizers of the Conservative Party. In retaliation, Conservative mobs set fire to the residences of López Pumarejo and former finance minister Lleras Restrepo, to Liberal Party headquarters, and to the presses of *El Espectador* and *El Tiempo*, the two largest Liberal newspapers in Colombia.[160]

By year's end the *Violencia* in the countryside 'had reached its peak.'[161] An estimated 80,000 guerrillas existed with about 20,000 under organized command; National Police strength ranged at approximately 10-30,000, while the Army controlled about 12,000 soldiers, though fewer were actively engaged in anti-guerrilla campaigns. At the same time popular support for both the guerrillas and the Gómez government began to wane as the spiral of violence brought ever-greater acts of brutality.

Liberal support in the *Llanos* for continuing the guerrilla struggle dropped as political conditions failed to improve. Conservatives, tired of the seemingly endless political violence and fearing that the Gómez regime was moving towards the creation of a Colombian 'Falange State,' began to seek alternative leadership.[162]

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[159] Ramsey, *Peasant Revolution*, pp.87-89.
[160] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, pp.91-92.
[161] Daniel, *Rural Violence in Colombia Since 1946*, p.69.
[162] Ramsey, *Peasant Revolution*, pp.88-89.

The situation became so critical that military forces led by Lieutenant General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla launched a coup d'état on 13 June 1953, deposing Gómez and replacing him with a military junta of 13 officers. After years of violence Colombians saw Rojas as a 'deliverer' as he set about to reestablish order throughout the nation.[163]

La Violencia in Colombia, 1953-1957: The Rojas Dictatorship

Aftermath of the Rojas Coup

By the end of 1952 more than a dozen independent and reasonably well-organized guerrilla groups and commands existed throughout Colombia. Active groups existed in northern Cundinamarca and western Boyaca, in eastern, southern, and central Tolima, and in northern, western, and eastern Antioquia. Active Communist-led commands existed in Viotá, Sumapaz (southern Cundinamarca), Gaitania (southern Tolima), Rio Chiquito, and Símbola-Paez, a mountain area on the Cauca-Huila border, while organizational contact existed between 19 smaller guerrilla groups in the Eastern Plains.[164]

The composition of these guerrilla groups varied across a wide political spectrum. Some contained veteran Liberal and Conservative fighters who continued to wage partisan battles against one another. Others consisted of dissidents from the traditional parties who had not accepted amnesty from the Rojas government or later, became disillusioned and intent on undermining its effectiveness.

Still other groups were composed of communist party members and their sympathizers or simply bandits who employed guerrilla tactics. Centralized direction of these disparate

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[163] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-65-Prospects for Colombia, 9 July 1965, *DDQS* Vol.14 (1988), p.3.

[164] D.M. Condit and Bert H. Cooper, Jr., 'US Military Response to Overseas Insurgencies-Colombia (1948-1958),' Center for Research in Social Systems (Washington, DC: The American University-CRESS, December 1970), p.50. As found in John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (JFKSWC), United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) Archives, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Hereafter cited as JFKSWC-USASOC Archives.

movements did not exist, though many did maintain support from a wide range of political elements including the Colombian Communist Party and factions within both the Liberal and Conservative parties.[165]

Shortly after the coup, US officials noted that incidents of violence in Colombia, at least against Protestants, had virtually ceased. In this respect the Rojas government brought a marked improvement to the situation.[166] Indeed *Life* magazine, in a two-page photographic spread showing hundreds of guerrillas walking in file from the mountains to lay down their arms, declared that, 'after years of autocracy and bloody revolt freedom had returned to Colombia and that traditionally democratic country's nightmare was ended.'[167] This declaration proved overly optimistic.

After the Rojas coup. greater possibilities did appear open to democratic elements within Colombian society. For these elements to take root the new regime needed to contain violence and reestablish a sense of security and confidence within the population.[168] Acting upon widespread initial enthusiasm for the coup, Rojas attempted to restore stability by offering amnesty and aid to guerrillas that laid down their arms.

On 21 August 1953 and again on 8 July 1954 the Rojas government passed amnesty laws affecting thousands of Colombians involved in political crimes over the previous decade. The first decree sought to solidify police and military support, granting amnesty to officers involved in the Pasto Rebellion against former President Alphonso López Pumarejo in 1944. The following year's decree aimed directly at demobilizing guerrilla and

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[165] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-56-Probable Developments in Colombia, 10 April 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, pp.907-09.
[166] Memorandum by Albert H. Gerberich of the Office of South American Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Cabot), 12 November 1953, *FRUS* Vol.IV 1952-54, p.805.
[167] *Life*, 35 (5 October 1953), pp.30-31.
[168] *The Nation*, 177 (11 July 1953), pp.22-23.

paramilitary groups involved in acts of insurrection against the government.[169] As one US analyst declared, the amnesty period 'was probably the first real demarcation between the political guerrillas and those simply using the breakdown of public authority for criminal purposes.'[170]

Besides amnesty programs, Rojas sought to release political prisoners, relax press censorship, and depoliticize the police by placing the entire national force under Ministry of Defense jurisdiction and its code of military justice. The regime closed the Prefecture of National Security, founding the *Servicio de Inteligencia de Colombia* (Colombian Intelligence Service-SIC) in its place. The SIC combined under one organization a national detective agency as well as an intelligence and counterintelligence service, though it would ultimately prove ineffectual and be disbanded. Rojas also pursued populist reform policies in an attempt to address Colombia's structural problems. He initiated projects to improve transport systems and medical facilities, sought aid for peasant farmers, and attempted to reform tax codes that favored only the wealthy.

The regime undertook other interventionist actions in an attempt to redistribute wealth and restructure various aspects of Colombian society. It made efforts to advance rural education, reform landholding, introduce more modern farming techniques, and protect small businesses, while seeking to reform labor unions in order to make them representative of their membership rather than beholden to partisan political interests. Rojas intended these

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[169] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, pp.277-78.

[170] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study, Department of State Airgram A-649, 6 April 1964, NSF, Country File, 'Colombia, Volume 1', Box 14 (Austin, TX: Lyndon B. Johnson Library), p.5. Hereafter cited as Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL).

actions as a populist appeal to the masses in an attempt to create a sense of greater influence for the wider population while breaking down oligarchic control.[171]

Thus within the first six months of his administration Rojas made positive achievements towards reestablishing public order, but his promise to restore constitutional processes languished. By 1954 his government did little to deliver on pledges to promote agrarian reform and rural reconstruction, reinstate civil liberties, or restore elected government.[172] As a result, political deterioration continued.

As the situation worsened, Rojas' political strength declined. Both Liberals and Conservatives became militant as the regime failed to open the way for them to return to power. Rojas continued to derive his main support from the armed forces, the Church, and a minority Conservative faction led by Gilberto Alzate Avendaño, whom one US intelligence report described as 'an opportunist and extremist primarily interested in furthering his own presidential ambitions.' The same report predicted that Rojas would increasingly depend upon authoritarian controls to maintain power, while striving to build a pro-government labor coalition as Argentinean President Juan Domingo Perón had done.[173]

Guerrillas, Bandits, and Independent Republics

The violence in Colombia altered its character during the 1953-55 period, transforming itself from primarily politically motivated guerrilla warfare to banditry and agrarian extortion. Notable exceptions could be found in the autonomous regions that formed during

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[171] Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.294-95; Dennis M. Hanratty and Sandra W. Meditz (eds.), *Colombia: A Country Study*, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-26 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1990), pp.39-40; Vernon Lee Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions: Military Rule and the Social Revolution in Colombia 1930-1956* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), pp.265-66.

[172] Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State-Intelligence Note: The Political Climate in Colombia, 20 January 1954, *FRUS* Vol.IV 1952-54, p.807.

[173] Ibid., pp.807-08.

this time in southern Cundinamarca (Sumapaz) and eastern Tolima (Marquetalia). Irregular peasant groups controlled these so-called 'independent republics,' which were 'communistically oriented only in the primitive meaning of the term.'[174]

Bandit groups operating in coffee-growing regions seized the harvest, selling it on the underground market, while guerrilla groups financed operations by extorting protection payments from rural farmers. Guerrillas then sold 'badges' that identified peasant farmers as supporters of their political party,[175] while both bandit and guerrilla forces often maintained 'subrosa political relationships with major figures of the legitimate government and opposition involving the trade of votes, hatchet jobs, and influence.'[176]

Outside of the 'independent republics' violence increasingly centered on organized groups of rural bandits and hired urban gunmen (*pájaros*). These groups, abetted by corrupt local officials, coerced money through threat of assassination or demanded crop-shares from wealthy landholders. Their tactics affected primarily coffee proprietors, though plantation owners growing sugar, cotton, and cacao also endured extortion by these gangs, who disposed of illicit crops through the black market.[177]

Within the 'independent republics' the increased threat of communist control pushed the Rojas government into confrontation with guerrilla groups. Rojas ordered the army to strengthen surveillance in these areas in an effort to track guerrilla leadership cadre and suppress local support. Guerrilla commanders responded by sending 500 irregular troops to Villarrica, where they destroyed an army infantry company on patrol.

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[174] Bailey, '*La Violencia* in Colombia,' *JIAS*, 9 (October 1967), pp.567-68.
[175] Condit and Cooper, 'US Military Response to Overseas Insurgencies-Colombia (1948-1958),' (JFKSWC-USASOC Archives), p.51.
[176] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.8. For an in-depth study of these sub-rosa relationships see Gonzalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens (trans. Alan Hynds), *Bandits, Peasants, and Politics: The Case of "La Violencia" in Colombia* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2001).
[177] Bailey, '*La Violencia* in Colombia,' *JIAS*, 9 (October 1967), p.568.

In retaliation Rojas declared all of eastern Tolima and southwestern Cundinamarca a 'zone of military operations.' By Spring 1955 the army had cordoned off most of the Sumapaz area, ordering peasant farmers out of the combat zone. Aerial bombardment of suspected guerrilla strongholds followed, worsening the refugee crisis.[178] Unofficial US Embassy protests against the use of American-supplied weapons in this offensive were made to no avail, though the Embassy did deny the Rojas regime's request for napalm bombs.[179]

By June 1955 six regular army battalions encircled guerrilla forces in the Sumapaz region. Fighting against heavily armed security forces, 2000 guerrilla combatants sought to break out of the military encirclement, but were forced to retreat after sustaining heavy losses. To prevent guerrilla attempts to regroup, the army continued to patrol the area.[180] Despite this initial success, attacks on army units in the border region of Tolima-Cundinamarca escalated. In response the Colombian army undertook 'Operation Galilea,' using troops from the Military Institutes Brigade, with several other battalions in support.

Colombian forces swept through the Sumapaz region almost a dozen times between 15 September and 3 November, placing captured guerrillas and suspected sympathizers into the Cunday concentration camp, while displacing thousands of peasants from the operational zone. This punitive campaign did cause guerrilla resistance to dissipate, but in the long run indiscriminant violence wreaked on the peasantry reinforced

[178] Henderson, *When Colombia Bled*, pp.191-93.
[179] Telegram from the Ambassador in Colombia (Bonsal) to the Department of State, No.367, 12 May 1955, *FRUS* Vol.II 1955-57, Editors footnote 2, p.863.
[180] Henderson, *When Colombia Bled*, p.194.

antigovernment enmity and ensured that the area remained a potential recruiting ground for future insurrection.[181]

By the end of 1955, with violence gathering momentum in the countryside, Rojas became increasingly isolated as unchecked corruption and severe restrictions on press freedoms and political liberties alienated Colombia's elite. As W. Park Armstrong, US State Department Special Assistant for Intelligence noted, Rojas' ability to finish his term in office now remained dependent upon Colombia's armed forces.[182]

Decline of the Rojas Regime

With its failure to restore constitutional government the Rojas regime moved increasingly towards an authoritarian stance. The state of siege in effect since 1949 continued, while both opposition party activity and press freedoms remained severely curtailed. No attempts to restore Congress or popular elections appeared forthcoming. The National Constituent Assembly (ANAC), which had confirmed Rojas as president until 7 August 1958, was stacked with regime supporters, as were the Supreme and lower courts. Military personnel were placed in formerly civilian positions as violence against the regime's opponents continued to escalate.[183]

Leaders of both the Liberal and Conservative parties, restrained by the regime from reestablishing political assemblies throughout the country, continued to pressure Rojas to allow renewed political activity. Some Liberals, for instance, sought to support guerrilla groups in the countryside, but in doing so they remained cognizant of the massive destruction that had occurred during the pre-Rojas *Violencia* and of the regime's strong

[181] Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.330-32.
[182] Memorandum from the Secretary of State's Special Assistant for Intelligence (Armstrong) to the Secretary of State-Intelligence Note: Colombia-President's Position Deteriorates, 5 April 1955, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, pp.860-61.

military support. Nonetheless an increasingly punitive reaction by the Rojas regime to these efforts proved the effectiveness of the opposition campaign.[184]

In an attempt to rebuild declining support Rojas also launched several new political organizations in early 1956 including a *Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores* (National Workers Confederation-CNT) and the *Tercera Fuerza* or Third Force movement in a direct attempt to organize people into a Peronista-style mass-movement against the elite.[185]

Though the regime did offer proclamations advocating social justice and tried to increase taxation of Colombia's elite, Rojas' Third Force movement often proved little more than a subsidization of the armed forces.[186] In the end these efforts to build a populist movement in opposition to both the traditional parties and to Church-supported labor unions further alienated some of his last remaining political supporters, while also bringing out the most determined clerical opposition to his regime.[187]

Economic Deterioration and Ongoing Guerrilla Violence

Poor crops and fluctuations in the price of coffee during the mid-1950s undermined growth in the Colombian economy and further destabilized the Rojas regime. The peso was devalued and a foreign currency shortage developed as loans became due. The government pursued a policy of deficit financing, continuing its large public works

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[183] Despatch from the Ambassador in Colombia (Cabot) to the Department of State-Political Summary and Assessment: The Rojas Regime and Its Fall, 9 July 1957, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, pp.942-48.
[184] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-56-Probable Developments in Colombia, 10 April 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.906.
[185] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, p.94.
[186] Helguera, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia,' *JIAS*, 3 (July 1961), pp.355-56.
[187] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-56-Probable Developments in Colombia, 10 April 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.907.

programs and industrial base expansion unabated, driving internal debt to almost 880 million pesos by late 1955.[188]

Ballooning debt caused officials at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to take a somber view of Colombia's deteriorating economic situation. IBRD officials judged that errors directly attributable to poor administration and the faulty economic policies of the Rojas government were to blame. Military officers with inadequate economic training had been placed in management positions and funds diverted to military projects that held strategic but little economic, value. Moreover, Rojas himself had accepted 'excessive gifts' and 'countenanc[ed] extensive corruption among Colombian officials.'[189]

Even SENDAS, directed by Rojas' daughter and initiated in an effort to aid small land owners and peasants displaced by the Violence became, in the words of one US official, an 'octopus social action organization' that served only Rojas' own political agenda.[190] By the end of 1956 inflation, the trade deficit, and popular discontent continued to rise, while support for Rojas from the business community declined as the military's economic influence expanded.[191]

Coupled to economic problems, guerrilla violence once again flared in the countryside. In order to justify the ongoing state of siege and regime efforts to restore order, Rojas had in the past exaggerated the extent of the guerrilla problem. Irregular

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[188] Helguera, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia,' *JIAS*, 3 (July 1961), pp.356; National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-56-Probable Developments in Colombia, 10 April 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.911.

[189] Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State: Colombian Economic Situation, 1 July 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.874.

[190] Despatch from the Ambassador in Colombia (Cabot) to the Department of State-Political Summary and Assessment: The Rojas Regime and Its Fall, 9 July 1957, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.942. For the positive accomplishments of SENDAS see Fluharty, *Dance of the Millions*, pp.250-52.

[191] Helguera, 'The Changing Role of the Military in Colombia,' *JIAS*, 3 (July 1961), pp.356.

warfare in isolated terrain, conducted under conditions of rigorous press censorship, compounded the difficulty of accurately assessing the regime's proclamations.

US intelligence estimated that about 6000 active guerrillas existed throughout central and western Tolima, southern Caldas, Valle de Cauca, Cauca, and Huila. Smaller groups operated in the Cauca and Magdalena River valleys and the western parts of the *Llanos* and, despite the major military operations conducted by the Colombian army in 1955, violence continued to flare in eastern Tolima and southern Cundinamarca.

Large, inactive groups continued to exist in southern Tolima and the Magdalena River valley – intelligence estimates placed the figure as high as 6000 in Tolima alone – with little government interference. US intelligence analysts concluded that with only 4500 government troops directly committed to the anti-guerrilla campaign, Rojas did not consider these groups a serious threat to his regime.[192]

Though these irregular forces did not yet constitute a serious threat to government stability, they did move US officials in Colombia to prepare a contingency study containing recommendations for action against the guerrillas. Perhaps for the first time the focus of local American attention in Colombia shifted, informally, from hemisphere defense to internal security. In 1956 the US army Mission submitted a proposal to the Colombian General Staff that outlined, analyzed, and criticized the command structures, staff procedures, and organization of field units.

The Mission recommended a unified field command approach to combating the guerrilla problem. It also recommended a systematic operational commitment of troops coupled to the division of violence zones into action areas for aggressive offensive

[192] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-56-Probable Developments in Colombia, 10 April 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.907-10.

operations backed by full logistical support.[193] With Mission support, the *Escuela de Lanceros*, modeled after the US Army Ranger School, was established in late 1955 to train senior NCOs and junior officers in unconventional warfare methods under 'live' conditions in the Sumapaz-Cunday region.[194]

US intelligence maintained that the PCC had supplied some of the guerillas with arms, food, clothing, medicine, money, and political propaganda. Communist strategy was to develop 'self-defense' committees that could control areas with good defensive positions. Eventually this might lead to an independent economy and ultimately, a 'government of national liberation.' Although some Liberals sought to counter communist influence by establishing their own sources of supply, none of the guerrilla forces were able to control lines of communication within the country or disrupt static army positions.

Armed only with rifles, submachine guns, homemade grenades, and machetes, guerrilla capabilities were limited to 'harassment of government forces and the pillaging of local farmers.' Nonetheless within the Colombian army senior officers considered recruiting a special 6000-man anti-guerrilla force.[195] In June 1956 Rojas signed a request authorizing the purchase of over $1.1 million in small arms, automatic weapons, recoilless rifles, grenades, ammunition, and spare parts. Delivery began in October, but little was done to implement the Mission anti-guerrilla plan until 1957 when a new army commander and a different political atmosphere existed.[196]

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[193] Mission History-US Army Mission to Colombia, 1956, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab C, p.57.
[194] Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.336-37.
[195] National Intelligence Estimate: NIE 88-56-Probable Developments in Colombia, 10 April 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII, 1955-57, pp.908-10.
[196] Mission History-US Army Mission to Colombia, 1956, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab C, pp.55, 67.

Fall of the Rojas Regime: An Interim Junta and a National Front Government

As early as February 1956 rumors circulated in Washington and Bogotá that efforts by elements of the military and political elite to depose Rojas were underway.[197] On 20 July 1956 leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties, Laureano Gómez and Alberto Lleras Camargo, met secretly in the Spanish cities of Benidorm and Sitges in an effort to end partisan violence and return the country to democratic rule. From these meetings evolved the concept of a bipartisan, *Frente Nacional* (National Front) government,[198] as stipulated in the Declaration of Benidorm and later, in the Sitges and San Carlos agreements of 1957.

In an effort to deflect growing criticism, Rojas reorganized his Cabinet, recalled the ANAC, loosened press restrictions, and dropped the Third Force concept in the Fall of 1956. But by attempting to perpetuate his control of the presidency through an improvised election campaign and by stacking the ANAC with regime supporters, Rojas only further entrenched opposition to his government.

On 1 May 1957 the arrest of Conservative presidential candidate Guillermo León Valencia sparked massive demonstrations against the regime in which over 100 people lost their lives.[199] As universities, businesses, and newspapers closed in protest, the Church offered its support to the demonstrators, criticizing security force excesses. Despite these actions, Rojas arranged his own reelection on 8 May at the protest's peak: civil war appeared imminent.[200]

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[197] Memorandum from Albert H. Gerberich of the Office of South American Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Lyon), 3 February 1956, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.895.
[198] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, p.94-95.
[199] Despatch from the Ambassador in Colombia (Cabot) to the Department of State-Political Summary and Assessment: The Rojas Regime and Its Fall, 9 July 1957, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.943-44.
[200] Ibid., p.944.

Massive popular opposition forced the military to act. On 10 May 1957 a five-man military junta composed of former Ministers of War and Public Works, Major General Gabriel París and Rear Admiral Rubén Piedrahita, former Commanders of the National Police and Army, Major General Deogracias Fonseca and Brigadier General Rafael Navas Prado, and former Chief of the Intelligence Service Brigadier General Luís Ordoñez, removed Rojas from office, forcing him into exile in Spain.

After Rojas' departure the Junta immediately expressed its desire to maintain 'excellent relations' with the United States and, in order to reassure Colombian's, 'announced as its principal objective the formation of a Government of National Unity in order that the people of Colombia may freely choose their President for the 1958-1962 term.'[201] To this end the Junta undertook a number of concrete steps including the appointment of a bipartisan Cabinet of five Conservatives, five Liberals, and three military officers; suspension of the discredited ANAC; and a promise to restore press freedoms and constitutional government.

It also established a national commission to investigate the causes of the *Violencia* and undertook significant efforts to secure Colombia's precarious financial situation. Finally, in an effort to restore stability to the countryside, amnesty decrees were offered as a means of demobilizing guerrilla opposition forces.[202] These positive actions notwithstanding, Junta members remained concerned that factionalism within Colombia's political parties could undermine the new bipartisan effort underway, while civilian

[201] Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, 11 May 1957, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.936-37.
[202] Despatch from the Ambassador in Colombia (Cabot) to the Department of State-Political Summary and Assessment: The Rojas Regime and Its Fall, 9 July 1957, *FRUS* Vol.VII 1955-57, p.944-45; Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.354-60.

leaders worried that the military, forced to relinquish its positions of power within the government, might find it difficult to once again assume a subordinate role.

Despite these concerns, in December 1957 'Colombians voted overwhelmingly in a national plebiscite,' approving the agreements previously established by Gómez and Lleras Camargo in Spain. Amongst other items this included 'alternation of the presidency between the two parties every four years; parity between parties in all legislative bodies; a required two-thirds majority vote for the passage of legislation; and the establishment of an administrative career service of neutral parties not subject to partisan appointment.'[203]

On 4 May 1958, Lleras Camargo won the presidential election and the transition to constitutional order was finalized with his inauguration on 7 August. The Junta had 'kept their word,'[204] restoring civilian rule in Colombia.

Summary

A wide range of structural dynamics within Colombian society contributed to the emergence of *la Violencia*. Unyielding oligarchic control over the nation's social, political, and economic institutions; an inability of these same elite to establish a reformist and modernizing democracy to combat poverty and inequality; ineffective and politicized security forces; and acute political polarization inflamed social conflict throughout the nation.

With Gaitán's assassination and the ensuing *Bogotazo* the possibility for social, political, and agrarian reform that he had championed disintegrated, giving way instead to

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[203] Hanratty and Meditz (eds.). *Colombia: A Country Study*, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-26, p.41.

[204] John D. Martz, *Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1962), p.257.

armed partisan confrontation. The end result of this confrontation was highly ambiguous. Though it ultimately failed to evolve into full social revolution, it did manifest clear aspects of class struggle and political uprising,[205] leading eventually to the formation of Colombia's modern insurgent movements, headed by Marxist guerrillas determined to overthrow the existing political order.[206]

Equally ambiguous is Rojas Pinilla's role in both curtailing – and accentuating – the *Violencia.* Using the tools of amnesty and social reform the regime successfully blunted the worst excesses of the Violence during the early stages of its tenure. But by attempting to perpetuate itself the Rojas regime became a focal point for discontent in an already highly unstable political environment. Ironically, 'Rojas' politicization achieved what his original intentions of neutrality and conciliation failed to realize: cooperation and mutual guarantees between Colombia's traditional political parties.'[207]

In the end, while the National Front system did hold the promise of curtailing the devastating partisan political confrontations of the past decade, new threats emerged from the earlier *Violencia* period that would jeopardize this coalition government. It was within this volatile context that the US-Colombian internal security relationship developed.

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[205] Gonzalo Sánchez, 'The Violence: An Interpretative Synthesis,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, pp.75-124.
[206] Peñeranda, 'Surveying the Literature on the Violence,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, p.295.
[207] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.65.

CHAPTER THREE

SURVEYING *LA VIOLENCIA*:

A CIA SPECIAL TEAM IN COLOMBIA

Introduction

Colombians inaugurated their first National Front government in August 1958. Splitting power between the country's Liberal and Conservative parties for a 16-year period, the Front system offered an opportunity to end a decade of terror, internecine political warfare, and military dictatorship brought on by Gaitán's assassination. But ongoing guerrilla-bandit problems spawned during earlier phases of the *Violencia* period forced its first president, Liberal Alberto Lleras Camargo, to seek internal security assistance from the United States.

In October of 1959 the Central Intelligence Agency, under State Department guidance and with Department of Defense participation, fielded a US Special Survey Team, jointly composed of civilian and military personnel, to review the internal security situation in Colombia and to make recommendations towards solution of the violence problem.[208]

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[208] Report of the Colombia Survey Team, Part III-Recommendations for US Action, April 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 12, Folder #-Part III (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace), RUS-6. To reiterate from the introduction of this dissertation, hereafter the following are cited as Bohannan Papers Hoover Institution Archives (HIA); Report of the Colombia Survey Team (RCST); Colombian Survey (CS); Recommendations for Colombian Action (RCA); Recommendations for US Action (RUS).

The basic report of the Colombia Survey Team is broken into three parts. Part I details the actual survey of the Colombian situation from October through December of 1959 and includes a preface and nine chapters: Chapter 1-Introduction to Colombia; Chapter 2-The Violence Problem; Chapter 3-The Military Establishment of Colombia; Chapter 4-National Police; Chapter 5-The *Lanceros*; Chapter 6-Intelligence; Chapter 7-Information and Psychological Warfare; Chapter 8-Relief and Rehabilitation; and Chapter 9-Communism in Colombia.

Chapter and paragraph numbers, rather than page numbers, are given throughout Part I of the survey and citation will follow this convention. (For instance, if paragraphs 17 through 27 of Chapter 2 are used they will be cited as 2-17 thru 27. Non-consecutive paragraphs will be cited as 2-17, 19, etc.). Part II details Recommendations for Colombian Action (RCA) and Part III, Recommendations for US Action (RUS). Page numbers are given as RCA-I-1, RCA-I-2, etc. depending upon the particular appendix number (although the introductory chapter is, again, unnumbered) or RUS-1, RUS-2, etc. and will be cited as such.

This initiative became 'the first major effort of the US to influence the internal security problems of Colombia'[209] and the foundation for wide-ranging internal security initiatives that would ultimately contain the *Violencia* problem.

The Colombia Survey Team: Formation, Composition, and Mandate

In his acceptance speech of 7 August 1958, President Lleras Camargo, reflecting on the years of bloodshed in Colombia declared, 'there are no harsher years or more dramatic experiences in the entire history of the Republic. We descended, savagely and suddenly, to monstrous extremes. To reduce and control the *Violencia* . . . the entire nation must prepare itself for a long and arduous endeavor, which might require the alteration of most of our customs, our concepts, and our capacity to endure difficult trials.'[210]

Lleras, following the example set by both the transition junta and the Rojas regime, initiated his program to rebuild the nation through an amnesty decree. The new law identified both the political character of the fighting as well as the role of political leaders in its organization. Retroactive from October 1958, amnesty for politically motivated criminal acts was granted for the entire decade after the murder of Gaitán.[211]

Amnesty ended on 26 June 1959, after which *Violencia*-type offences were officially considered criminal rather than political acts by the Lleras government. This freed security forces from previous politically inspired restrictions and allowed them to target

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[209] Summary and Conclusions, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), p.33.
[210] Acceptance speech of President Lleras Camargo, 7 August 1958 as quoted in Fals Borda, 'The Role of Violence in the Break with Traditionalism: The Colombian Case,' *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), pp.7-8.
[211] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.66.

guerrilla-bandit organizations with considerably less risk of sparking wider, internecine conflict amongst the politicized peasantry.[212]

Despite these initial actions, a state of emergency remained in the departments of Caldas, Cauca, Huila, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca, where guerrilla and bandit gangs continued to operate with impunity (see Appendix 2).[213] Active violence constituted that country's greatest national problem, interfering with attempts by the Lleras government to restore peace and undertake rehabilitation programs.

As Colombia's conventionally oriented security forces proved incapable of controlling the problem, Lleras met on 18 June 1959 with the Chiefs of the US Military Mission and Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) for consultation on the violence question. His goal, with US support: to activate and arm within the Colombian Army a special counter-guerrilla force to be deployed for immediate impact in emergency zones.[214]

Prior to this point, the Eisenhower administration had provided only rudimentary internal security assistance to Colombia. As previously described the Colombian Infantry School at Usaquén established the *Lancero* School in late 1955. A US advisor organized the school to train sergeants and young officers in unconventional warfare.[215] In 1956 the Mission prepared a study containing recommendations for action against guerrilla forces, and that same year Rojas signed a request authorizing purchase of over $1.1 million in anti-guerrilla materiél, including grenades, small arms, and automatic weapons.[216]

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[212] Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.395-96.
[213] RCST, Part I-CS, Preface, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.i.
[214] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-1; RCST, Part I-CS, Preface, Bohannan Papers (HIA) pp.i-ii.
[215] Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.336-37.
[216] Mission History-US Army Mission to Colombia (1956), *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab C, pp.55, 57, and 67.

Previous support notwithstanding, Mission personnel now expressed concern to Lleras that the request to develop, equip, and deploy a 1500 man special-force complete with 24 transport helicopters faced considerable restrictions under newly enacted provisions of existing MAP legislation.[217] In further discussions, Lleras drew parallels to the failure of US aid to China and urged reconsideration of US internal security policy in Latin America given the current situation in Cuba, the trend throughout the region generally, and his own precarious situation within Colombia.[218]

While he did not consider his government in immediate danger of being overthrown by communist forces, he did worry that 'such elements, if permitted to grow in this fertile breeding ground of guerrilla activity would later become a serious threat to the stability of his government.'[219]

State Department personnel, troubled by Lleras' comments on US policy and concerned that Colombia would again descend into anarchy if violence were not contained, recommended a survey of the problem by US guerrilla warfare specialists. Dempster McIntosh, newly appointed Ambassador to Colombia, relayed this 'preliminary response to Lleras' request for reconsideration of US policy' to the Colombian government and in late September 1959 Lleras personally approved this first step himself.[220]

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[217] Report from chief of MAAG to the US Ambassador to Colombia dated 24 June 1959, and Embassy dispatch to the Department of State dated 1 July 1959 as referenced in RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-3. In their discussions with Lleras, Embassy personnel gave no encouragement that MAP assistance would be forthcoming for internal security purposes. As they saw it, current MAP programs, as a result of the Morse Amendment, allowed 'only a minimum of training services and advice' and no equipment.

[218] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-2,3.

[219] Report from chief of MAAG to the US Ambassador to Colombia dated 24 June 1959, and Embassy dispatch to the Department of State dated 1 July 1959 as quoted in RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-4.

[220] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-3, 4. McIntosh replaced John M. Cabot who was Ambassador to Colombia from 12 July 1957 to July 1959.

A survey team for Colombia was selected from CIA and military personnel with operational experiences relevant to the kinds of problems faced within that American republic. The team's primary members included Hans Tofte (Chief of Team), a CIA officer with experience in guerrilla warfare in Asia (especially Korea), the Middle East, and Europe; Colonel Napoleon Valeriano, Philippine and US Army, a former chief of police in Manila and personal aide to President Ramon Magsaysay with experience in counter-guerrilla operations against the Hukbalahap with Ed Lansdale; Major Charles T.R. Bohannan, who fought with Filipino guerrillas against the Japanese in World War II and later worked with Lansdale and Valeriano in suppressing the Hukbalahap rebellion.

It also included Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Koontz, a US Army infantry officer attached to the Special Team because of previous service with the US Army Mission in Colombia (1952-1956); Colonel Berkeley Lewis, a retired US Army officer and former military attaché to Argentina who specialised in small arms, unorthodox weapons, and logistics; and finally, team administrative officer Bruce Walker, a former Marine Corps lieutenant with area knowledge of Latin America and a specialist in air-ground support in Korea.[221]

A team information sheet provided to the Colombian government did not indicate Tofte's CIA affiliation or the fact that some of its military personnel might be seconded to that organization. Whether Lleras knew of the team's primary affiliation to US Central Intelligence, given the intimate working relationship he later developed with Tofte, Bohannan, and Valeriano, is uncertain.

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[221] RCST, Part I-CS, Preface-Information re Survey Team members, submitted to the Colombian Government by the Department of State via the United States Embassy at Bogotá, October 1959, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 1 page; The Colombia Survey Team: A Preliminary Report Summarising Observations, Conclusions and Principle Recommendations With an Operational Analysis (Annex I) Concerning

In a letter to Tofte on 23 October 1959, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom, Jr. detailed the Special Team's mandate. At the personal request of Lleras Camargo the team was to spend six to eight weeks in Colombia studying the 'terrorist problem.' Its mission: to examine political, psychological, intelligence, economic, and military factors pertaining to the violence problem and to offer conclusions and recommendations for immediate action, bearing current US legislative restrictions in mind.

In Colombia they would operate under the guidance of Ambassador McIntosh, keeping him and other relevant Mission members fully informed, while utilizing existing studies to familiarize themselves with any ongoing US security programs in order to avoid duplication of effort.[222] Any recommendations for US action were to include material, training, time, and cost estimates, as well as personnel requirements.[223]

A final report for use by the Colombian government was expected after the team's return to Washington, though Rubottom stressed that if separate reports for US and Colombian consumption proved necessary, 'the Government of Colombia not be given any impression that it is not receiving the full report.' Only Lleras and his closest advisors were to know of the existence and actual purpose of the team in order to avoid political embarrassment to the Colombian president for inviting 'foreigners' to review domestic security problems. The Special Team's cover was 'routine technical business'

Proposed US Overt and Covert Action, 1 February 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, Folder #-ID Survey Team to Colombia-Forward (HIA), p.1. Hereafter cited as Preliminary Report (Majority).

[222] Letter Rubottom to Tofte, 23 October 1959, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File#13 (HIA), pp.1-3. Survey Team documents list Rubottom as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. *FRUS*, on the other hand, lists his title as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 19 June 1957 until August 1960 (American Republics, Vol.VII 1955-57, p.XXV and Vol.V 1958-60, p.XXXIII). For continuity this dissertation will utilize the title stipulated in the survey report.

[223] Memos to CIA and Department of Defense dated 4 August and 25 August 1959 respectively as referenced in RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-5,6.

connected to programs, security and otherwise, of mutual concern to the US and Colombia.[224]

Overall Rubottom believed the mission would 'serve to fill in our own knowledge of the nature and scope of the problem, particularly the Communist aspect, which information might later justify a change in the present recommendation against providing grant military assistance.'[225]

The Special Team in Colombia: Problems and Intrigues

Tofte and his team departed the United States, stopping in Panama to brief the Commander in Chief, Caribbean (CINCARIB) on mission objectives before arriving in Colombia on 26 October 1959.[226] On the surface the Special Team appeared well placed to accomplish its objectives, but the mission was plagued with problems from the beginning. Its arrival 'was not welcome[d]' by the US Country Team, which harbored 'the usual resentment towards "visiting experts".'

Dempster McIntosh, ill-informed by the State Department of the team's impending actions, fretted over whether it had been ' "invited", "requested", or "offered" ' to the Colombians – a point that the team believed was 'of no particular concern to Washington.' Mission personnel, including Colonels Spinney (Army Mission), Clugston (USAF Mission), and Crabbe (Air Attaché), also reacted warily, having received little advance notice of team objectives. Greater co-operation began to exist after interaction between personnel.[227]

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[224] All quotes, Letter Rubottom to Tofte, 23 October 1959, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.1-3.
[225] Memorandum dated 21 July 1959 addressed to the Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Robert A. Murphy) from the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Rubottom) as quoted in RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-5.
[226] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-6.
[227] All quotes, Notes Regarding the Colombia Survey Team, 6 June 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File #13 (HIA), p.1. The author of this three-page letter is not explicitly given. Though the faint

Surprisingly, the harshest reaction came from CIA's own 'senior representative' (Chief-of-Station [COS]), Paul Loeb. According to Bohannan:

> At the first opportunity [Loeb] made it very clear that the Team was unwelcome, that its mission was unnecessary and an insult to him, etc. It immediately developed that his attitude had been assiduously peddled to other members of the US official family, to the point that there seemed grave doubt that the Team could accomplish its mission, unless Loeb were summarily relieved. . . . The prejudice with which the Team was initially greeted by US officials was soon largely dispelled, but it required constant effort by the Team Chief to counter the effects of what can only be called adverse intriguing by Loeb among US, and perhaps, Colombian, officials.[228]

External difficulties that greeted the team in Colombia were further exacerbated by festering internal grievances. Early in the mission, relations between Koontz, DOD's former Colombian Mission officer, and other team members soured. Tofte believed that Koontz's only interest once attached to the Special Team was to write a 'minority report' that reflected his own proposals for solution of Colombia's violence problems.

Difficulties between Tofte and Koontz were to reach a climax in early January 1960. In a draft letter to Lansdale, Tofte detailed what he described as Koontz's insubordination, violation of orders, verbal challenges of team members' integrity, and general efforts to 'sabotage' the mission. With a hand written note at the end Tofte concluded, 'I didn't particularly want to send this in but I'll have no choice unless the

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initials 'CTRB' (Charles T.R. Bohannan) occur at the end, it appears Tofte wrote the letter. At the top of the first page is a hand written note declaring, 'For NORBERG's info. Prior to talks w. DEMPSTER MAC!,' – apparently referring to discussions set to be held between Dempster McIntosh in Colombia and Charles Norberg, a Washington attorney, Secretary of the American Bar Association, and US Air Force Colonel (Reserve). Bohannan wrote Norberg a letter of introduction to Dr. G. Leon Orjuela, the Chief of the Department of Criminal Instruction, Office of the Minister of Justice in Bogotá prior to Norberg's visit to Colombia. Norberg, who was interested in international law and relations between North and South American lawyers, was travelling to Colombia, 'in connection with the development of forestry and lumber business in a large area somewhere north of Buenaventura.' (See Letter Bohannan to Leon Orjuela, 7 June 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File #13 (HIA), 1 page). However, the notes regarding the Colombia Survey Team, ostensibly to his attention, offer a basic overview of team activities, profiling problems, complications, and some mission undertakings of the team. Norberg's larger relationship, if any, vis-à-vis the Special Team is unknown to this author.

Koontz issue is settled in a way that will prevent him from embarrassing the Survey Team Mission. Court martial seems to me the best solution.'[229]

In the end, Koontz did write his minority report – a report that offered relevant alternatives to the majority view and one that certainly impacted future US internal security policy towards Colombia.[230] Overall, however, the team's problems detracted from its effectiveness in the field and, upon return to Washington, sharpened inter-agency rivalries over policy roles related to foreign internal security.

Besides bureaucratic infighting and personality clashes the team faced other difficulties and intrigues while carrying out its mission in Colombia. Early in its mandate the team was 'discovered' by the Colombian press. *La Calle*, a Bogotá weekly, described the team as agents of the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and offered a 'highly amusing and very readable, if mostly fictional account of Team activities for a brief period.'[231] Notwithstanding Rubottom's previous admonitions regarding the importance

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[228] Reply to Questionnaire-Bohannan to Chief, Colombia Survey Team [Tofte], 1 August 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File #-13 (HIA), p.1.

[229] Draft Letter Tofte to Colonel Edward G. Lansdale, 14 January 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File #-13 (HIA), pp.1-5 plus attached note. The attached (typewritten) note to the above letter – unsigned, but apparently from Bohannan (perhaps to add weight to Tofte's charges, given Bohannan's long association with Lansdale) – reiterates the point that Koontz's only concern from the beginning of the mission was to write a minority report, but gives no indication why Koontz believed this necessary. In no uncertain terms the note's author declares that 'Joe Koontz does not belong on any team. Least of all a joint Survey Team of unorthodox warfare specialists, where mutual co-operation, sound judgement and qualifications of improvisation are of the essence. His persecution complex and general neurotic condition prevented him from gaining a genuine appreciation of his duties and status on the Team. His extraordinary lack of elementary diplomacy and a pronounced, tenacious stubborness [*sic*] tested the patience of his Team mates to the limit. Without a doubt Koontz by now ought to have his head examined.' Koontz's position is unavailable in the Bohannan Papers, but General (Ret) Valencia Tovar of the Colombian Army knew Koontz personally during this period and spoke highly of him in discussions with the author.

[230] While with the US Army Mission in Colombia during the Rojas dictatorship, Koontz inspected military garrisons in the Llanos and offered operational recommendations. This visit initiated efforts to establish the *Lancero* School. He also assisted in preparing a combat intelligence handbook for Colombian intelligence and reconnaissance personnel. Before leaving Colombia he was awarded the Order of Military Merit "General Jose Maria Cordoba" Commanders Grade. For further information on Koontz's Mission activities see Mission History-US Army Mission to Colombia (1953-1956), *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab C, pp.39, 47-48, 51-52, and 66.

[231] RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 7-Information and Psychological Warfare, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 7-11. A United States Information Agency (USIA) report described *La Calle*, which had a circulation of

of cover, this breech appeared to have little impact on the team's overall ability to function.

Chance encounters also placed team members in potentially dangerous political situations. In one incident, Bohannan was approached at a party by a Colombian intelligence officer, Major Carvajal, inquiring whether he was interested in meeting with Colonel Hernando Forero – an officer that might have pertinent information for the team on the violence question in Viotá, a region with communist guerrilla enclaves where Forero was previously stationed.[232]

Bohannan's problem lay in the fact that Forero had led an attempted *golpe* (coup) by some members of Bogotá's special Military Police Battalion the previous year. During the coup attempt, four of the ruling transition junta leaders were taken into custody by rebel military forces, though Admiral Rubén Piedrahita eluded capture. Lleras Camargo also escaped imprisonment – rather comically – after members of the Presidential Guard Battalion who freed him and arrested his captors stopped the car in which he was being spirited away for speeding in front of the Presidential Palace. Lleras, with Piedrahita's aid, mustered the support of a majority of Colombia's loyal troops and quickly put-down the ill-conceived coup attempt.[233]

Cognizant of these events, Bohannan explained to Carvajal that any discussions with Forero 'seemed like rather a delicate matter, since [the team] were guests of the

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approximately 11,000, as 'leftist liberal; nationalist; frequently critical of US.' See RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 7-Information and Psychological Warfare, Appendix I-Newspapers and Periodicals: Extract from Newspapers and Periodicals in Colombia by the United States Information Agency Office of Research and Analysis (4 November 1959), Bohannan Papers (HIA), CS/7-I-2.

[232] Memorandum Bohannan to Team Leader, 'Conversation at Party-Loeb-5 November', 6 November 1959, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File #-13 (HIA), one page.

[233] Martz, *Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey*, pp.270-71; Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.369-70.

government which Col. Forero had been in rebellion against.'[234] Carvajal, declaring that he 'understood' what Bohannan meant, continued to explain that the situation, in fact, 'wasn't really that way, and that anyhow the visit could be arranged very securely so that no one would know of it.'

Again Bohannan reiterated the 'delicacy' of meeting with someone who had held the Commander of the Colombian Army, General Berrio, prisoner, to which Carvajal responded that this was not a concern since Berrio and Forero 'were very close.' Bohannan, extricating himself from the conversation, declared his 'appreciation' for the offer, which, he said, would be given 'more active consideration' if the team could manage it at the end of its stay in Colombia.[235]

Beyond these intrigues, Tofte, Valeriano, and Bohannan were able to conduct a number of private conferences with Lleras Camargo, establishing 'an interesting and highly confidential direct working relationship' that ultimately afforded them 'unlimited access' to the president and his close advisors.[236] With Lleras' personal backing the team worked its way through Colombia in November and December, travelling more than 23,000 kilometers, visiting over 100 military garrisons, towns, and cities with the complete co-operation of local military commanders and civilian authorities in emergency zones.

Lleras' support also gave the team access to both official and private documents from military, police, and intelligence services, church and political leaders, and rehabilitation organizations. In the field they observed both civic action efforts and combat operations

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[234] Memorandum Bohannan to Team Leader, 'Conversation at Party-Loeb-5 November', Bohannan Papers (HIA), one page.

[235] All quotes, Ibid. In a comment to Tofte on the memorandum Bohannan asked simply, 'Was Gen. Berrio a prisoner of Forero?' [Underlined in original].

against bandits, and interviewed over 2000 people, including refugees and *campesinos*, labor leaders, jailed bandit and guerrilla fighters, as well as 'a number of guerrilla leaders in control of substantial regional fighting potentials.'[237]

After almost two months of field observations, interviews, and documentary research the survey of Colombia's violence problem was completed in mid-December 1959. In Bogotá the Special Team briefed Colombian and American officials, who endorsed their preliminary determinations and conclusions. Except for Bohannan the team then departed for Panama, where representatives reported to CINCARIB on its activities and operations before returning to Washington.[238]

Bohannan's Special Mission

After the rest of the team's departure Bohannan, on Tofte's instruction and with McIntosh's clearance, remained in Colombia for several extra weeks to conduct activities deemed critical to the completion of the mission. First, with the Embassy's Political Officer (Section II) detailed to offer administrative and operational support, Bohannan was to acquire an overview of the larger Caribbean security situation.[239]

Though outside the team's original mission parameters this assignment was not particularly surprising. That same month (December 1959), CIA began a survey under the direction of the new Cuban Task Force in the Directorate of Plans (now Directorate of Operations) that led to a first draft for covert operations against the new revolutionary

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[236] Preliminary Report (Majority)-Forward, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.2.
[237] RCST, Part I-CS, Preface, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.ii-iii; Preliminary Report (Majority)-Forward, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.1-2.
[238] RCST, Part I-CS, Preface, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.i; RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-6.
[239] Memorandum Tofte to Bohannan, 'Letter of Instructions,' 19 December 1959, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File #-13 (HIA), pp.1-2.

government in Cuba.[240] Guatemalan bases were eventually used to train Cuban exiles for this purpose, but it is little wonder, given Colombia's geostrategic proximity to both the Panama Canal and Castro's Cuba, that Tofte considered this 'a matter of immediate and high priority.'[241]

Second, Bohannan was tasked to follow-up with political leaders, such as the more radical left-wing Liberal Alfonso López Michelsen and with Lieutenant Colonel Valencia Tovar, commanding officer of the *Ayacucho* Battalion. Bohannan and Valencia were to discuss plans to establish a training program to improve civil-military relations and a public affairs section for the Colombian Armed Forces.[242] Valencia became a key figure in the counter-guerrilla/counter-bandit campaigns of the early and mid-1960s, instrumental in his later position as Chief of Operations of the Colombian Army in bringing the *Violencia* era to a close.[243]

Meetings with government officials responsible for internal stability, community development, and social rehabilitation programs – including Minister of Labor, Otto Morales Benítez; Presidential Counselor for Rehabilitation, José Gómez Pinzón; and Director of the *Equipos Polivalentes* (welfare or multifaceted teams), Héctore Morales – were also planned.

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[240] Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), p.43.

[241] Memorandum Tofte to Bohannan, 'Letter of Instructions', 19 December 1959, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.2.

[242] Ibid. In 1974, López Michelsen became the first non-National Front candidate elected to the Colombian presidency after the alternation period.

[243] Ramsey, *Guardians of the Other Americas: Essays on the Military Forces of Latin Americas*, pp.120-21. Associated article first published as 'Internal Defense in the 1980s: The Colombian Model' in *Journal of Comparative Strategy* (Winter 1994). Valencia went on to a full career in the Colombian military. He was promoted to Commanding General of the Army and, ultimately, nominated, though not confirmed, as Minister of Defense. For his own account of the *Violencia* era see Alvaro Valencia Tovar, *Testimonio de Una Epoca: Años Signados por el Conflicto en el que han Vivido Inmersos el Estado y la Sociedad Colombianos Bajo el Rótulo de la Violencia* (Bogotá: Planeta Colombiana Editorial S.A., 1992).

The Special Team placed considerable importance on *Polivalente* team efforts in the Colombian countryside. Composed of a doctor, nurse, engineer, home economist, and agricultural expert, fourteen teams were distributed throughout the five emergency departments of Tolima, Caldas, Valle del Cauca, Huila, and Cauca. Supported by an array of social welfare institutions, they also had access to heavy machinery in order to develop penetration roads into their areas and were generally tasked with reintegrating emergency departments into Colombia's larger political, economic, and social fabric.[244]

Polivalente teams did provide substantial aid to these rural communities, rebuilding violence-torn areas where the government had previously invested little support. They also offered 'great propaganda value, being the first tangible evidence in many localities that the Government [was] really interested in their problems and [was] trying to do something about it.'[245]

Critics have charged that these teams, in conjunction with larger government rehabilitation programs, initiated efforts which grew into more complex attempts at social control of the Colombian populace in the violence zones and that they were linked to 'militarization' of rural areas through civic action plans carried out by the Colombian armed forces.[246] But achieving some level of government presence, rather than extensive social control, appears to have been the goal with these kinds of programs. One unintended consequence of the increased role of the military in civic action projects,

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[244] Sánchez, 'The Violence: An Interpretative Synthesis,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, p.116. As Sánchez points out, this social welfare infrastructure covered a wide range of institutions including schools, churches, and even sewing centers as well as demonstration farms and branches of the Agrarian bank. They functioned with varying success during the early National Front period.

[245] RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 8-Relief and Rehabilitation, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 8-27.

[246] Sánchez, 'The Violence: An Interpretative Synthesis,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, p.117.

however, 'was the weight it added to military opinion on politically sensitive issues relating to social change and economic development.'[247]

Finally, utilizing the assistance proffered by Lleras through his presidential aide-de-camp Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Hauzeur, Bohannan was to accomplish one last task. Wrote Tofte:

> You will attempt to contact guerrilla leader "Pelligro" [*sic*] in Tolima if up-to-date intelligence indicates that a meeting can be arranged under conditions of safe passage and secure circumstances. If contact can be made with "Mariachi" through "George Peter" in Bogotá or vicinity this would be preferable for various reasons incl. time-saving [*sic*].[248]

Both '*General Peligro* (General Danger)' (Leopoldo García) and '*General Mariachi* (General Mariachi)' (Jesús María Oviedo) were Liberal guerrillas in southern Tolima who maintained substantial fighting capabilities and controlled large regions through defacto military-style governments. *Peligro* led the Liberal National Revolutionary Movement of Southern Tolima, which had established 'laws' for its operational area in an attempt to control the more extreme elements ('*violentos*' or '*antisociales*') spawned by the *Violencia.*

In 1960 the theft of a machine gun by communist forces controlled by Indian guerrilla leader '*Charro Negro* (Black Clown or Churl)' (Jacobo Prías Alape) sparked internecine warfare between Tolimas's southern guerrilla groups. Battles between *liberales limpios* and *liberales sucios* ended with the liquidation of *Charro Negro* by *Mariachi* over this seemingly innocuous incident. *Charro Negro's* death, however, altered the power-balance in the region and caused concern that *Mariachi* was abusing his 'protected status.' This led his former ally *Peligro* – aided by the Colombian army – to destroy

[247] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.78.

Mariachi's power base and remove him as a force within the guerrilla leadership of southern Tolima.[249]

Certainly the most important political result of *Charro Negro's* death was the subsequent rise to leadership of Manuel Marulanda Vélez ('*Tiro Fijo*' or 'Sure-Shot') over communist forces. Marulanda was 'committed to the idea of using southern Tolima as the staging ground for a nation-wide revolution,' following the example set by Castro's revolutionary forces in Cuba.[250]

Communist rural enclaves, sponsored by the PCC, developed during the *Violencia* period. Between 1600 and 2000 guerrillas were active in the so-called 'independent republics' that included *Sumapaz* (southern Cundinamarca), *Marquetalia/Gaitania* (southern Tolima), *Guayabero/El Pato* (Huila and Meta), *Ariari* (Meta), and *Riochiquito/Paez Simbola* (Huila, Cauca, and Valle border junction). By 1962, the Colombian military increasingly targeted these enclaves under the US sponsored counter-insurgency program known as Plan LAZO, initiating their final destruction with Operation *Marquetalia*, launched in May 1964.[251]

With the annihilation of the independent republics in the mid-1960s, *Tiro Fijo* founded the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas* (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC), a guerrilla army that more than 30 years later continues its insurgency with Marulanda at its head. As to whether the planned meeting between

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[248] Memorandum Tofte to Bohannan, 'Letter of Instructions,' 19 December 1959, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.1.

[249] Henderson, *When Colombia Bled*, pp.199, 219.

[250] Ibid., p.219. For an analysis of Marulanda as pragmatist rather than strident communist ideologue see LTC Robert S. Gordon, 'From *Caudrilla* to FARC, Inc.: The Transformation of the *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, 1982-1999,' Air University Research Report (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University, 1999), pp.1-74.

Bohannan and *Peligro* or *Mariachi* had any impact on this episode of Colombian history – an episode that gave rise to Colombia's most powerful guerrilla leader – is uncertain.

There is no current evidence to support a conclusion that *Mariachi* killed the communist *Charro Negro* at the behest of the US Special Team. Colombian communists, however, 'were quick to accuse *Mariachi* of acting as a [Colombian] government agent.'[252] What is certain is that any meeting Bohannan may have had, arranged, as it must have been through Lleras' aide-de-camp, clearly confirms the sub-rosa political relationship that existed between Liberal guerrillas and the Liberal party leadership at the highest levels.[253]

On 28 December Bohannan met a last time with Lleras Camargo before leaving Colombia. The focal point of discussion between the two men was a recent massacre in which 36 people, including women and children, were killed. Lleras was deeply disturbed by the event, both from a humanitarian perspective and for its adverse political implications on his government's recent claims that violence was being contained.

For Lleras this terrible incident underscored the urgent need for wide-ranging US security assistance that would have both immediate and long-term impact on the violence problem including modern communications and air-lift capabilities for *Lancero* teams hunting bandit and guerrilla groups; an effective, properly trained intelligence service

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[251] A FARC web page mistakenly labels the Colombian military's overarching counterinsurgency operation of this period as Plan LASSO (Latin American Security Operation) rather than Plan LAZO (that is, lasso, lariat, or noose) – see www.contrast.org/mirrors/farc/marque.htm.

[252] LTC R.E. Downen, 'Communist Attempt to Convert Colombian Rural Violence Into Insurgency During 1948-1966: Study of Failure,' Master of Military Art and Science Thesis (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 1969), p.125. Document No. AD B954454 as found in Air War College, Air University. I am grateful to LTC Robert Gordon, former US Air Force Defense Fellow at the University of Miami-School of International Studies for directing me to this document.

[253] Within the context of Colombia's rural guerrilla groups during the early phases of the *Violencia* the terms 'Liberal' or 'Conservative' reflect the remarkable degree to which traditional party loyalties were present through all sectors of Colombian society. Consequently, the kinds of sub-rosa relationships that

providing useful and timely information; aid for agrarian development; and ongoing training and material support for civic action efforts in the countryside.[254]

The meeting ended with a request by Lleras that Bohannan, Tofte, and Valeriano return quickly to Colombia with the completed survey report in order to implement its recommendations expeditiously.

The Colombia Survey Team Reports

Staking Out Contested Ground: Preliminary Views-Majority and Minority Reports

On 27 January 1960 the Special Team[255] completed a preliminary (majority) report, summarizing its findings of the security situation in Colombia. After internal (CIA) review, an edited version was disseminated to State and Defense on 15 February.[256] The report, presented under Tofte's name, outlined the critical problems of both active (primarily bandit) and potential (primarily communist guerrilla) violence.

Violence in Colombia, the team estimated, had taken more than 250,000 lives – 10,000 alone between 1958 and 1959 – while displacing more than 1.5 million people from farms and homesteads in the countryside. The inability of security forces to take effective action compounded this grave situation. The Army was garrison-bound, the

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existed between guerrillas in the field and government officials helps to explain why, for instance, Colombian communists saw *Mariachi* as a 'government agent' enjoying 'protected status'.

[254] Memorandum Bohannan to Tofte, 'Interview with President Lleras Camargo, 28 December 1959,' 31 December 1959, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File #-13 (HIA), pp.1-4.

[255] From this point forward the 'Special Team' explicitly refers to Tofte, Valeriano, and Bohannan who were the driving force behind both the Preliminary (Majority) Report and the final Colombian Survey. Koontz is explicitly identified with the dissenting Minority Report and did not participate in writing the final, comprehensive survey.

[256] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-6. It appears that the editing process culled out information that referred to the team as 'fielded by CIA' as well as most references to 'overt and covert' US assistance. Also, statements of Lleras as 'pro-US' or of Lleras having requested the Special Team as well as comments that the team had established an 'interesting and highly confidential direct working relationship' with the Colombian President are also crossed-out in the Preliminary Report (Majority) available in the Bohannan Papers. These mark-ups were likely deleted from copies sent to State and Defense.

population despised the National Police, and military and civilian intelligence/counter-intelligence organizations were ineffectual.

In general, security forces lacked any kind of information, public relations, or psychological warfare capabilities. Public opinion toward government, justice and law-enforcement agencies, and security forces oscillated between distrust and outright hatred after more than a decade of brutal internal war. Communist forces, though not an immediate threat, had the potential to exploit the existing situation and were already in control of several rural enclaves, organizing armed militia groups into *autodefensa* (self-defense) units.[257]

In the team's opinion the personal prestige, ability, and integrity of Lleras Camargo constituted the key element and asset in any effort to rebuild a broadly supported democratic government in Colombia.[258] Long-term solutions to the violence problem could only be undertaken through major structural changes in the social, economic, and political system of that country. Nonetheless, recognizing the need to utilize Lleras' influence and authority in any immediate bid to control current, active violence, the Special Team recommended the following six-point program for the Colombian government.

1. Found a special counter-guerrilla combat force from *Lancero* units within the Colombian Army.
2. Institute an effective military intelligence service and reorganize the civilian Colombian Intelligence Service.

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[257] Preliminary Report (Majority)-Forward, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.1-3 and Outline of Observations and Principle Recommendations, pp.6-17. A more rigorous analysis of the complete *Violencia* era puts the total death toll at approximately 159,200 – see Ramsey, 'The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, p.449.

[258] Preliminary Report (Majority)-Outline of Observations and Principle Recommendations, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.11-12.

3. Establish an effective and aggressive government public information service with a covert psychological warfare capability.
4. Initiate a so-called 'attraction' program, coordinated through a Civil Affairs (G-5) section of the Armed Forces, in an effort to rehabilitate public opinion of Colombia's security forces.
5. Reorganize, train, equip, and deploy the National Police and rehabilitate their public image.
6. Emphasize national development and rehabilitation programs, particularly land settlement and government-community welfare ('self-help') projects.[259]

US national interest required that Colombia, given its strategic Caribbean location, not be allowed to sink into turmoil and revolution as this might lead to a nation controlled by a government hostile to the United States. Consequently, an emergency US aid program that offered assistance and guidance to the Lleras administration best served that national interest. Both materiél and appropriate personnel were needed to support objectives outlined in the six-point program for Colombian action.[260]

This support, the team believed, fell within CIA's purview of 'covertly countering Communist influence and collecting intelligence on the Communist effort (Priority A), and of covertly supporting a stable, democratic, pro-US Government and collecting information on opponents of such a Government (Priority B).'[261]

Recalling their 'special relationship' with Lleras Camargo – and following the model established by Lansdale both with Ramon Magsaysay in the Philippines and Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam – Tofte, Bohannan, and Valeriano recommended that any support

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[259] Ibid., p.16 and Annex I, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.2-15.
[260] Preliminary Report (Majority)-Outline of Observations and Principle Recommendations, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.11.
[261] Preliminary Report (Majority)-Annex I, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.1.

and assistance be given through a US team with foreign internal security experience, organized specifically to help the Colombian government resolve its violence problem.[262]

Bolstering all other active US programs (e.g., ICA, Country Team, USIA) would reinforce these new efforts, promoting maximum impact over the duration of the Lleras government's remaining term in office. To what extent this support should be overt, the team concluded, was a 'matter for policy determination at appropriate echelons.'[263]

In early February, LTC Joseph Koontz presented his minority report to Tofte for submission to the State Department. Anticipating the early return of Tofte, Bohannan, and Valeriano to Colombia, he also presented a copy on 9 February to Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations), General Graves B. Erskine. His conclusions centered on several significant exceptions to the majority report.

First, Koontz recommended that any advice and assistance offered by the United States should be given through the established Country Team structure in Colombia. 'Know-how' not material assistance was the primary need of the Lleras government. A special team grafted onto an already existing Embassy framework would only impede this requirement.[264]

Second, he recommended that any advisory assistance – counter-guerrilla, intelligence, public information, civil affairs, or rehabilitation – be overt in nature. In Koontz's opinion, Tofte's proposals for US advisory support to help build Colombia's internal security capabilities could not even be properly described as covert action. More

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[262] Preliminary Report (Majority)-Outline of Observations and Principle Recommendations, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.16-17.
[263] Preliminary Report (Majority)-Annex I, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.1.
[264] Interdepartmental Survey Team to Colombia Preliminary Report (Minority), 9 February 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, Folder #-ID Survey Team to Colombia (HIA), Memorandum for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) [Erskine] concerning Minority Report,

importantly, comprehensive covert intervention by the United States was unnecessary: communists had not penetrated the Colombian government. Political, economic, and moral problems were at the root of Colombia's violence problem, not communism.

> Although the communists are very active, there are no concluding indications of a union of the urban proletariat with rural violence. In short the violence is not a communist problem. Serious consideration should be given before any covert activity is undertaken. The questionable future gain from penetrating the organizations of a very friendly power should be weighed against the real danger of damaging relations. The building of mutual trust with members of the Colombian Armed Forces took time. Tearing it down does not.[265]

Finally, military training of Colombia's Armed Forces, Koontz concluded, should be conducted by Defense agencies. Personnel needed for the kinds of assignments envisioned for Colombia were readily available within DOD and could be detailed for these duties through the US Army Mission in Bogotá without drawing undue attention to their activities. ' "Tinkering" with the Colombian Armed Forces by outside elements not responsible for US Military Policy and aims will not work,' he declared.[266]

Koontz's exceptions to the majority report reflected a deeper concern within the Defense Department that went beyond personal enmity and bureaucratic infighting carried over from the Special Team's work in Colombia to Washington. Eisenhower's internal security policies placed training of foreign military and select paramilitary forces in counter-guerrilla operations under DOD's jurisdiction.

Among special operations personnel there was a growing perception that Defense had abrogated many of its responsibilities in this field. Specialists in intelligence, special warfare, and civil affairs were under-utilized, hampering efficient planning and

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Interdepartmental Anti-Terrorist Survey Team to Colombia, p.1. Hereafter cited as Minority Report. At that time Lansdale officially held the Deputy Assistant position to Erskine.

[265] Ibid., p.2.

[266] Ibid., pp.2-3.

operations, while conventional training and support limited DOD's contribution to countering the threat of communist-supported revolutionary warfare in the Third World. Under pressure to alter this situation, DOD personnel undertook to review the need to augment counter-guerrilla training on a world-wide scale.[267]

As regards covert action, Koontz was not wholly correct in claiming that Special Team proposals could not be properly described as such. Covert operations are planned and executed in such a way as to conceal, or at least permit plausible deniability of, sponsorship. Obviously, wide-ranging US advisory assistance to Colombia's internal security forces could not be concealed from – indeed required the approval of – the Colombian government. In Cold War terms the objective was to conceal this assistance from communist adversaries who would label US support as interventionist and exploit it for propaganda purposes against both the Eisenhower and Lleras administrations.

Moreover the Special Team had envisioned an advisory role beyond mere 'overt' training: US advisors were to guide the development, direction, and output of Colombia's internal security forces by 'establish[ing] influence over its officers.' In the area of public relations and psychological warfare, for instance, the Special Team believed that a

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[267] Memorandum John N. Irwin to Maj. John Eisenhower, 16 April 1960, *DDQS* Vol.10 (1984), Microform 000834, 1 page. The wider implication of the DOD-CIA debate over counterinsurgency in Colombia is evidenced by the divergent strategies undertaken in Vietnam. In light of the Koontz-Special Team differences, it is ironic that those DOD elements that evolved in the unconventional warfare climate of SE Asia were more closely linked (figuratively and literally) to CIA pacification strategies than conventional DOD-based strategies of attrition. As well the (internal) DOD debate over the role of counterinsurgency within the US military created a definite split (still visible today) between Special Forces/Special Operations units and the larger, conventional army. Of the extensive literature available that touches on this debate see for instance Dale Andrade, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990); Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance 1950 to Present*; William Colby, *Lost Victory: A Firsthand Account of America's Sixteen-Year Involvement in Vietnam* (New York, NY: Contemporary Books, 1989); Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder, CO: Lexington Books, 1995); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., *The Army and Vietnam* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Timothy J. Lomperis, *From People's War to People's Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996). For an excellent analysis of

'Colombian Information Service [could] become virtually a US-directed source for overt and covert psychological warfare operations in joint US-Colombian interest. The potential for third country operations and the advantages offered by use of the agency of a president so respected internationally are too obvious to require emphasis.'[268]

In Koontz's defense, these latter proposals focused on US penetration of Colombia's security structures and fall more directly into the realm of clandestine action. That is, they were activities that attempted to conceal or assure secrecy of operations conducted by US government agencies to further US Cold War interests within Colombia.[269]

The debate over whether – or how much – covert or clandestine action should be undertaken in Colombia also reflects a fundamental institutional difference between CIA and DOD. In June 1948, NSC directive 10/2 established the Office of Policy Co-ordination (OPC) within CIA to undertake covert actions for which the US government could plausibly disclaim responsibility. OPC's mandate was to operate in gray areas – for instance, supporting counter-insurgency efforts, organizing resistance movements, facilitating subversion against hostile states – where 'armed conflict by recognized military forces' could not be ventured given the realities of the Cold War.[270]

It is evident that the majority report of the Special Team, while not dismissing the need for formal, overt military training, drew from the extensive 'gray area' experiences of Tofte, Valeriano, and Bohannan in Europe, Korea, and the Philippines. Their

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Third World successes (as opposed to US failure) in countering Maoist-style insurgency see Marks, *Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam*.

[268] All quotes Preliminary Report (Majority)-Annex I, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.8.

[269] Definitions of covert and clandestine operations are drawn from Department of State Airgram, Office of the Secretary (Dean Rusk), 'Approved Definitions Related to Internal Defense and Counterinsurgency,' 12 July 1962, *Low-Intensity Conflict Document Collection (LICDC)*, National Security Archives (NSA), pp.1-2. Hereafter *LICDC* (NSA).

[270] NSC 10/2 as quoted by Jeffreys-Jones, *The CIA and American Democracy*, pp.55-56.

difference in approach to Colombia's internal security problems reflected these experiences.

Furthermore the danger of conducting covert operations, as noted by Koontz, points to an ongoing dilemma faced by US policymakers generally and the intelligence community in particular. That dilemma lies in finding a balance within the gray area between fighting 'only according to Marquis of Queensberry rules' and actively seeking, in the words of the Doolittle Report of the 1950s, to 'subvert, sabotage and destroy [America's] enemies by more clear, more sophisticated and more effective methods' than are employed against it.[271]

That policymakers during the Cold War often instructed the intelligence community to pursue the latter course of action is borne out by the findings of the Church Committee in 1976. Nonetheless, covert action remains a normal, necessary – if controversial – tool of statecraft that should be properly integrated into the overall conduct of US foreign policy.[272]

Finally, linked to the above debates over lead-agency status and the role of covert action were differences concerning the nature of the violence problem in Colombia and the role, if any, played by both indigenous and external communist elements within the context of the *Violencia*. Koontz correctly assessed the violence problem as rooted, in its first instance, in the intense political rivalry between Liberals and Conservatives that

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[271] Quotes from Ray S. Cline, 'Should the CIA Fight Secret Wars?' *Harper's* (September 1984), p.39 and Doolittle Report cited in Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee), *Final Report*, Book I, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Rept. No. 94-755, 1976, p.9 both quoted in Loch K. Johnson, *Secret Agencies: US Intelligence in a Hostile World* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), p.60. Retired Air Force General James H. Doolittle headed a four-man committee that produced the 'Doolittle Report' in October 1954. Appointed by Eisenhower the Doolittle Committee's mandate was to examine CIA's covert activities.

existed throughout all segments of Colombian society. This communal violence had uprooted entire communities in efforts to 'homogenize the party colors' in some regions of the country.[273] To use current terminology, violence became a means for territorial-based political 'cleansing' in the countryside.

But the *Violencia* had also transformed itself over time – indeed, transmogrified itself in some instances – to become a multifaceted phenomenon that encompassed everything from state-sponsored violence to personal vendetta. In the latter phase it also gave rise to political banditry as well as reformist and revolutionary agrarian movements.[274] This is what the Special Team - Valeriano and Bohannan in particular, given their background in combating the Huk rebellion in the Philippines - were able to distinguish with greater clarity: that violence in Colombia did indeed have nascent, revolutionary characteristics.

It is clear that Koontz's assessment of the nature of the *Violencia* problem failed to recognize both its transformation over time and the evolving role of various radical rural and urban forces. Tofte, Valeriano, and Bohannan, on the other hand, presciently identified those characteristics of the *Violencia* that later gave rise to a diverse group of radical movements in the early 1960s that included FARC, the *Ejército de Liberación* (ELN-Army for National Liberation), and the *Ejército Popular de Liberación* (EPL-Popular Army for Liberation) in the countryside and urban counterparts such as the *Frente Unido de Acción Revolucionario* (United Front for Revolutionary Action-FUAR)

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[272] Roy Godson, 'Covert Action: Neither Exceptional Tool Nor Magic Bullet' in Roy Godson, Ernest R. May, and Gary Schmitt (eds.) *US Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform* (Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1995), p.170.

[273] Mauricio Solaún, 'Colombian Politics: Historical Characteristics and Problems' in R. Albert Berry, Ronald G. Hellman, and Mauricio Solaún (eds.) *Politics of Compromise: Coalition Government in Colombia* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), p.33.

[274] Gonzalo Sánchez, 'La Violencia y sus efectos sobre el sistema político colombiano' as cited by Peñeranda, 'Surveying the Literature on the Violence,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, p.301.

and the *Moviemiento Obrero Independiente Revolucionario* (Revoutionary Independent Labor Movement-MOIR).[275]

A Meeting of Presidents – Lleras Visits the United States

Despite explicit support and approval for the majority report from Rubottom at State the Special Team's return to Colombia was stymied by differences in Washington over policy implementation as a result of Koontz's minority report.[276] In late March 1960, Lleras Camargo received an edited and interagency coordinated edition of the preliminary report for his review.[277] Privately, Special Team members admitted that this '"doctored" version' so 'watered down' their original recommendations that they 'refused to be identified with it in regard to key aspects of considerable importance.' Lleras, the team learned, was 'disappointed' by the non-committal nature of the report.[278]

The Colombian President had a chance to air these concerns to Eisenhower during a state visit to the United States from 5-16 April. A US briefing book details the wide-ranging discussions planned for the two presidents: agrarian reform, loan assistance for economic development, investment guarantees, problems concerning coffee, shrimp, and sugar imports, arms limitation for Latin America, and assistance to Colombia in combating guerrillas.[279]

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[275] Eduardo Pizarro, 'Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, p.173.

[276] Notes Regarding the Colombia Survey Team, 6 June 1960, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.1-2.

[277] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-7.

[278] Notes Regarding the Colombia Survey Team, 6 June 1960, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.2. The noncommittal nature of the report sent to Lleras apparently left Ambassador McIntosh 'likewise disgusted' and 'fed up' because he had not received the Special Team's preliminary reports or completed final drafts. This despite Tofte's claims that he had 'urgently recommended' that McIntosh and Country Team chiefs be kept informed. Unfortunately a copy of the edited report sent to the Lleras government is not contained in the Bohannan Papers.

[279] Briefing Book-Contents, undated, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Records as President, White House Central Files (Confidential File), 1953-61, Subject Series, Box 80, STATE, Department of (Apr.1960) [Briefing Book-Pres. Lleras Visit] (2) (DDEL), one page.

Regarding the latter, a position paper prepared by John Hill, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, recommended support for Lleras' desire to 'liquidate the guerrilla problem,' while encouraging that his government pay for equipment required to support the mobile counter-insurgency force advocated by the Special Team.

This, Hill believed, would avoid charges that the Eisenhower administration had contravened the Morse Amendment, which prohibited the use of MAP funds for internal security purposes in Latin America without an explicit presidential determination. Given the urgency of the situation in Colombia, however, Hill further recommended that MAP funding be considered if the Colombians were unable to purchase the necessary equipment themselves, using the Special Team's final report – once completed – as a basis for considering any requests for support.[280]

After a series of formal state dinners the two presidents met at Camp David to discuss US-Colombian relations. There Lleras commented to Eisenhower on the increasing need among Latin American military forces for anti-guerrilla training. He feared that guerrilla warfare would increasingly become the communist weapon of choice throughout the developing world. In Colombia, Lleras declared, the US Mission 'was not training the Colombian Army in what they really needed,' though he conceded that Colombian generals were getting what they 'thought they needed' and that it would be very difficult to convince them 'to do anything but emulate the American Army.'[281]

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[280] Briefing Book-Position Paper: US Assistance to Colombia in Combatting [*sic*] Guerrillas (DDEL), undated, three pages.

[281] All quotes Memorandum E.P. Aurand to General Goodpaster, 7 April 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-61, International Series, Box 3, Colombia [May 1958-July 1960] (DDEL), one page.

Eisenhower concurred with Lleras that US military training in South America should focus on counter-guerrilla operations, but countered – rather unpersuasively in light of the Special Team's activities – that the actions of the US Mission in Colombia were necessarily bound by the policy directives of the Colombian government.[282] Nonetheless, following this discussion. Eisenhower directed that Defense prepare a comprehensive report on the needs of the Colombian Army including equipment, training, and organization, to combat guerrilla activity in that country.[283]

With this directive Eisenhower moved DOD rather than CIA towards lead-agency status, initiating a militarized approach to Colombia's internal security problems that characterizes US policy to the present day.

Colombia Survey – Final Report

On 25 May 1960 the Special Team presented its final report to Secretary of State Christian Herter. Comprised of three parts – Colombian Survey, Recommendations for Colombian Action, and Recommendations for US Action – the first two sections were prepared for possible distribution to the Lleras government, while the latter was 'US Eyes Only.'[284] This detailed review and analysis of Colombia's multifaceted violence problem reinforced and elaborated upon the findings proffered in the preliminary (majority) report.

Echoing Lleras Camargo's concerns the team identified current, active violence as the most critical, short-term problem facing the new National Front government. Criminal in

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[282] Memorandum Maj. John S.D. Eisenhower to John N. Irwin II, 14 April 1960 and Memorandum Maj. John S.D. Eisenhower to Douglas Dillon, 14 April 1960 both in White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary: Records of Paul T. Carroll, Andrew J. Goodpaster, L. Arthur Minnich, and Christopher H. Russell, 1952-61, International Series, Box 3, Colombia [May 1958-July 1960] (DDEL), one page each.
[283] Memorandum E.P. Aurand to General Goodpaster, 7 April 1960, (DDEL), one page.
[284] Letter of Transmittal Tofte to Secretary of State (Herter), 25 May 1960 in RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), one page; RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-1.

nature, this was primarily the work of bandit gangs committing acts of murder, rape, and 'economic terrorism' in coffee growing and cattle raising regions. Led by *violentos* nurtured in the brutality of the period, these gangs operated as quasi-guerrillas, raiding and maintaining rudimentary intelligence networks throughout their areas of operation, establishing spheres of influence that promoted a rapid growth in black-market activities, aided by intermediaries and purchasers of illicit produce.[285]

The team judged that the Colombian government could eradicate these groups more easily because, unlike real guerrillas, they lacked ideological motivation and popular support. *Lancero* units, guided by qualified advisors and supported by a functioning intelligence service as well as basic psychological warfare and civic action programs, could alleviate this problem relatively quickly. By employing counter-guerrilla methods to 'capture, kill, or adequately discourage bandits and outlaws,' the team estimated that current, active violence could be 'substantially eliminated' in 10-12 months.[286]

As to overcoming the second, more substantial obstacle of potential violence – a problem not easily remedied by a single action – the team was less sanguine. To bring long-term stability to Colombia required wide-ranging reform of that country's social, political, and economic system. Military solutions were secondary and largely a derivative of nation-building efforts that would entrench a broadly respected, democratic

[285] RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 2-The Violence Problem, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 2-45 thru 55. For an extensive analysis of the relationship between the *Violencia*, land transactions, intermediaries, and the illicit trade in coffee see Carlos Miguel Ortiz Sarmiento, 'The "Business of the Violence": The Quindío in the 1950s and 1960s,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, pp.125-54.
[286] Ibid., 2-56; RCST, Part III-RUS, RUS-9,10; RCST, Part II-Recommendations for Colombian Action (RCA), April 1960 Rev. 10, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 12, Folder #-Recommendations (HIA), Introduction-paragraph 16 (no page numbers in introduction). It should be noted that documents encompassing Recommendations for Colombian Action available in the Bohannan Papers are a 'Rev.10' version. Nonetheless, given the late date, they are likely to closely reflect (likely even mirror), the final, official, report sent to Herter.

society.[287] Their stark appraisal: short of 'genocide or bankruptcy' no military solution to the problem of potential violence existed.[288]

The Lleras administration faced the 'rock-bottom, elementary issue' of re-establishing confidence in government among Colombia's demoralized population. Restoring public faith in the government's ability to maintain peace required it to reduce current, active violence to tolerable levels, develop political stability based on democratic processes, and ensure equitable solutions to basic social and economic needs.

Internal stability could only be achieved by coordinating military and law-enforcement activities with ongoing efforts to eliminate widespread social, political, and economic injustice. The 'cardinal principle' to achieving this goal in Colombia was the development of a true democratic government, reflecting the will of the majority of its people, while concomitantly protecting minority rights.[289]

But the team did not minimize the extent of Colombia's social ills, recognizing the magnitude of the dilemma faced by any Colombian government, even one led by a person of Lleras' stature. Problems included a large rural population displaced from the land or onto tracts too small for productive use (*minifundia*); widespread illiteracy in the countryside; racial inequality; the highest rates for diseases such as typhoid, typhus, yellow fever, small pox, and leprosy in the Western Hemisphere; and an entrenched political oligarchy, serving only the interests of the elite. Critical shortages of food, housing, medical services, and education were creating what can only be described as a revolutionary situation amongst 'have-nots.'[290]

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[287] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-7.
[288] Ibid., RUS-8.
[289] RCST, Part II-RCA, Introduction, Bohannan Papers (HIA), paragraphs 1 thru 7.
[290] RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 1-Introduction to Colombia, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 1-17 thru 45.

In Colombia efforts to suppress violence, promote effective labor organizations, develop extensive social welfare and rehabilitation services, resettle displaced persons, and stabilize the economy were all necessary components in establishing internal stability. This Lleras attempted to do by supporting land resettlement and malaria suppression programs, improving educational facilities, undertaking judicial reform, and promoting government initiatives to expand industrial and agricultural productivity as well as infrastructure improvements to transportation and communications facilities.[291]

But countering insurgents requires a coordinated political-military posture that incorporates a full spectrum of social, economic, and psychological components into any security strategy.[292] Though Lleras had undertaken some important first steps the Special Team offered a list of new programs – many of them focused on reorienting Colombia's security forces to an internal security mission – that it deemed essential in developing the kind of comprehensive strategy needed to achieve lasting stability.

Key elements of this plan included regaining public trust in the Armed Forces by focusing military efforts on the problem of active violence, establishing competent national intelligence and public information agencies, enlarging rehabilitation efforts, and improving national tax structures as well as government administration and operations.

Finally the team recommended that Lleras initiate an anti-subversive program either 'partially or wholly clandestine, to discredit or eliminate by legal means those anti-democratic forces seeking for their own benefit, or for the benefit of a foreign power, to impede or prevent the establishment of a stable, popular, democratic government.'[293]

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[291] RCST, Part II-RCA, Introduction, Bohannan Papers (HIA), paragraphs 8, 10.
[292] Sam C. Sarkesian, *US National Security: Policymakers, Processes, and Politics* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), pp.34-36.
[293] RCST, Part II-RCA, Introduction Bohannan Papers (HIA), paragraphs 11, 12, 63.

The Special Team also identified another vital component to any successful political-military strategy designed to counter internal instability in Colombia: US support. Emphasizing 'quasi-covert' assistance to augment and reorient Colombian stabilization efforts the team envisioned 'special temporary aid' in the form of both materiél and advisory personnel.

Specialists with experience in counter-guerrilla, information, and psychological warfare, intelligence and counter-intelligence, civic action and rehabilitation programs, and police operations would focus on both short-term anti-violence activities and on long-term measures aimed at ameliorating the causes of potential violence. In short, they would concentrate their efforts towards reorganizing Colombia's conventionally oriented security forces. The team recommended that these advisors be fitted into the existing Country Team framework on a temporary basis under the supervision of a senior advisor acting as special assistant to the US Ambassador (see Appendices 3 & 4).[294]

In an effort to deflect 'interventionist' charges, the Special Team also advocated the use of third-country nationals – contracted to the Colombian government under 'cover' arrangements but actually under covert US control – as advisors to security forces engaged in guerrilla-bandit suppression operations. Non-US personnel, they reasoned, brought experience and training not readily available in the United States and offered additional propaganda value by demonstrating 'international solidarity and support of US objectives.' As to material aid the team suggested 'sterile' equipment, stripped of US

[294] RCST, Part III-RUS, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS-9, 10.

markings and supplied through alternate military aid channels. Total US costs for this special temporary aid were estimated at less than one million dollars.[295]

Mission Accomplished? Frustration and Recriminations

Despite the sense of urgency conveyed by the Special Team its final report did little to mobilize immediate support from the US security community. Officials at the Pentagon's Special Warfare office, for instance, continued to delay implementation of the team's recommendations because of differences of opinion over deployment of *Lancero* units.

The problem was passed to CINCARIB in Panama for further evaluation, while State, DOD, and CIA prepared 'Position Papers' on other issues concerning military, intelligence, psychological warfare, and rehabilitation programs. Worried by this lack of initiative, team members feared that their work would amount to little more than 'waste motion,' creating 'disillusion and disappointment' among Colombians who had supported their efforts.[296]

These frustrations intensified as problems for Tofte grew at CIA over his professional relationship with Loeb. Bohannan – ever the colorful character – tried to bolster the embattled Tofte with a letter from Kansas in which he wrote: 'As for the pals around your building, they may be reminded about the sprig of mistletoe I always wear pinned to my

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[295] Ibid., RUS-15 thru 17, 31; RCST, Part III-RUS, Appendix I-Analysis of Requirements for US Assistance, to Recommendations for US Action, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RUS/I-3. Costs were based on the following estimate: (a) Counter-Guerrilla Force: Advisory and misc. ($50,000), Equipment ($600,000), (b) Intelligence ($30,000), (c) Info and Psywar ($40,000), (d) Rehabilitation ($78,000), (e) Intell Co-ordination ($5,000), (f) Police ($45,000), (g) Civic Action and 'Attraction' ($25,000), (h) Supervision and Organizational ($30,000), and Misc. Transport ($30,000) for a total of $933,000. The State Department sought Colombian financing of equipment requirements, reducing aid costs to approximately $333,000 (see RUS/I-15). Equipment costs were primarily tied to purchasing two light helicopters and six fixed-wing 'Helio-Couriers' for *Lancero* units engaged in counterinsurgency operations. For a review of the Helio-Courier's capabilities see RCST, Part II-RCA, Annex E-Descriptive Data on Helio Super-Courier to Appendix I-The *Lanceros*, to Recommendations for Colombian Action, Bohannan Papers (HIA), RCA/I-E-1 thru 3.

coat-tail.'[297] By late summer though, things had taken a decidedly serious turn: tellingly, Tofte began to sign-off his correspondence to Bohannan with 'Assistant Vice President of The Doghouse Club.'[298]

In July, reports sent to CIA's Inspector General intimated that Loeb had been bypassed and disregarded by the Special Team during its survey mission to Colombia and that Tofte personally had proved unfit for leadership duties given the internal problems that occurred within the team. Though not formally under investigation, Tofte sought to quell the growing controversy by circulating a questionnaire among fellow team members, asking them to provide answers (sealed if they preferred) to 19 questions regarding the relationship between Tofte, the team, and Loeb that might be placed in the record.[299]

Bohannan gave a strong reply in favor of both Tofte personally and his leadership generally during the survey period. In a private note attached to the questionnaire he remarked angrily: 'Those goddam miserable bastards!!!!' Entreating Tofte not to 'let the bastards wear you down,' Bohannan further remarked that, '[i]f necessary, I would be happy to make a trip back there [Washington] on my own time and money, . . . to testify, be doodle-bugged [polygraph tested], or what have you.' He also proposed writing a letter to the 'YMCA secretary' (a euphemism referring to CIA and its Director of Central

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[296] Notes Regarding the Colombia Survey Team, 6 June 1960, Bohannan Papers (HIA), pp.1-3.
[297] Letter Bohannan to Tofte, 7 June 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File#13 (HIA), one page. As early as mid-May, frustrated by the lack of support even at CIA, Valeriano had proposed a 'critique report on company procedures' over the improper handling of the Special Team. See Letter Valeriano to Bohannan, 14 May 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File#13 (HIA), one page and attachment.
[298] See Letter Tofte to Bohannan, 28 July 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File#13 (HIA), one page.
[299] Memorandum for Members of Colombia Survey Team-Questionnaire, 28 July 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File#13 (HIA), one page (cover letter) plus attached questionnaire (one page).

Intelligence (DCI) – at that time, Allen Dulles) dealing with matters detailed in the questionnaire and cover letter.[300]

But for Tofte this proved a particularly inopportune time within CIA to add to perceptions of him as a controversial figure. As the Agency sought to clear out 'OSS hangovers and former FBI gumshoes' from the clandestine service, Tofte's difficulties with Loeb resulted in a demotion in 1962 to Domestic Operations division and the end of his CIA career, for unrelated reasons, by 1966.[301]

The immediate effect of these recriminations was that neither Tofte, Valeriano, or Bohannan ever returned to Colombia in an official advisory position: support within the US government for seconding a team with Lansdale-style plenipotentiary power to the Lleras administration – especially one headed by Tofte – was non-existent. Nonetheless,

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[300] All quotes, Letter Bohannan to Tofte, 1 August 1960, Charles T.R. Bohannan Papers, Box 31, File#13 (HIA), one page, attached to Reply to Questionnaire. No other replies to Tofte's questionnaire are contained within the Bohannan Papers. Loeb's side of this story is likewise unavailable, but a general idea of the direction of his complaints can be gleaned from the questions put to Survey Team members by Tofte.

[301] Evan Thomas, *The Very Best Men, Four Who Dared: The Early Years of The CIA* (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1996), p.187. It is mild to say that opinions regarding Special Team members, in particular Tofte and Valeriano, vary considerably. Thomas describes Tofte, who trained with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and fought with the Danish resistance against the Nazis as 'a brave commando' for these efforts, but also a 'blowhard' who exaggerated his actions for CIA during the war in Korea and, eventually, a 'pariah' whose CIA career ended badly and in a very public manner - see *The Very Best Men*, p.313. For the public airing of Tofte's break with CIA see Thomas' citation [Chapter 21-footnote 20] of Morton Mintz, 'Tofte Case Blows Covers High and Low,' *Washington Post* 16 October, 1966). For other views concerning Tofte's actions during the Korean War see Nathan Miller, *Spying For America: The Hidden History of US Intelligence* (New York, NY: Marlowe and Company, 1997), p.322; John Prados, *Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II Through The Persian Gulf* (Chicago, IL: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), pp.68-70; and G.J.A. O'Toole, *Honorable Treachery: A History of US Intelligence, Espionage, and Covert Action From The American Revolution To The CIA* (New York, NY: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1991), p.450. For Tofte's view of his own actions in Korea as cited by Thomas see Joseph Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War* (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1982), pp.262-475.

Napoleon Valeriano receives mixed reviews, too. While regarded as 'the most successful anti-guerrilla fighter in the military campaigns against the Huks in the Philippines' (Preliminary Report (Majority)-Forward, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.1), others describe him as an 'arch rightist' who led the Philippine Constabulary *Nenita* units, 'death squads famous for their efficiency'- see Sterling Seagrave, *The Marcos Dynasty* (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988), pp.130-31. For Valeriano and Bohannan in their own words see Col. Napoleon D. Valeriano (Ret.) and Lt. Col. Charles T.R. Bohannan (Ret.), *Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The Philippine Experience* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc.,

despite these problems, team members believed they had accomplished two major objectives. First, that US policymakers were now fully aware of the threat communist forces posed to Colombian internal security and second, that US assistance to the Lleras administration, 'military and otherwise,' would be essential in helping that country to reduce or eliminate its violence problem.[302]

In actuality the accomplishments as stated were far too modest. Historically speaking the Special Team's survey and recommendations became the foundation upon which the United States aided in the construction of Colombia's modern national security structures. Ultimately this facilitated the containment of that nation's violence problem during the last phase of the *Violencia* era.

Summary

A confluence of security interests between the United States and Colombia gave birth to the Special Survey Team. With Castro's revolutionary success in Cuba the exigencies of the Cold War became immediate for the United States in Latin America. Fearing the spread of communist insurgencies throughout the hemisphere the Eisenhower administration revitalized its security efforts towards internal defense. Colombia's strategic location naturally placed it in the forefront of US internal security policy plans for the region.

For the Eisenhower administration the fall of the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship and the reinstitution of democratic government in Colombia under the highly respected Lleras Camargo only furthered the close political relationship that had long existed between the

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1962). Another useful source for this period continues to be Edward Geary Lansdale, *In The Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1991).

[302] Notes Regarding the Colombia Survey Team, 6 June 1960, Bohannan Papers (HIA), p.2. Given the history of US-Latin American relations it is likely that administration officials were aware of the

two countries. Aid to Lleras offered the administration an opportunity to help a democratic ally and counter criticisms of its support for authoritarian regimes elsewhere in Latin America. It also furthered the administration's goal of promoting that nation as a model for internal security in the region.

Lleras believed that endemic violence constituted Colombia's most immediate problem and that without economic and military support from the United States this violence jeopardized the stability of his government and nation. This raised the specter that a return to internecine political warfare between Liberals and Conservatives might open the door to radical solutions of that nation's problems. By framing his dilemma in Cold War terms – the Cuban Revolution as a blueprint for communist forces operating within his own nation – Lleras certainly furthered his aim of securing US support.

As for the Special Team, its mandate was to determine the best means of supporting this confluence of security interests. Team members viewed Colombia's problems through a prism of Cold War orthodoxy, though Koontz's dissent correctly placed the locus of the violence problem within Colombian society itself. Nonetheless the team's analysis did identify the nascent revolutionary characteristics of *la Violencia*, while seeking to constructively address the security-development dilemma this posed.

Clearly the team's dispatch to Colombia also provoked considerable controversy. For Tofte personally it has been reckoned 'a failed tour of duty in South America.'[303] But their accomplishments require a more nuanced historical evaluation. In the final analysis the Special Team report offered a 'blueprint' for prosecuting the war against internal violence in Colombia. This blueprint – weighted as it was in the short-term towards

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vulnerability of any 'special team' to charges of 'interventionism' and all that implied for US policy throughout the region.

securing the stability of the Colombian state – did not neglect long-term solutions centered on legitimate, democratic governance. Its wide-ranging counterinsurgency strategy encompassed those military, economic, and sociopolitical elements vital to the success of any nation-building effort.

Ultimately policymakers in Colombia and the United States would narrow the focus of this strategic proposal, concentrating too heavily on military solutions at the expense of broad social reform. Nonetheless the Special Team's contribution was a benchmark strategy for combating revolutionary insurgency and revitalizing a structural reform process that might have led to deeper democratization in Colombia. As it was the team's survey efforts acted as a prologue to wide-ranging – and successful – US-Colombian internal security efforts undertaken during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

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[303] Thomas, *The Very Best Men*, p.313.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONTAINING *LA VIOLENCIA*:

COUNTERINSURGENCY IN THE EARLY NATIONAL FRONT PERIOD

Introduction

The Kennedy administration came to power determined to revitalize what they perceived as a stagnant US policy towards Latin America. To this end the administration applied a bifurcated policy of military and socioeconomic assistance – counterinsurgency coupled to the Alliance for Progress. This dual-track model remained in place under Lyndon Johnson, though with less commitment given the exigencies imposed by growing US involvement in the Vietnam War.

Colombia was in the forefront of this US policy initiative. With the fall of the Rojas dictatorship and advent of the first National Front government under Lleras Camargo, national security policy was reoriented towards internal defense. Ongoing guerrilla-bandit problems during the second Front government of Conservative Guillermo León Valencia brought even greater security collaboration between Colombia and the United States.

Ultimately this led to the US-supported Colombia Internal Defense Plan and Plan LAZO: internal security strategies that utilized counterinsurgency, civic action, intelligence, civil defense, and psychological warfare to contain *la Violencia* and bring some measure of stability to the Colombian countryside.

The Soft Track: Kennedy and the Alliance for Progress

John F. Kennedy came to the White House determined to rejuvenate US economic and defense strategy, particularly in Latin America. In mid-February Special Assistant to

the President Arthur M. Schlesinger went on a fact-finding mission, filing his report in early March. Quoting Germán Arciniegas the Colombian historian, Schlesinger described the prosperous 'visible' Latin America made up of presidents, embassies, armies, and business offices, in juxtaposition to the 'invisible' masses – some 150 million repressed people who continued to live in near-feudal conditions.

According to Schlesinger the US needed to support economic modernization in order to promote a new middle class and give hope to this 'vast reservoir' of potential revolutionaries. Failure to do so would guarantee 'workers and peasants' revolts and the rise of other Castros throughout the region.[304] That same month, in a speech to the diplomatic corps of the other American republics, Kennedy called for a vast cooperative effort to develop the hemisphere.

In Punte del Este, Uruguay, a charter established the Alliance for Progress in August 1961. Signatories to this document recognized implicitly that basic social, economic, and institutional reform was needed in Latin America in order to make both US and international assistance effective. Policymakers pledged to undertake urban and rural housing development, increase literacy and health care, reform tax laws, and restructure land tenure systems.

They called for an economic growth rate target of 2.5 percent per year, along with stimulation of private investment, economic diversification, increase agricultural productivity, and a more equitable distribution of the national income.[305] In effect the

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[304] Report to the President on Latin American Mission, 12 February-3 March 1961: Arthur M. Schlesinger, *DDQS* Vol.2 (1976), Microform 217(A), pp.1-2.

[305] US Senate, Compilation of studies and hearings of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *Survey of the Alliance for Progress: Colombia-A Case History of US Aid*, 1 February 1969, in *Survey of the Alliance for Progress*, US Senate Document No.91-17, 29 April 1969 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), pp.768-69. Hereafter *Colombia-A Case History of US Aid*, US Senate Document No.91-17.

Charter of Punte del Este became, as Schlesinger declared, 'a summons to a democratic revolution'[306] and the key US economic strategy for the region.

The Kennedy administration saw Colombia as a 'showcase' nation for this new policy given that 'it had a democratic two-party system and progressive political leadership, was traditionally oriented toward sound financial policies and free enterprise, possessed a strong, forward-looking private sector, had varied natural resources, and had a market potential sufficient for advanced industrialization.'[307] But despite these positive attributes, social and economic development failed to meet expectations.[308] Mismanagement of financial resources, lack of sustained economic reform, and the failure to disperse political power under the National Front system would 'tarnish' Colombia's showcase image.[309]

Still, although comprehensive structural reform was not forthcoming, the Colombian economy did sustain surprising long-term strength, recording 5 percent annual GDP rates between 1967 and 1980.[310] As for the short-term, Alliance for Progress programs did achieve 'political stability and maintenance of Colombia's democratic political institutions,'[311] which, in turn, favored the successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations – the second track of US 'democratic revolution' strategy.

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[306] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1965), p.763.
[307] Randall, *Colombia and the United States: Hegemony and Interdependence*, p.233.
[308] David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993), pp.230-31; *Colombia-A Case History of US Aid*, US Senate Document No.91-17, p.669.
[309] John H. Hunter, 'Colombia: A Tarnished Showcase,' *Current History*, 51/303 (November 1966), pp.283, 309.
[310] Hanratty and Meditz (eds.). *Colombia: A Country Study*, Department of the Army, DA Pam 550-26, p.138.
[311] *Colombia-A Case History of US Aid*, US Senate Document No.91-17, p.669.

The Hard Track: Kennedy and Counterinsurgency

The administration coupled the Alliance for Progress to its key military strategy for the region: counterinsurgency. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's January 1961 speech supporting 'wars of national liberation' in the developing world conjoined with Kennedy's own interest in counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare gave impetus to a new US defense policy centered on internal security.

This policy focused concurrently on civic action programs that sought to eliminate root causes of violence and the development of internal defense structures that would produce effective police, military, and intelligence organizations capable of acting against subversive groups.[312] Within the US government all departments that dealt with security matters were tasked with placing greater emphasis on deterring insurgency and enhancing counterinsurgency operations on a global basis.[313]

In April the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion marred, but did not undermine, this new policy initiative. Even after this debacle administration officials did not shy away from undertaking paramilitary operations. McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, sought to conduct these operations with 'maximum effectiveness and flexibility' within the Cold War context. Bundy called for a determination of all existing US paramilitary assets in conjunction with probable regional requirements throughout the world. Overt operations remained the responsibility of DOD, while CIA controlled those of a wholly covert or disavowable nature.[314]

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[312] Tom Barry, *Low-Intensity Conflict: the New Battlefield in Central America* (Albuquerque, NM: The Inter-Hemispheric Education Center, 1986), pp.6-7.

[313] National Security Action Memorandum (NSAM) No.2-Development of Counter-guerrilla Forces, 3 February 1961, 1 page, in *LICDC* (NSA); Memorandum for the File: Essential Points Arising from JCS meeting with the President, 3 February 1961, *DDQS* Vol.14 (1988), Microform 002853, 1 page.

[314] NSAM No.56-McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) to the Secretary of Defense: Evaluation of Paramilitary Requirements, 28 June 1961, *LICDC* (NSA), 1 page: NSAM No.57-

Many of the administration's programs and initiatives were already well established and playing an integral part in the development of US internal security policy by the end of 1961.[315] In July the Army Caribbean School in Panama (renamed the US Army School of the Americas in the summer of 1963) began to retool its training mission for both US and Latin American military personnel. It initiated a counterinsurgency committee and offered instruction in counterinsurgency operations with 34 students from 14 different Latin American nations attending the first class.[316]

US training encouraged Latin American servicemen to see internal security as their most effective contribution to hemisphere defense as well as the potential that an apolitical armed forces could have on economic and social development in their countries through civic action programs. Training targeted junior-ranking military officers, anticipating their future leadership role.[317]

Police training programs, initiated under Eisenhower's NSC Action 1290d in December 1954, continued to expand under the auspices of the Agency for International Development (AID-formerly ICA). AID's Public Safety Division sought to improve the capabilities of indigenous police forces to combat subversion while maintaining the rule of law. One of the few overt operational links between the US government and civilian

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McGeorge Bundy to Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of CIA: Responsibility for Paramilitary Operations, 28 June 1961, *LICDC* (NSA), 1 page.

[315] Memorandum for the President-Introduction: Counter-Subversion training for Latin American Police Forces, 30 September 1961, *DDQS* Vol.7 (1981), Microform 213(A), p.1.

[316] Counterinsurgency Training at the US Army School of the Americas, Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, 26 October 1965, call number 8-29A EA cy1, JFKSWC-USASOC Archives, p.1.

[317] Memorandum for the President-Military Actions for Latin America, JCSM-832-61, 30 November 1961, *DDQS* Vol.7 (1981), Microform 166(A), pp.4-7. See also *DDQS* Vol.9 (1983), Microform 002319 for follow-up document JCSM-30-62, 13 January 1962. The report by the JCS to the President contained 27 proposals for military programs in Latin America under the categories (1) Internal Security, (2) Hemisphere Defense, (3) Economic Development, (4) Troop Information and Education, (5) Miscellaneous (Public relations). Under State Department Policy Guidance CW8071 to all Latin American Embassies (10 April 1962), Ambassadors and Country Teams were to develop specific programs from these 27 general

law enforcement in Latin America, ongoing programs existed in eight nations throughout Central and South America by late 1961.[318]

On 18 January 1962 the Kennedy administration established Special Group (Counter-Insurgency (CI)) in order to coordinate the efforts and resources of agencies involved in countering insurgency and subversion. A high-powered organization, its members included Military Representative to the President General Maxwell Taylor (chairman), Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatrick, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General L.L. Lemnitzer, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, Administrative Director of AID Fowler Hamilton, and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy. In August, Special Group (CI) added Edward Murrow, Director of USIA to permanent membership, while inviting other department and agency representatives into sessions as needed.[319]

Special Group (CI) insured that all US agencies and departments recognized insurgency as a major form of conflict equal in importance to conventional warfare and that training, organization, equipment, and doctrine of US armed forces reflected the importance the administration placed on this new policy. Maintenance of adequate resources to deal with actual or potential insurgencies, coordination and unification of interdepartmental programs and actions, and a supervisory role in regards to training programs offered to developing nations all fell within Special Group's purview.[320]

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proposals on the authority of the President's directive NSAM No.118, 26 March 1962 (see *DDQS* Vol.15 (1989), Microform 000341).

[318] Memorandum for the President: Counter-Subversion training for Latin American Police Forces, 30 September 1961, in *DDQS* Vol.7 (1981), Microform 213(A), p.1-4.

[319] Barber and Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power*, p.97.

[320] NSAM No.124-Establishment of the Special Group (Counter-Insurgency), 18 January 1962, *LICDC* (NSA), pp.1-2.

On 1 July 1962 the Inter-American Police Academy opened, though it later moved to Washington where it reappeared as the International Police Academy. A number of military service schools also expanded in order to provide greater training in counterinsurgency and civic action to both US and Latin American personnel including the Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg and the School for Civil Affairs at Fort Gordon. Staff at the National War College, the Strategic Intelligence School, and the Military Assistance Institute reoriented curricula to include internal security training.

Language training expanded in an effort to support a program to deploy 30 Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) to fourteen Latin American nations. Early 1962 found 15 US Special Warfare teams training host-nation militaries in counterinsurgency and jungle operations, intelligence, civic action, and psychological warfare in nine Latin American countries.[321]

By August 1962 Kennedy had inaugurated national counterinsurgency doctrine. His approval of 'US Overseas Internal Defense Policy' (US OIDP)[322] instituted the political framework within which the various departments and agencies of the US government would further American national interest in the developing world. Although the administration sought to foster an evolutionary process of reform and change, it would

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[321] Annex A-Current Progress in the Participation of US and Latin American Armed Forces in the Attainment of Common Objectives in Latin America, undated circa 1962, *DDQS* Vol.16 (1990), Microform 002577, pp.2-7; Barber and Ronning, *Internal Security and Military Power*, pp.17-24; Memorandum for the President-Recent Actions taken by the Special Group (CI), 22 March 1962, *LICDC* (NSA), pp.2-4.

[322] NSAM No.182-Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 24 August 1962, *DDQS* Vol.6 (1980), Microform 273(B), pp.1-2.

also condone – and instigate – the forceful overthrow of certain types of governments by non-communist elements if this favored US interests.[323]

In sum, in order to deter communist subversion the administration initiated social, economic, and educational development strategies through the Alliance for Progress in an effort to promote institutional growth, open markets, and the flow of resources. Military assistance and counterinsurgency training targeted internal security. As with its Alliance programs the administration designated Colombia as its showcase for counterinsurgency – with what would prove considerable short-term success.

Internal Defense in Colombia: The Early National Front Period

In 1961 the Kennedy administration completed Eisenhower's policy reorientation towards Colombia, placing it on a firm internal defense posture. The administration revived earlier plans to develop a special counter-guerrilla team deployed from helicopters and the Colombian armed forces received a 'special impact shipment' of approximately $1.5 million worth of military hardware in late 1961 to enable *Orden Público* (Public Order) missions.

This shipment included a variety of vehicles, communication equipment, and small arms meant to equip and mobilize the specialized ranger-style unit that became prototypical in the campaign against rural violence and uncontrolled banditry in the countryside.[324] It also included the first shipment of helicopters, an aircraft that proved 'a major, even crucial, element in the struggle against violence.'[325]

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[323] US Overseas Internal Defense Policy-Document prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee consisting of Representatives of State. DOD, JCS, USIA, CIA, and AID, undated, *DDQS* Vol.6 (1980), Microform 281(A), pp.10-13

[324] Helicopter Operations in Colombia, Tab L, p.1; Military Sales and Military Assistance Part I-1943 to 1960, Tab I, p.6; Planning and Objectives, Tab E, p.2, all in *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives).

[325] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p.15. As the cover page to this document states, it is 'a case study of the Colombian rural "violence" phenomenon prepared at the request of the Special Group (CI) following its meeting with Ambassador Fulton Freeman on February 20, 1964. The study was written by Second Secretary Gerald M. Sutton of the Embassy Political Section and contains information furnished

For the Kennedy administration this special shipment became the first tangible effort to assist Colombian military forces in their struggle against internal violence and led to a vastly expanded internal security effort under MAP support.

The Yarborough Team

In February 1962 Brigadier General William P. Yarborough led a US Army Special Warfare Center team to Colombia in a follow-up study to the Special Survey team's report. The Yarborough team's primary objective was to study the violence problem, evaluate the effectiveness of the Colombian counterinsurgency effort, and make recommendations that would allow the effective deployment of a US Counterinsurgency Military Training Team (MTT).[326]

During a twelve-day mission the team toured areas encompassing four of Colombia's eight brigades (see Appendix 5). In its final evaluation it concluded that lack of central planning and coordination had seriously effected all levels of the counterinsurgency effort in Colombia. Fragmentation of resources, lack of essential communications, transportation and equipment, reliance on static outposts, and improper use of military personnel in civil capacities placed the army on the defensive and allowed both subversive and bandit elements to acquire the initiative.

Inadequate collation and dissemination of intelligence at both an army and national level further hampered internal security operations as did the lack of counterintelligence training. Civic action and psychological operations programs remained sporadic, no properly

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by [sanitized], Service Attachés, the Military Group, AID, the Colombian Government, and local news media and publications.' I am extremely grateful to Regina Greenwell, Senior Archivist-Lyndon B. Johnson Library for expediting the delivery of this document. It is an excellent overview of the *Violencia* period, with three appendices detailing the communist role in the 'independent republics', a précis of the Colombian military plan to stem internal violence (Plan LAZO), and a brief history of US internal security assistance.

[326] Planning and Objectives, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab E, pp.1-2.

delineated relationship existed between the army and National Police, and broader social, political, and economic problems existed for which resolution seemed remote.[327]

The team recommended that the Colombian government institute corrective measures including greater collaboration between the DAS, National Police, and armed forces in the fields of intelligence and counterintelligence; coordination and standardization of programs structured to a national counterinsurgency plan; and improved transportation and communications equipment.[328] At brigade level they believed it essential to garrison fixed outposts with state police in order to facilitate increased army mobility, prioritize action areas, intensify anti-bandit propaganda, equip and maintain troops for rapid reaction and night operations, and conduct joint, inter-brigade operations.

Armored buses filled with soldiers or police in civilian clothing could be covertly introduced into the transportation system and operational zones isolated through curfews, civilian registration programs, and other populace control measures. Finally, exhaustive interrogation of captured bandits and guerrillas using sodium pentathol and polygraph was needed in order to gather intelligence information on hostile groups.[329]

The Yarborough team also recommended that the US provide guidance and assistance in all aspects of counterinsurgency. To establish proper anti-violence plans, requirements, and operations the team envisioned the deployment of MTTs for psychological warfare, civic action, air support, and intelligence as well as five Special Forces A-teams that would work concurrently with the battalions of the four brigades most seriously engaged with guerrillas and bandits.

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[327] Visit to Colombia, South America by a Team from Special Warfare Center, 26 February 1962-Major Conclusions, *LICDC* (NSA). pp.3-4.

[328] Visit to Colombia, South America by a Team from Special Warfare Center, 26 February 1962-Recommendations, *LICDC* (NSA), pp.5-8.

Finally, concerned by the political instability surrounding the transfer of power from Lleras to Valencia, the Yarborough team presented its final report to the Kennedy administration's Special Group with a secret supplement. The team believed that, in view of the economic and political environment in Colombia, 'positive measures' be instituted should the internal security situation deteriorate further. This would require civilian and military personnel, clandestinely selected and trained in resistance operations, in order to develop an underground civil and military structure.

This organization could then undertake 'clandestine execution of plans developed by the United States Government toward defined objectives in the political, economic, and military fields.'[330] While pressuring for reforms it would also undertake 'counter-agent and counter-propaganda' functions as well as 'paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents.'

If such a structure already existed, the Yarborough team declared, it should be deployed immediately against communist elements. The team suspected that 'the *Rurales* operating in the Llanos are CAS [Covert Action Staff] directed through DAS in Colombia.' This being the case they believed it a 'step in the right direction' as long as CAS had 'positive leadership influence' over the security force.[331]

Although the use of US Special Forces A-teams in a direct combat role 'was not favorably considered by the Colombian Minister of War, COMUSMILGP [Commander US Military Group], or the US Ambassador,'[332] the Colombian government did make

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[329] Visit to Colombia, South America by a Team from Special Warfare Center, 26 February 1962-Narrative Report: Survey Team Activities Colombia, Observations, *LICDC* (NSA), pp.1-8.
[330] All quotes from Visit to Colombia, South America by a Team from Special Warfare Center-Secret Supplement, 26 February 1962, *LICDC* (NSA), 1 page.
[331] Ibid.
[332] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study-Appendix C: The Role of the Military Missions (LBJL), p.3.

maximum use of US MTTs in the period following submission of the Yarborough report.[333] To facilitate internal security programs in Colombia and throughout the other American republics the Latin American Special Action Force (1st Special Forces, 8th Special Forces Group) was stationed in the Canal Zone in August of 1962.

This force provided the majority of mobile training teams used in support of internal defense. Numerous MTTs involved in a broad range of instruction went to Colombia in the decade after the Yarborough team, teaching everything from supply, engineering, sanitation, and other civic action projects, to intelligence, counterinsurgency, psychological warfare, and special operations. In fact more MTTs went to Colombia during this period than any other country in Latin America.[334]

Overall the Yarborough Team report represents the beginning of a drift in US policy towards a more militarized approach to Colombia's internal security problems. Less focused on a broad, nation-building strategy, it is nonetheless notable for promoting components – professionalization of security forces, collaborative intelligence structures, development of rapid reaction capabilities – critical to the tactical and operational success of any counterinsurgency plan.

It is also notable that US policymakers resisted the temptation to 'Americanize' Colombia's conflict through the introduction of Special Forces combat teams directly onto the battlefield. Unlike Vietnam, decision-makers pursued an indirect policy that played to America's strengths: economic and military aid, training of security forces, technical

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[333] Planning and Objectives, Tab E, pp.1-3; Summary and Conclusions, pp.1, 26 and 33, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives).

[334] CPT Roy Benson, Jr., The Latin American Special Action Force of the US Army as a Counterinsurgency Force, December 1965, p.2; Classified US Army Special Forces MTT Missions, Latin America 1962-1973, Enclosure 2-Colombia,' pp.2-7. Both documents in Jack Taylor Donation Box 2-Vietnam: Files-Latin America-MTTs, Colombia-MTTs, *LICDC* (NSA). See also Training, Annex B to Tab K (Mobile Training

assistance, and logistical and intelligence support. Not only did this policy prove judicious from a domestic political standpoint, it ensured Colombian solutions to Colombian problems while furthering US Cold War interests.

Plan LAZO

After the Yarborough and Special Survey team reports, a Colombia Internal Defense Plan evolved designed to integrate military efforts with economic, social, and political aspects of the internal security problem. Approval of this plan came from the highest levels of the Kennedy administration.

> In May 1962 . . . Ambassador [Fulton] Freeman established the Country Team Task Force to consider recommendations for an anti-violence program. The recommendations of this task force were handcarried by the Ambassador to Washington in June, 1962, where they were presented to Special Group (CI). The Special Group shortly thereafter approved the recommendations as the Colombia Internal Defense Plan. In August, 1962, the recommendations and the implied offer of US assistance to implement them were presented to President Valencia and the Minister of War. Upon their concurrence, the way was cleared for close cooperation between the US Country Team and the Colombian Government on an anti-violence campaign.[335]

During this same time period Commanding General Ruiz Novoa, Generals Rebeiz and Fajardo, Colonel Alvaro Valencia Tovar, and a dozen other Colombian Army, Air Force, and National Police officers – all supported by a US Counterinsurgency MTT – prepared the Colombian military response to the violence problem. Known as Plan LAZO ('snare' or 'noose'), it called for broad civic action programs within violence zones and an improved anti-violence apparatus coupled to military action that would target leading bandit elements and suppress and eliminate guerrilla forces. Ultimately it would become the basis for additional counterinsurgency plans, including more sophisticated ones involving joint

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Teams 1960-1968) *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives) for MTT information not declassified in Jack Taylor collection.

[335] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p.20.

operations, such as the Colombian Armed Forces (Joint) Counterinsurgency Plan of 1964-66.[336]

Plan LAZO's primary components were:

1. Tightening and integrating the command structure of all forces engaged in public order missions to clearly establish military responsibility for all operations
2. Creating more versatile and sophisticated tactical units capable of successful unconventional warfare operations
3. Expanding the military's public relations and psychological warfare units to improve civilian attitudes toward the army's public order mission
4. Employing the armed forces in tasks intended to contribute to the economic development and social well-being of all Colombians, especially those subjected to guerrilla-bandit activity.[337]

The Colombian army implemented Plan LAZO in July 1962. One of its primary objectives was to 'eliminate the so-called "independent republics" created by leftist insurgents and some bandit elements in the upper Magdalena Valley.'[338] Within these insurgent enclaves US intelligence estimated that 11 communist guerrilla groups of approximately 1,600 to 2,000 men remained active, aided by the Colombian Communist Party. The PCC attempted to both organize and strengthen these enclaves, establishing militia units in an effort to direct and control bandit and former Liberal-guerrilla paramilitary capabilities (see Appendix 6).[339]

Another 29 non-communist guerrilla groups of approximately 4,500 men continued to exist primarily in the southern and central departments of Colombia. Remnants of the fighting since the assassination of Gaitán, these groups continued to maintain arms and

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[336] Report of Joint Mobile Training Team to Colombia (RCS CSGPO-125), No. 48-MTT-104-63, 18 November 1963 (JFKSWC-USASOC Archives), pp.1, 5.
[337] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.73.
[338] CPT David Edison Malott, 'Military Civic Action in Colombia,' MA Thesis (Gainesville, FL: University of Florida, 1985), p.76.
[339] CPT Charles L. Daschle, AI(CE) Assistant G2, US Army Special Warfare Center, 'The Background to Potential Insurgency in Colombia, 9 September 1962,' (JFKSWC-USASOC Archives), pp. 3-6.

remained unresponsive to government actions to improve social and economic conditions in their areas unless coordinated through former guerrilla leaders.

Though largely inactive they remained a potential threat to the government should the National Front system fail and partisan violence escalate in the countryside. Finally, somewhere between 90 and 150 bandit gangs totaling over 2000 men were reported as active primarily in the coffee-rich Cauca Valley region. Operating in a highly individualistic, though quasi-guerrilla fashion, these groups maintained intelligence nets throughout local rural communities. US intelligence concluded that organization and operational coordination had increased, but inter-bandit rivalry continued to cause clashes and attempts by the PCC to control these gangs had, at that point, achieved little success.[340]

In conjunction with military civic action programs, targeting these bandit gangs and communist enclaves became the primary focus of the Colombian army as Plan LAZO progressed. As pacification in some violence-plagued departments took hold and area commanders determined 'that control had shifted in their favor,' they employed a classic technique vital to the long-term success of any counterinsurgency plan: 'The army then organized civilian self-defense units (*autodefensa*) and directed them to relieve army units of some patrolling and local garrisoning.' Within urban centers, security forces initiated a comparable program the following year as a 'wave of kidnapping had created apprehension among the wealthy.'[341]

Communications and civil defense early warning networks played an important role in linking these *autodefensa* units to security forces under Plan LAZO. At the national level the US Army Mission and Colombian Ministry of Government prepared a plan in

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[340] Ibid., pp.7-16: Summary and Conclusion, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), p.18.
[341] All quotes Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.75.

November 1962 for a communications network in the *Llanos-Amazonas* regions (see Appendix 7).[342] The new system allowed military, police, and border elements to utilize the system for security purposes, while simultaneously allowing the central government to maintain closer links with its territorial areas. By 1965 plans existed to expand the communications net into isolated regions along Colombia's Pacific coastline.[343]

At the departmental level the Colombian government established rural civil defense early warning radio nets with local community support (see Appendix 8). These nets were utilized in violence-afflicted regions as a means of gathering intelligence and providing early warning against bandit or guerrilla attacks. Colombian security forces described each net as a 'Federation,' with subscribers contributing $200 for radio equipment that brought two-way communication down to individual farm level. Authorities intended the system to interlink battalions in I, III, VI, and VIII Brigade areas to local authorities, the air force, local and National police agencies, and most importantly, the civilian populace.[344]

Supported by groups that had suffered considerable economic dislocation in the violence, eleven separate networks existed in the Spring of 1965. These included coffee cooperatives along the Cauca River in Caldas, Valle, and Tolima, agricultural groups in the sugar growing region of Cauca and cotton growers in Magdalena, and other armed agricultural groups along the central Magdalena River Valley from Bolivar and the major oil extraction and refining area of Santander to Huila. Each net consisted of up to 100 citizen band radio sets distributed to farms, civilian defense centers (net control stations), and military civil defense monitor and repeater locations. Based on the success of the original

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[342] After Action Report, Civic Action Mobile Training Team No.48-MTT-01-63, Colombia, South America, 10 May 1963 (JFKSWC-USASOC Archives), pp.6-7.
[343] Civic Action Projects: Llanos-Amazonas National Territories Net, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab H, pp.5-7.

nets Colombia's security forces scheduled another 47 for installation in the 1966-68 period.[345]

It is clear that Plan LAZO was an ambitious and innovative counterinsurgency strategy that reflected the security interests of the Colombian state. With its inception, counter-violence measures became more determined as security forces increasingly aimed their operations towards destroy and capture missions.[346] Despite earlier US concerns regarding Colombian military capabilities, the Armed Forces took to counterinsurgency with alacrity. Late 1962 saw 75 percent of Colombia's military forces engaged in some form of anti-violence measures.[347]

Equally important is the fact that Plan LAZO incorporated civic action and civil defense in conjunction with counterinsurgency operations in an effort to win popular support. By engaging Colombia's rural – and urban – population, security forces denied radical groups the ability to develop the kind of widespread, clandestine civilian infrastructure vital to the successful prosecution of revolutionary 'People's War'.

Acción Cívica Militar

Decision-makers in both Washington and Bogotá supported rehabilitation programs for Colombia's civilian population as an integral component to their anti-violence policy. Early in the National Front period the Lleras government instituted rehabilitation commissions and *Equipos Polivalentes* to coordinate civilian efforts at ameliorating conditions wrought by the *Violencia* and to reestablish stability in violence-affected departments.

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[344] After Action Report, Civic Action Mobile Training Team No. 48-MTT-01-63, Colombia, South America, 10 May 1963 (JFKSWC-USASOC Archives), pp.7-8.
[345] Civic Action Projects: Rural Civil Defense Early Warning Radio Nets, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab H, pp.4-5.
[346] Summary and Conclusions, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), pp. 5,18.
[347] Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (CI), 12 April 1962, *LICDC* (NSA), p.3.

At the national level, rehabilitation commissions attempted to track programs in designated zones, coordinate relief efforts (particularly for abandoned children), assist refugees in finding employment, seek solutions to land title problems, and promote colonization of unused land.[348] In an attempt to provide credit to displaced peasants seeking to reestablish farms the Lleras government made extensive use of social security ministries, banking institutions such as the *Credito Agrario*, religious organizations, the Red Cross, and US assistance through PL-480 surplus provisions.

At the community level the administration dispatched 30 *Polivalente* Teams, each composed of a doctor, nurse, several agrarian technicians, an engineer, veterinarian, home economist, and occasionally a public administrator. The government used these special impact teams as advisors in community development efforts, particularly project-oriented, small-scale undertakings that utilized agrarian credit assistance and co-op-style local labor to build rural schools, mills, medical facilities, or 'model farms.'[349]

These Welfare Teams produced 'the best kind of propaganda favorable to the long-term objectives of the [administration],' establishing a government presence in rural communities previously outside existing national structures. Despite this fact, 'partisan politics' impeded rehabilitation efforts as did 'lack of funds, lack of personnel, and perhaps most of all, [a] lack of appreciation among certain elements of the ruling class in Colombia, of the magnitude and the critical importance of these needs.'[350]

At the same time Colombian military officers began to show heightened interest in the concept of *acción cívica militar* – military civic action. In 1958 Louis J. Lebret – French economist and clergyman – produced a report that studied development conditions in

[348] RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 8-Relief and Rehabilitation, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 8-12 thru 8-20.
[349] Ibid., 8-21 thru 8-29.

Colombia in which he proposed to use the military, by virtue of its institutional coherence, as an agent of social change. Lebret called for:

> . . . the optimal utilization of the armed forces to assure harmonious development, particularly in what refers to the more rapid establishment of infrastructure, for the preparation of technicians at different levels for the purpose of exploiting the territory, and for the cultural elevation of the whole. Stated in another form, the armed forces of a developing country not only have a defensive function: they should also be, according to the eminent French rural economist, Jean Marious Gatheron, "a creative army."[351]

Ruiz Novoa, nominated to the position of Commanding General of the Colombian Army in 1960, strongly advocated the use of Colombia's armed forces 'as agents to mend the national social fabric and to develop the social infrastructure.' Ruiz believed that destroying guerrillas was simply not enough – the army must also 'attack the social and economic causes as well as the historic political reasons for their existence.'[352]

Civic action efforts remained sporadic until the period April-September 1962, when the Colombian military, working with the US Country Team, developed an 'impact' program for violence-afflicted regions. A US Civic Action MTT positively evaluated the plan later that year and projects outlined within it – road construction and maintenance, education, health care centers, and communications networks – 'came to embody the core' of the Colombian civic action effort in the early National Front period. Informal programs ran throughout much of that following year until Presidential Decree No.1381 established the *Comité Nacional de Acción Cívica Militar* on 24 June 1963.[353]

Road construction fostered by MAP and MTT support began in June 1963 and over the next several years the Colombian government initiated gravel surfaced routes in the

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[350] All quotes ibid., 8-38 and 8-41.

[351] Louis J. Lebret, *Estudio sobre los condiciones del desarrollo de Colombia* (Bogotá: Aedita Editores Ltda., 1958), p.361 as cited in Malott, 'Military Civic Action in Colombia,' MA Thesis, pp.73-74.

violence-ridden departments of Huila, Cauca, Caldas, Valle, Cundinamarca, Santander, and Tolima. Providing access to both civil and military traffic, maintenance and construction of 'farm-to-market' and penetration roads had a direct effect on the suppression of violence in these areas.[354]

Beginning in February 1964 the Valencia administration, supported by MAP and AID funding, established 19 health care centers in an attempt to reach approximately 100,000 people in rural areas particularly impacted by the *Violencia.* That same year the Colombian air force and navy – again with MAP support – developed a 'Flying Dispensary' to reach colonists and indigenous populations in remote regions by aircraft and two 'Floating Dispensaries' along the Putumayo and Magdalena rivers.[355]

In communist influenced regions or areas controlled by *violentos* the Colombian army also undertook civic action programs such as construction of water wells and potable water systems, literacy training programs, development of youth camps, and construction of rural schools as well as dispensaries to provide dental treatment and medicine. In one instance a dispensary established in an area of Caldas became instrumental in turning the populace against the leader of a local bandit gang.[356]

Simultaneously, US support for community action groups and public safety programs in Colombia began under the Alliance for Progress. Though not directly under US military

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[352] Alberto Ruiz Novoa, *El Gran Desafio* (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundos, 1965), pp. 53 and 85-88 as cited in Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.68.
[353] Malott, 'Military Civic Action in Colombia,' MA Thesis, pp.90, 92.
[354] The US Army and Civic Action in Latin America, Vol.3 (1 July 63 to June 67), prepared by Staff Historian, Assistant Chief of Staff, G3 HQ-USARSO, October 1968, File USARSO-1, 1963-67 cy.1 (CMH Archives), pp.32-34; Civic Action Projects, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab H, pp.1-2.
[355] Malott, 'Military Civic Action in Colombia,' MA Thesis, pp.75-78.
[356] History of Counterinsurgency Training in Latin America (October 1962 to 31 December 1965), 3D Civil Affairs Detachment, prepared by 3D Civil Affairs Detachment, Fort Clayton, Canal Zone Headquarter, United States Army Forces Southern Command, File 8-2.9A DA cy.1 (CMH Archives), p.1; Civic Action Projects, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab H, pp.2-4, 7-8.

control this assistance did provide community development funds at the local level, while also providing aid to the National Police and civilian intelligence organizations in order to improve training, administration, operations, communications, and public relations.

In sum, the Valencia administration, with extensive US support, implemented civic action programs within the context of Plan LAZO as a means to improve internal security throughout the countryside. Rural development projects alleviated factors contributing to violence, opening areas to greater pacification efforts by security forces and projecting state power into regions long ignored by successive governments in Bogotá.

Civic action allowed security forces to overcome 'the traditional suspicion of the military held by the people in the violence regions,' improving intelligence and support for internal security operations.[357] In that sense civic action became a means not only for building physical infrastructure, but also for denying Colombia's human infrastructure to insurgent organizations.

In the long run, however, the failure of successive Colombian administrations to build and maintain an effective state presence in the countryside allowed insurgent forces to regain momentum. Ultimately the ensuing security vacuum also gave rise to the privatization of civil defense in the form of paramilitary forces.

Building Colombia's Intelligence Structures

Intelligence is critical to the successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations. But by its very nature, irregular warfare:

> . . . place[s] new demands on conventional concepts of intelligence. . . . In counterinsurgency, underground and guerrilla targets are elusive and transitory, and the life cycle and usefulness of intelligence are brief. . . . In conventional warfare intelligence is not primarily concerned with individuals, whereas in counterinsurgency activities it focuses on individuals and their

[357] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p.16.

> behavior patterns. The identity and whereabouts of the insurgents are usually unknown and their attacks are unpredictable. The underground lines of communication and the areas of underground logistical support are concealed from view. It is to these highly specific unknowns that counterinsurgency intelligence must address itself.[358]

In Colombia the Rojas regime perpetrated a classic litany of abuses – 'resorting to torture, concentration camps, and indiscriminate aerial bombing'[359] – characteristic of a government ill-prepared to meet an underground enemy. By the time the US Special Team arrived in Colombia it found an intelligence apparatus that still remained unprepared for the exigencies of counterinsurgency operations.

The team noted that President Lleras received no intelligence briefing, the civilian SIC had proved inefficient and incompetent, the intelligence section of the National Police (F-2) suffered from training deficiencies, lack of direction, and no clear mission, while military intelligence as it existed provided little more than 'classified news reporting.'[360] It recommended extensive US intelligence support, both civilian and military, in order to increase the effectiveness of Colombia's intelligence organizations.

Lleras sought to alleviate some of these deficiencies by instituting the *Departamente Administrativo de Seguridad* (Administrative Department of Security-DAS) in place of the deactivated SIC. The DAS performed intelligence and counterintelligence functions and coordinated counter-subversive actions amongst all security forces, while F-2 section of the National Police concentrated on anti-bandit (criminal) measures. The mandates of these two agencies were ostensibly delineated by political versus criminal acts of violence, but the

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[358] Molnar, *Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies*, pp.234-35.
[359] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p5.
[360] RCST, Part I-CS, Chapter 6-Intelligence, Bohannan Papers (HIA), 6-2, 6-20, 6-52, and 6-56.

interrelated nature of violence within the Colombian context often made it difficult to differentiate between them.[361]

Interest in developing an effective military intelligence program increased as more Colombian officers recognized the need for timely and accurate intelligence in maintaining public order. They supported the US idea of establishing a broad intelligence course for Latin American military personnel in Panama and beginning in 1960 the Colombian army filled its quota in each class in an effort to expand this program. However, difficulties arose in assigning personnel to duties on their return as the army lacked a proper intelligence infrastructure.[362]

US efforts to institute a more effective military intelligence organization in Colombia began in earnest with a two-man US Intelligence MTT in February 1961, followed by a second, three-man Intelligence MTT in May 1962 and a permanent Mission intelligence advisor. The first team was not completely successful,[363] but it did establish a base for intelligence operations that became increasingly more effective after the adoption of Plan LAZO by the armed forces. In the same period the US initiated plans to deploy a Psychological Warfare MTT to Colombia and made course spaces available for officers at both the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg and the Canal Zone in psychological operations and counter-resistance training.[364]

The second US Intelligence MTT proved more successful. It gave several short-term training programs for interrogators, mobile intelligence groups (*grupos móviles de inteligencia*), and *Localizadores* teams (*grupos inteligencia de localizadores* – intelligence

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[361] Ramsey, ' The Modern Violence in Colombia, 1946-1965,' Ph.D. Thesis, pp.405-06.
[362] Mission History-US Army Mission to Colombia, 1959 and 1960, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab C, pp.93-94, 98.
[363] USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia, 1961-1965, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab F, p.1.

hunter-killer teams). Colombia's armed forces used hunter-killer teams – composed of 25 veteran officers, NCOs, and civilians, heavily armed, and trained to operate in the field for long periods of time – to fight and penetrate hostile groups as well as work with informants.[365]

> Perhaps the most notable military aspect of Plan Lazo, however, was the adoption of counterguerrilla warfare techniques that were highly dependent on sophisticated intelligence-gathering and analysis. . . . Army tactical units acquired a '*comando localizador*,' or unconventional warfare shock group, which clandestinely killed or captured guerrilla and bandit leaders. In addition, Mobile Intelligence Groups (*grupos móviles de inteligencia*) were attached to all major operating units. Their activities seem to have included counterguerrilla work similar to the *comando localizador*, as well as information-gathering.[366]

These tactics brought security forces continued success against urban radical groups, killing or capturing nearly two dozen people largely associated with the FUAR and 'Workers-Students-Peasants' Movement (MOEC), and against rural bandits and guerrillas, killing 388 in 1962 alone.[367] Attacking the leadership structures of guerrilla-bandit groups splintered organizational cohesion and led to a 20% increase in deaths attributable to the military's aggressive new tactics. Casualty ratios went from about even to 7:2 in favor of Colombia's security forces.[368]

In 1963 the Colombian armed forces developed and issued Internal Security Directive 001. Addressed to all three military services, the National Police, and DAS, it called for

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[364] Public Relations, Public Information, Troop Information and Education (TI and E), and Psychological Warfare, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab M, p.2.
[365] USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia (1961-1965), *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab F, pp.1-4.
[366] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, p.75.
[367] Central Intelligence Agency Memorandum-Cuban Training of Latin American Subversives, OCI No.0515/63, 27 March 1963, *CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946-1976*, pp. 15-56. There is some discrepancy in the figures estimated earlier by the Special Forces intelligence officer (150 bandit groups, approximately 2000 men) and the sanitized source for CIA. Figures from the latter for 1962 alone estimated 2,582 bandits captured, 1020 detained on suspicion of banditry, and 388 bandits killed. CIA's estimate does acknowledge that only two percent of all those arrested and detained were actually convicted and sentenced.
[368] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), pp.11, 16-17.

cooperation through a Joint Operations Center (JOC) and the establishment of an intelligence agency that would consider both military and national intelligence requirements.[369] Although the Valencia administration did form a central intelligence committee consisting of the three military services and the National Police, no 'substantial progress towards the establishment within the Colombian Government of an inter-agency intelligence committee which could coordinate intelligence produced by all agencies having a collection capacity'[370] was made by mid-1964.

However the Colombian Armed Forces did create a Military Intelligence Battalion to undertake combat intelligence, counter-intelligence, and special operations. Fielded to assist in coastal surveillance and internal security operations against infiltration of agents, 'provocateurs,' arms, and propaganda, it was also utilized to find, destroy, or eliminate communist and extremist activities through a network of clandestine agents.[371] Finally, the US provided vehicles, radios, and other equipment to II Brigade in the Guajira area in an effort to establish a surveillance-intelligence net that could monitor Colombia's northern coast for 'subversive agents and contraband.'[372]

In sum, despite national-level deficiencies, US-supported reorganization of Colombia's intelligence organizations played an integral part in the containment of the violence problem. Enhanced intelligence capabilities 'proved a key factor' in helping security forces to halve the level of violent death – especially of civilians – in the countryside from the pre-National Front period.[373] Reorienting Colombian intelligence to an unconventional mindset facilitated the ability of that nation's security forces to deal with both the overt and

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[369] Planning and Objectives, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab E, p.3.
[370] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p.24.
[371] USARMIS Intelligence Effort in Colombia (1961-1965), *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab F, p.5.
[372] Training, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), Tab K, p.6.

clandestine components of insurgent organizations, that is, both main-line guerrilla units and their underground support structures.

Although the transformation remained incomplete Colombia's intelligence organizations did become adept at performing their counter-insurgent function, providing timely information that helped to curtail the kinds of combat excesses that might have ignited widespread support for a revolutionary movement that could destroy the existing state. In short, intelligence proved to be a force multiplier, critical to the successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations in Colombia.

Operation Marquetalia

Even prior to the inception of Plan LAZO the Colombian government deemed action against the communist-influenced independent republics essential to internal security. While most of these regions remained relatively passive, causing little interference in government affairs,[374] they did gradually develop shadow governments ruled by skilled Marxist guerrilla leaders unresponsive to control from Bogotá.[375] Early in the National Front period Lleras Camargo attempted a two-track policy against these guerrilla zones. The administration attempted both to encourage peasants to participate in rehabilitation programs while eliminating guerrilla leadership that resisted government efforts to gain local support.[376]

This was the case in 1961 when guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez declared a 'Republic of Marquetalia.' The Lleras government, fearing that a Cuban-style revolutionary

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[373] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), pp.11, 16.
[374] Summary and Conclusions, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), p.11.
[375] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, p.280. One report describes the Lleras administration's efforts as 'strongly identified, rightly or wrongly, with an appeasement policy towards the bandits' – see Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p.14. This assessment seems overly harsh given the administration's early efforts to enlist US support against the violence problem.

situation might develop, launched a surprise attack against the area in early 1962. Although unsuccessful in driving irregular forces from their stronghold the army did establish several outposts in the area.[377] Ironically Marulanda began his guerrilla career in the early *Violencia* period with other Liberal irregular forces that later combined with communist fighters from the same area prior to the formation of the National Front.[378]

The Colombian government accelerated probing actions against the enclaves after the development of Plan LAZO, adopting a US counterinsurgency methodology that included:

1. Counter-guerrilla training for security forces, initiation of civic action programs, recruitment of informers, and infiltration of security personnel into guerrilla groups.
2. Conducting psychological operations in order to establish control over the civilian population.
3. Initiating operations to blockade specific areas and isolate guerrilla groups from their sources of support and intelligence.
4. Utilizing in-place informers and infiltrators to splinter the internal cohesion of the guerrilla groups and conducting ongoing offensive counterinsurgency operations coupled with psychological warfare to destroy guerrilla units and liquidate leadership cadre.
5. Reconstructing operational zones economically, socially, and politically under the auspices of US aid programs.[379]

For Colombia's security forces, 1964-65 proved pivotal years in the struggle against the enclaves. On 18 May 1964 the Valencia government launched Operation Marquetalia against Marulanda's guerrilla forces using a combined arms approach that included heavy artillery, air force bombing, and infantry and police encirclement of suspected guerrilla

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[376] Alberto Gómez, 'The Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia and Their Perspectives,' as cited in Gott, *Rural Guerrillas in Latin America*, p.298.
[377] Henderson, *When Colombia Bled*, pp.221-22.
[378] Osterling, *Democracy in Colombia*, p.295. Marulanda was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party as were several others within the guerrilla leadership – see Gott, *Rural Guerrillas in Latin America*, pp. 279-89.

villages.[380] Some 3500 men swept through designated combat zones while 170 elite troops airlifted into Marulanda's *hacienda* redoubt in an attempt to trap the guerrilla leader.[381] The government recruited Paez Indians with notable success against the guerrillas as scouts and guides through difficult terrain.[382]

Security forces drove most of the guerrillas – including Marulanda – out of the Marquetalia area, though they escaped the army cordon and fled to the neighboring 'republic' of Río Chiquito. On 20 July 1964 Marulanda and other guerrilla leaders from the Tolima-Cauca-Huila border areas met in the First Southern Guerrilla Conference. Declaring themselves 'victims of the policy of fire and sword proclaimed and carried out by the oligarchic usurpers of power,' the new coalition called for 'armed revolutionary struggle to win power.'[383] Composed originally of both communist and non-communist bandit and irregular forces, this southern guerrilla bloc, with some financial and political aid from the PCC, consolidated its command into the unified insurgent force known as the FARC.[384]

The modern mythology of the FARC promotes the idea that Operation Marquetalia was a defeat for the Colombian state.[385] Nothing could be further from the truth. Ernesto 'Ché' Guevara, in reference to Marquetalia, declared that the existence of a 'self-defense zone when it is neither the result of a total or partial military defeat of enemy forces, is no more than a colossus with feet of clay.' Its recapture by security forces, ' . . . will have a major

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[379] Gilberto Vieira, 'La Colombie à l'heure du Marquetalia,' *Democratie Nouvelle* (July-August 1965) as cited in Gott, *Rural Guerrillas in Latin America*, pp. 299-300.
[380] Henderson, *When Colombia Bled*, p.222.
[381] 'The Backlands Violence is Almost Ended,' *Time*, 26 June 1964, p.31.
[382] Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America*, p.146.
[383] All quotes Manuel Marulanda Velez, 'The Republic of Marquetalia-Manifesto issued 20 July 1964 by the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC),' in J. Gerassi (ed.) *The Coming of the New International* (New York, NY: The World Publishing Company, 1971), pp.502-03.
[384] Maullin, *Soldiers, Guerrillas, and Politics in Colombia*, pp.14, 30, 40.
[385] See for instance 'Marquetalia: Simbolo de la Resistencia del Pueblo en Armas.' INTERNET: www.contrast.org/mirrors/farc/marque.htm.

effect: a great victory for the bourgeoisie, a great defeat for the "Castro-Communist revolution".'[386] As Régis Debray noted in his response to Guevara, the recapture of Marquetalia forced the FARC back to the first stage of mobile guerrilla warfare.[387]

Thus in contrast to policymakers today, security-minded officials in Washington and Bogotá during the early National Front period considered the existence of strategic base areas that might become a staging ground for insurgent strike forces, simply unacceptable. They directed Colombia's armed forces to respond with relentless counterinsurgency campaigns against rural guerrilla-bandit groups coupled to ongoing operations against urban terrorists. By 1966 this strategy brought an end to the existence of the 'independent republics,' significantly reduced previous levels of intense violence throughout the nation, and restored a semblance of stability to that country after nearly 20 years of internecine warfare.

Summary

The Kennedy administration adjoined the Alliance for Progress to counterinsurgency strategies in an attempt to 'transform the social and economic structures of Latin American nations'[388] and stave off further Castro-inspired social revolutions. In Colombia – which the administration placed in the forefront of this dual-track strategy – attempts to solve the security-development dilemma achieved mixed results.

Militarily, an extensive, collaborative internal security effort between the US and Colombia produced considerable success in containing *la Violencia* and reestablishing order in the countryside. In this regard the early National Front period offered security

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[386] Ernesto Ché Guevara as quoted in Régis Debray (trans. Bobbye Ortiz), *Revolution in the Revolution? Armed Struggle and Political Struggle in Latin America* (New York, NY: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), pp.31-32.
[387] Ibid., pp.32-33.

forces the opportunity to depoliticize their image and concentrate on attacking those groups considered dangerous or subversive by the new inter-party government in an effort to restore stability.

The development of Plan LAZO, a cooperatively generated counterinsurgency strategy, facilitated this military success. Incorporating civic action, civil defense, hard-hitting hunter-killer team tactics and intelligence-supported counterinsurgency operations, this plan proved an ambitious anti-violence effort for the Colombian Armed Forces.[389] Under the auspices of Plan LAZO and the Colombia Internal Defense Plan, security forces successfully liquidated a large number of bandit and guerrilla gangs and returned to government control those 'independent republics' that might have become effective base areas ('*focos*') for staging guerrilla operations. Containment of a wider social revolution effectively brought the final phase of the *Violencia* period to an end in 1966.

Nonetheless significant problems remained. Though the National Front system did initially provide stability, restricting dangerous political antagonisms, it also restricted normal political competition. This contributed to voter apathy, party infighting, and the formation of more extreme political elements. Disillusionment with successive governments increased as economic, political, juridical, and social problems underwent only marginal reforms, and political opportunism continued.[390] The inability and unwillingness of an entrenched elite to devolve economic and political power ensured

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[388] Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*, p.125.

[389] For a Colombian perspective on counterinsurgency during this period see for instance *Operaciones Contra las Fuerzas Irregulares* (Bogotá, Colombia: Fuerzas Militares Ejercito Nacional, 1962); *Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas* (Journal of the Colombian Army: 1960-1973 various); and especially VIII Brigada, Colombian Army, *De la Violencia a la Paz: Experiencias de la Octava Brigada en la Lucha Contra Guerrillas* (Manizales (?), Colombia: Departamental de Caldas, 1965).

[390] Summary and Conclusions, *Colombia Document* (CMH Archives), pp.9, 28.

that Colombia's structural inequalities continued to nurture radical social movements that challenged government legitimacy.

As a result, new internal security problems related to the earlier violence arose. Mobile FARC forces developed in VI Brigade area and early in 1965, unrelated to the campaign against the enclaves, the ELN attacked the village of Simacota in Santander Department. US observers described this as 'the first prominent incident of Castro backed insurgency during the National Front tenure.'[391] Other rural and urban radical organizations followed, representing a spectrum of political extremism.

In the end, elite failure to address pressing social and economic needs fused to the rise of a host of organized insurgencies and criminal syndicates involved in kidnapping, terrorism, and drug trafficking ensured Colombia's preeminence as 'one of the stickiest areas'[392] for internal security problems in Latin America to the present day.

[391] Ibid., p.6.
[392] Memorandum for the President from McGeorge Bundy: Colombia, 20 June 1965, *DDQS* Vol.10 (1984), Microform 002770, p.1.

CONCLUSION

Important lessons can be drawn from this historical analysis that lend themselves to policymakers facing the current crisis in Colombia. First, at the systemic level, the Cold War between the US and USSR brought a significant degree of international pressure to bear on developing nations, impacting in particular on issues of internal security. US policymakers saw less developed countries as susceptible to communist subversion and thus a threat to American national security. Latin America too was perceived as vulnerable: its unique geostrategic position and Castro's successful communist revolution propelled US internal security policy to primacy under the Eisenhower administration.

But differences emerged, both within the United States and more broadly throughout Latin America, over the focus of internal security strategies. Early critiques dating back to the Truman administration are representative of much of the Cold War period. US internal security strategies often: (1) overestimated Soviet influence in the region; (2) failed to identify strategic and tactical differences between regional communist parties and the Soviet Union given local political, economic, and military conditions; (3) did not properly account for Latin America's low priority on the Soviet's target list; and (4) did not give proper recognition to countervailing factors such as the Catholic Church, the role of the armed forces, and Western – especially US – economic influence.[393]

Under Kennedy and Johnson, attempts to ameliorate these differences brought an expanded dual-track policy that conjoined attempts at social reform with

[393] Soviet Objectives in Latin America-Summary: Enclosures A and B-Dissent of the Intelligence Organization, Department of State, and Dissent of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, Central Intelligence Agency Document ORE 16/1, 1 November 1947 in *CIA Research Reports, Latin America, 1946-1976*, Reel #2, no page numbers.

counterinsurgency.[394] Certainly the scale of the aid effort undertaken through the Alliance for Progress overshadowed any previous American assistance programs. But while US economic support for the region did grow, commitment to democracy and social change remained largely rhetorical as the fear of Castro-supported revolutionary warfare throughout the hemisphere overwhelmed issues of social and economic reform.

Failure to systematically institutionalize – as an integral part of internal security programs for the region – human rights safeguards that would distinguish legitimate opposition from subversion exposed US administrations throughout the Cold War to criticisms of colluding with authoritarian regimes in order to maintain regional stability. In the end successive US administrations 'never reconciled their security fears with their calls for peaceful revolution in Latin America.'[395]

This preference for security, stability, and order over social and economic reform remains a distinguishing feature of US policy in the region to the present day, despite the declining utility of force. In many instances, multilateral approaches will better serve growing regional economic interdependence and transnational policy issues such as migration, health, and drug trafficking.

Second, as regards Colombia, US policy initiatives during the early National Front period resonated positively, particularly in the military field. Yet while there was a close alignment in the US-Colombian security relationship during this time, strategic needs and perceptions of those needs often differed. For the United States, counterinsurgency, paramilitary operations, and internal defense became integral parts of US national security policy in the Cold War arena. Colombian officials, both Liberal and

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[394] Schoultz, *National Security and United States Policy Toward Latin America*, p.19.

Conservative, undertook these policies as organic to the survival of the nation, leading them to act in concert with the US in order to best protect their own perceptions of Colombia's national interest.

Certainly it is not an exaggeration to say that without the support of the United States during the early National Front period, Colombians could not have contained the *Violencia* so effectively nor 'found themselves at a stage where they could seriously contemplate [its] elimination.'[396] The infrastructure established by Colombians in collaboration with the United States during this period – psychological operations and civic action capabilities, inter-regional communications and civil defense networks, and an intelligence supported counterinsurgency apparatus – has proved essential to a nation that appears plagued by 'permanent and endemic warfare.'[397]

Equally important is the fact that US policymakers opposed direct involvement in Colombia's internal security problems. Then, as now, it remained a conflict for which Colombians ultimately needed to find their own solutions, though this did not connote US disengagement from its ally. On the contrary, it meant comprehensive support at the highest levels of US government without conjunctively Americanizing the conflict through the introduction of combat forces. Ultimately, recognition of mutual security interests ensured at least a short-term solution to the violence problem that proved beneficial to both nations.

Today much rhetoric is expended on providing long-term solutions to the current crisis in Colombia through a broad sociopolitical strategy. But from an historical

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[395] Rabe, *The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts Communist Revolution in Latin America*, p.197.
[396] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p.19.

perspective, it is apparent that policymakers have once again narrowed their focus to a short-term, militarized approach. For the United States, policy remains mired in a supply-side approach to the war on drugs, while Colombians must deal with a multifaceted violence problem where the 'drug issue is only one piece of a larger strategic puzzle.'[398]

In order to once again establish a sphere of mutual security interests between the US and Colombia, policymakers must move away from the stale debate over sprayed hectares and captured kilograms. They must move instead towards the true center-of-gravity of the current crisis: the struggle for state stability and the need to capture the hearts and minds of Colombia's human topography.

A third lesson that can be drawn from this historical analysis is that the current crisis in Colombia will require an integrated strategy that addresses the social, economic, political, and military dynamics of the problem. The origin of modern US internal security policy in Colombia can be traced back to the CIA Special Team survey of 1959. Their final study offers insights relevant to Colombia's current internal security situation. Concerning the nature of the violence problem, a clear distinction emerged between criminally motivated violence versus the more complex phenomena of 'potential' violence posed by insurgent groups. A comprehensive and integrated strategy was required to eradicate the latter threat.

In this regard the team correctly emphasized the need to rebuild a brutalized populace's belief in government and restore political stability through democratic

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[397] Gonzalo Sánchez, '*La Violencia* in Colombia: New Research, New Question,' (trans. Peter Bakewell), *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 65 (April 1985), p.789.
[398] Max Manwaring, 'US too narrowly focused on drug war in Colombia,' *Miami Herald*, 15 August 2001, (no page numbers).

processes and wide-ranging reform of Colombia's social, political, and economic infrastructure. Although its members clearly viewed Colombia's dilemma through a Cold War prism the Special Team's lasting contribution to a broader understanding of the *Violencia* era lay in the recognition that military force alone would prove insufficient in solving that nation's complex violence problem.

While they did advocate military engagement and the discriminating use of force against guerrilla-bandit gangs, they also recognized that a prerequisite of successful counterinsurgency operations was an integrated politico-military policy. Their key nation-building strategies continue to resonate: professionalizing the armed forces, curbing excesses in combat and building respect for human rights, improving social and economic conditions for a marginalized peasantry, and fashioning competent, widely trusted, government institutions.

Unfortunately, in the long run policymakers in both the United States and Colombia chose to narrow the focus of the Special Team's wide-ranging counterinsurgency strategy. Ultimately they failed to recognize that counterinsurgency is **not** a military strategy, it is a political strategy with a derivative military component. The larger nation-building concept envisioned in the original Special Team report was supplanted instead by a narrow operational focus on liquidating guerrilla-bandit groups.

Thus by privileging security and order over development and democratization, by focusing primarily on military repression of radical actors rather than a long-term commitment to civic action and the amelioration of structural factors that exacerbated internal tensions, policymakers ensured containment – but not resolution – of the violence problem.

Fourth, it is noteworthy that important fault-lines in the domestic organization of the Colombian state – structural discontinuities that remain apparent to the present day – augmented the violence problem. In Colombia, political mobilization of the population after World War II eroded the structure of a society already burdened by regional differences, elite control over the institutions of power, and a certain cultural acceptance of violence. Inefficient and partisan security forces further aggravated this volatile situation.[399] Issues of land distribution, a widening gap between rich and poor, polarized political loyalties, and a political system inadequately prepared to adapt to changing expectations, the spread of new ideas, and the uneven impact of modernization further exacerbated internal tensions. As for the judicial system, as one Colombian Minister of Justice declared, 'justice was not operative in Colombia.'[400]

While the first two National Front governments did enact reforms that substantially reduced social grievances and political dissent throughout the country, retrenchment of Colombia's political elite after 1966 rekindled these same tensions. In response to failing oligarchical control, new urban radical and rural insurgent organizations emerged, promoting armed struggle and revolutionary alternatives to the existing political system.[401]

Lack of political will to reform Colombia's social, economic, and political infrastructure ensured that the National Front became a means for conducting 'interoligarchical relations,'[402] rather than a system of government dedicated to building a fully-functional, democratic society. In the post-National Front period little progress has

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[399] ARMLIC: Preconflict Case Study 2-Colombia (CMH Archives), pp.xii, 9-10.
[400] Violence in Colombia: A Case Study (LBJL), p.25.
[401] Bruce Michael Bagley, 'The State and the Peasantry in Contemporary Colombia,' *Latin American Issues* No.6 (1988), pp.3.

been made to enact wide-ranging structural reform. As a result policymakers today must address many of the same structural weaknesses that have plagued the Colombian state throughout much of its history in order to deepen democratization and weaken insurgent groups that promote radical political alternatives.

A fifth lesson that can be drawn from this investigation is that while no exclusively military solution exists, counterinsurgency operations remain a key element to solving Colombia's violence problems. The efficacy of US-Colombian counterinsurgency efforts during the latter phase of the *Violencia* period must be evaluated from both a short and long-term perspective. In the first instance, reconstituting the government under the National Front system allowed Colombian policymakers to generate security and development strategies to contain the *Violencia* and avoid a wider social revolution.

But even if Bogotá had dealt more effectively with that nation's social grievances in the long run, the dynamic of revolutionary warfare – that is, the manifestation of 'an alternative political body'[403] in the form of an organized insurgent movement such as the FARC – requires an ongoing commitment to a counterinsurgency strategy that neutralizes the ability of any underground organization to seize power. Successive Colombian governments have lacked this commitment to the present day.

The dynamic of insurgency leaves only three basic options open to the state: (1) destruction of the insurgent organization; (2) a negotiated settlement that incorporates ex-guerrilla fighters into the body politic; or (3) unresolved, ongoing low-intensity conflict. In Colombia, option three prevails. The failure of the Pastrana peace initiative coupled to the growing strength of the FARC presages either state collapse or a wider conflict under

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[402] Sánchez, 'The Violence: An Interpretative Synthesis,' *Violence in Colombia: The Contemporary Crisis in Historical Perspective*, p.113.

a new, hard-line government. The fact that US officials have publicly declared that, 'the political stomach [in Washington] for going into the counterinsurgency business is zero,'[404] means a continued mismatch of strategic interests between the two countries that threatens any long-term solution to the current crisis in Colombia.

A final lesson that can be drawn from this historical analysis – and perhaps the most important one as regards the current crisis in Colombia – is the need for policymakers to recognize that security of the Colombian state is not necessarily commensurate with security of its citizenry. More than fifty years after the murder of Gaitán, Colombia continues to survive largely under conditions of widespread internal violence. Today problems revolve around the issues of narcotics trafficking, insurgent warfare, and the decay of the Colombian state. The response is *Plan Colombia*: a policy initiative that attempts to combine counter-narcotics and institution-building strategies with a negotiated settlement to that nation's long-running insurgent war.

Fixated on the drug war, policymakers in the US – working in tandem with their Colombian counterparts – need to refocus their efforts towards the following interconnected policy agenda. First, a multilateral, cooperative approach to countering the narcotics problem is required that deals with issues concerning consumption as well as production, decouples national security from the wider spectrum of social, economic, and political issues between Colombia, the United States, and other nations in the region, and lastly has as its primary focus a strategy based on harm reduction.[405]

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[403] Marks, *Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam*, p.263.
[404] US Ambassador to Colombia Anne Patterson as quoted by Juan O. Tamayo, 'Training for war on drugs to go on,' *Miami Herald*, 26 July 2001, p.1.
[405] Bagley and Tokatlian, 'Dope and Dogma: Explaining the Failure of US-Latin American Drug Policies' in Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas (eds.) *The United States and Latin America in the 1990s*, p.228-33.

Second, in the short-term policymakers must secure the stability of the Colombian state. A fundamental manifestation of a modern state is its 'monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.'[406] but Colombia today, in counterpoint to this classic definition, endures instead under conditions of 'multiple sovereignty.'[407] Given the dynamics of the armed conflict in Colombia, a situation now exists between government, insurgent, and paramilitary forces in which:

> . . . (1) competing interest groups are so violently opposed on highly salient issues that their differences cannot be reconciled within the current political system, and (2) two or more competing groups have sufficient resources – political, financial, organizational, military – to establish "sovereignty" over a substantial political or military base, and thus to seek to achieve their goals by force.[408]

Conditions of multiple sovereignty will force Colombian policymakers to counter these threats to state stability using some variation of the following, basic, two-track policy. First, they must concentrate security efforts on neutralizing the clandestine infrastructure and military power of insurgent groups and secondly, they must conjoin counterinsurgency operations with legal, state-sponsored, internationally monitored, civil defense groups – an effective and proven 'force multiplier'[409] – in order to eliminate the power vacuum that has allowed paramilitary forces to expand exponentially.

In the long run, policymakers must focus their efforts towards building a more democratic and inclusive society in Colombia, constructing a policy which recognizes

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[406] Max Weber, 'Politics as a Vocation' in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. And trans), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946) as cited in Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.ix.

[407] Goldstone, 'Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation,' *World Politics* 32/3 (April 1980), p.429.

[408] Ibid.

[409] Daniel W. Tomlinson, 'Civil Defense in Colombia During Internal Conflict,' MA Thesis (San Diego, CA: University of California, San Diego, 2001), p.47 (as per final draft copy Tomlinson to author).

that achieving state security 'is not synonymous with the security of the nation.'[410] At this present juncture ensuring state stability is vital, but an equal, long-term commitment to democratization, social reform, institutional development, and economic progress is needed to ensure that Colombia's problems are finally resolved from a human security perspective.[411]

[410] Cathryn L. Thorup, 'Refashioning a National Security Agenda for the 1990s: The Dilemmas of Redefinition' in Bruce Michael Bagley and Sergio Aguayo Quezada (eds.) *Mexico: In Search of Security* (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami North-South Center, 1993), p.92.

[411] For articles that address issues of national interest, sovereignty, and human security from a new perspective see Bagley and Quezada (eds.) *Mexico: In Search of Security*.

APPENDIX 1 - PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL MAP OF COLOMBIA

Source: ARMLIC: Preconflict Case Study 2-Colombia, p.v, CMH Archives

APPENDIX 2 - COLOMBIA'S EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS

Source: Bohannan Papers, CS-Chapter 2: The Violence Problem, HIA

APPENDIX 3 - OVERT ORGANIZATION



Source: Bohannan Papers, RUS-Annex I, HIA

APPENDIX 4 - COVERT ORGANIZATION

COVERT ORGANIZATION



Source: Bohannan Papers, RUS-Annex I, HIA

APPENDIX 5 - COLOMBIAN TROOP DEPLOYMENTS

(1) 1 brigade -- Tunja (2) 2 brigade -- Barranquilla (3) 3 brigade -- Cali,
(4) 4 brigade -- Medellin (5) 5 brigade -- Bucaramanga (6) 6 brigade -- Ibaque
(7) School brigade -- Bogotá (7 brigade -- Villavicencio) (8) 8 brigade -- Armenia

Source: ARMLIC: Preconflict Case Study 2-Colombia, pp.231-33, CMH Archives

APPENDIX 6 - COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN COLOMBIA



Locality No.	Name	Estimated No. Party Members	Estimated No. Influenced	Estimated Military Str.
1	Ciénaga	500	2,000	250
2	Marquetalia	100	400	50
3	Armenia (Rural)	500	2,000	200
4	Líbano (Rural)	1,500	6,000	500
5	East of Ambalema	?	?	?
6	Viotá Region	7,500	30,000	3,000
7	Río Negro	200	800	75
8	Sumapaz	2,300	9,000	2,000
9	Llanos	1,300	2,600	200
10	Ataco	700	800	50
11	Dolores	500	2,000	150
12	Alto Caquetá	5,000	15,000	1,000
13	Gaitania	1,000	4,000	300
14	Río Ciman[illegible]	100	300	-
	TOTALS	18,000	75,000	7,775

Source: Bohannan Papers, CS-Chapter 9: Communism in Colombia, HIA

APPENDIX 7 - LLANOS-AMAZONAS NATIONAL TERRITORIES NET



Source: *Colombia Document*, Inclosure No.1, CMH Archives

APPENDIX 8 - EARLY WARNING CIVIL DEFENSE NETS



Source: *Colombia Document*, Inclosure No.2, CMH Archives

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